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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF USING SECURITY FRAMES ON GLOBAL AGENDA SETTING 
AND POLICY MAKING 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
 
SIRIN DUYGULU ELCIM, B.A., SABANCI UNIVERSITY 
M.A., KOC UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Charli Carpenter   
 
Why do transnational advocacy campaigns on environmental, health, human 
rights or humanitarian causes sometimes (but not always) frame these problems as 
security issues? This is an important question because there is an under-analyzed 
assumption made by some transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and securitization 
studies scholars that framing an issue as a security threat has an overall positive effect on 
convincing states to take actions in addressing transnational social problems. The lack of 
systematic comparison across cases limits our ability to reveal the advocates’ motivations 
in adopting security frames and the contrasting effects that securitization might have at 
various stages of advocacy campaigns. It is crucial to address this question as it will help 
us better understand the sources of transnational advocacy campaigns’ influence over 
states as well as the inner dynamics of advocacy strategies.  
The study conducts a systematic comparative analysis of thirty-eight transnational 
advocacy campaigns to test whether the assumed correlation between using security 
frames and reaching advocacy success would hold when analyzed comparatively. The 
viii 
 
study then takes a closer look at the question by conducting a comparative 
analysis of nine cases and an illustrative analysis of a securitized campaign 
(Conflict Diamonds) to address the similarities between securitization and other 
acts of framing as well as to shed light onto the inner dynamics of securitization.  
Based on this analysis, the study argues that rather than being unique and 
correlated to transnational advocacy success, as argued by the literature, security 
frames operate like any other frame, and in order for such framing decisions to 
translate into advocacy success they need to coexist with an enabling strategic 
environment. The study also provides insights into the conditions that shape 
advocates’ framing choices. In addition to the widely cited role of the broader 
political context, the study also finds the advocacy networks’ own dynamics as 
well as the advocates’ previous experiences and their fields of expertise to be 
important in shaping their framing choices. The study also argues that advocates 
engage in multivocalization, which refers to the inclination of the advocates to 
invoke multiple frames simultaneously to reach out not only to targets of 
influence but also to potential allies with the goal of strengthening their networks. 
The analysis also reveals that the motivations behind adopting security 
frames are more complex than appreciated by the securitization literature in two 
ways: (i) a security frame does not have to be tailored toward states or security 
organizations, it can also be crafted to get the attention and the cooperation of 
non-state actors; and (ii) a security frame might appeal to an audience not 
necessarily because of the security threat it voices but because of the non-security 
concerns it silences.   
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The Puzzle  
 “Ebola is a growing threat to regional and global security.”1 
Barack Obama, President of the United States 
“Many of us used to think of AIDS as a health issue. We were wrong…nothing 
we have seen is a greater challenge to the peace and stability of African societies 
than the epidemic of AIDS…we face a major development crisis, and more than 
that, a security crisis.”2 
James Wolfensohn, Former Head of the World Bank 
 “Among the future trends that will impact our national security is climate 
change.”3 
2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap 
“Sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to 
deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed 
conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security.”4 
 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1820 
Statements such as those above suggest that a variety of very different problems 
constitute “threats to national security.” The connection drawn between these concerns 
and national security is not an organic one, but rather a construct. Yet, identifying these 
issues as security threats was not necessarily the only way to highlight their 
importance; moreover, not every problem gets portrayed as a security threat before 
garnering international attention. 
                                                 
1
 “Ebola is a ‘National Security Priority,’ Obama says,” CNN, 8 September 2014, available at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/07/politics/ebola-national-security-obama/>, accessed 10 October 2014. 
2
 Cited in Singer 2002.  
3
 US Department of Defense, 13 October 2014.  
4
 UNSC/RES/1820, 19 June 2008.  
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Why do transnational advocacy campaigns on environmental, health, human 
rights, or humanitarian causes sometimes (but not always) frame these problems as 
security issues? This question is an important one because, despite numerous 
observations about the use of security frames by transnational advocacy campaigns, we 
know surprisingly little about the factors that shape advocates’ decisions to use security 
frames for some campaigns and not the others. Additionally, a dearth of knowledge exists 
concerning the conditions that translate such framing choices into advocacy success. Our 
limited understanding of the dynamics of securitization leaves assumptions about the 
utility of security frames untested, and also curtails the insights we have into securitized 
campaigns’ advocacy strategies. 
 The conventional answer to this question comes from the securitization theory. 
According to this literature security is not an objective reality
5
 but an articulated one 
which means, when successfully executed, any issue can be framed as a security threat 
through language.
6
 The studies that apply securitization theory to transnational advocacy 
campaigns observe the success of a number of campaigns such as women, peace and 
security
7
 and conflict diamonds
8
  and argue that advocates achieve their goals by using 
security frames as states are more likely to take action when they perceive their security 
                                                 
5
 Waever 1995.  
6
 Buzan et al. 1998.  
7
 Hudson 2010.  
8
 For instance Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), one of the leading non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the fight against conflict diamonds, describe the problem of conflict diamonds through the role 
these diamonds play in financing civil wars. “During the 1990s and into the beginning of this century, rebel 
armies in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) exploited the alluvial 
diamond fields of these countries in order to finance wars of insurgency… hundreds of thousands of people 
died as a direct result of these wars, and many more died of indirect causes. Millions of people were 
displaced, health and educational infrastructure was destroyed, and development was reversed.” 
(“Diamonds, Death and Destruction: A History,” available at <http://www.pacweb.org/en/diamonds-death-
and-destruction>, accessed 1 May 2014.) 
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to be threatened.
9
 Therefore, according to these studies, the reasons behind advocates’ 
attempts to securitize their campaigns are self-explanatory and are embedded in the 
unquestionable primacy of security concerns on states’ agendas. 
 Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom leaves us with a puzzle. Despite the 
straightforward logic that securitization literature sees behind various attempts to utilize 
security frames,  the studies within the transnational advocacy networks (TANs) literature 
illustrate that many of the most successful advocacy campaigns ranging from the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
10
 and Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM) Campaign
11
 to Campaign for International Criminal Court
12
  were either non-
securitized (i.e. did not use a security frame) or explicitly de-securitized (i.e. the issue 
was deliberately brought out of the security frame). Such examples challenge the primacy 
that securitization literature attaches to security frames. Moreover, as a number of studies 
concluded, even though security frames have a positive impact in attracting states’ 
attention to an issue in the short-run, using security frames becomes an impediment in 
front of properly addressing the problem at hand in the long-run as securitizing an issue 
brings it out of the realm of politics and hence out of the reach of the civil actors.
13
 These 
                                                 
9
 Hudson 2010.  
10
 ICBL owes its success to its ability to de-securitize the issue by downplaying the military utility of the 
landmines and emphasizing the humanitarian consequences, instead (Price 1998; Hubert 2000).  
11
 No Peace without Justice uses a human rights frame and evaluates the UN General Assembly’s decision 
to adopt a worldwide ban on female genital mutilation as a “paradigm shift in the fight against this 
widespread and systematic human rights violation, committed against millions of girls and women in 
Africa and around the world” (“Ban FGM Campaign,” available at <http://www.npwj.org/FGM/BAN-
FGM-CAMPAIGN.html>, accessed 9 December 2014).  
12
 Coalition for the International Criminal Court uses a human rights frame and defines the purpose of the 
campaign as “the global fight to end genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity through a 
commitment to the core values of human rights and justice” (“Coalition for the ICC,” available at 
http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/coalition-icc>, accessed 22 May 2014). 
13
 Such as the sidelining of the civil actors in dealing with HIV/AIDS (Elbe 2006) and changing dynamics 
of international aid where the criteria for distribution changed from “need” to “lack of connection with 
terrorist groups” (Woods 2005; Mawdsley 2007). 
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findings further problematize the securitization literature’s reasoning in explaining 
advocates’ decisions to use security frames.   
In this dissertation, I argue that “securitization” of social problems is not a 
uniquely effective strategy for influencing states. Rather, it is my claim that using 
security frames is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transnational 
advocacy campaigns’ success. On the contrary, I argue that security frames function like 
any other frame and therefore, their connection to advocacy success is mediated by the 
strategic environment within which the campaigns operate. I also argue that the 
advocates’ motivations in using security frames are not necessarily a function of their 
desire to appeal to security concerns of state actors (as argued by the literature). 
Advocates’ decision to use security frames can also be a function of their desire to appeal 
to non-security concerns of state and non-state actors who could both be targets of 
influence or potential allies.  
I build this study on the observation that the limited dialogue between 
securitization, TANs and framing literatures is the source of our limited understanding of 
the reasons behind advocates’ use of security frames.14  This study contributes to such 
dialogue by treating securitization as an instance of framing and by comparatively testing 
the claims made about securitization. The study conducts a systematic comparative 
analysis of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns to test whether the assumed 
correlation between using security frames and reaching advocacy success would hold 
                                                 
14
 This observation is built on a newly-developing literature that highlights the need to increase the dialogue 
between framing and securitization literatures (Such as Watson 2011; 2012; Pinto 2014). For instance, 
Watson problematizes the lack of such dialogue by stating that “scholars working within these frameworks 
generally do not draw on the other body of literature to inform theoretical development or to accumulate 
cases. This has resulted in the production of parallel literatures and the duplication of concepts, 
terminology, and has hindered the development of theory” (Watson 2012, 279). 
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when analyzed comparatively. The study then takes a closer look by conducting a 
comparative analysis of nine cases and an illustrative analysis of a securitized 
(Conflict Diamonds) to address the similarities between securitization and other 
framing as well as to shed light onto the inner dynamics of securitization.  
 My findings contribute to the analytical purchase of the securitization literature by 
comparatively testing the under-analyzed assumptions developed by the literature and by 
identifying the conditions under which these assumptions hold. My findings also speak to 
the broader literature on TANs by contributing to the insights we have into the dynamics 
of advocacy strategies and their role in successful norm-building.  
Relevance of the Research Question 
 What triggers the research question is the discrepancy between the uniqueness 
that the securitization literature attributes to the advocates’ use of security frames and 
what we know about transnational advocacy campaigns in general. While the former 
argues that securitization brings success by helping advocates appeal to states’ security 
concerns, the latter teaches us that even though strategically packaging issues in 
particular ways (framing) is an important component of advocacy success, such 
connection is mediated by the political opportunity structure within which advocates 
operate. Moreover, the existence of successful cases of non-securitized and de-securitized 
campaigns sheds further doubt on the claims of the securitization studies. The 
contradictory evidence does not disprove the argued connection between securitization 
and advocacy success; rather, it illustrates the need for a more rigorous analysis in order 
to understand the exact dynamics of securitization and its connection to advocacy 
success.  
6 
 
  Securitization is broadly defined as the “positioning through language of a 
particular issue as an existential threat to security.”15 The prominence that securitization 
literature attaches to security frames is built on the insights of traditional approaches to 
international security and the idea that states’ primary interests are to conserve and 
increase their power and security.
16
  Securitization literature is built on this argument and 
accepts that states care about their security more than anything else. The literature 
distinguishes itself from the traditional view by claiming that what states consider as 
threats to their security is open to interpretation.
17
 Thus, according to the securitization 
literature, anything can be framed as a security threat (when done properly).
18
  
 The goal behind securitizing issues is to prioritize them on political agendas. As 
Sheehan explains, “to securitize an issue not previously deemed to be a security issue is 
to challenge society to promote it higher in its scale of values and to commit greater 
resources to solving the related problems.”19 Securitization is argued to lead to 
“prioritizing some issues instead of others, the transformation of the political 
communities that are supposed to be protected, the legitimizing of security practices and 
the empowerment of actors that can contrast specific threats.”20 Thus, by framing issues 
as security threats “elites may implement a wide range of extraordinary measures in 
response to a growing number of issues and developments by drawing on the discourse 
and practice of security.”21 
                                                 
15
 Hudson 2010, 30. 
16
 Kennan 1985. 
17
 Such as Waever 1995; Buzan Waever, and Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2005. 
18
 Such as Ullman 1983; Wæver, Jahn, and Lemaitre 1987; Buzan 1991; Tickner 1992; Buzan et al. 1998; 
Balzacq 2005. 
19
 Sheenan 2005, 52. 
20
 Trombetta 2011, 138.  
21
 Watson 2011, 4. 
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While attributing a unique role to securitization in setting agendas, the 
literature also acknowledges the negative implications of using security frames, as 
such a move “takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames 
the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”22 Thus, 
securitizing an issue on the one hand prioritizes it on political agendas, and on the 
other hand legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures in dealing with it, which 
is not desirable from a democratic perspective.  
The securitization literature focuses on the use of the security language by 
the elite (the securitizing actor) who engages in such process with the goal of 
legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures in the eyes of other elites and the 
public (the audience).
23
 Those who apply the securitization literature to the study 
of global politics suggest that transnational advocacy campaigns themselves can 
utilize the security language in an attempt to get the state actors to prioritize an 
issue on their agendas.
24
   
Whether transnational advocacy campaigns use security frames matters 
because, as sizeable literature illustrates, various non-state actors, among which 
transnational advocacy campaigns play a significant role, have the ability to shape 
global political agendas and force states and international organizations to address 
                                                 
22
 Buzan et al. 1998, 23. For instance, in the case of environmental protection Barnett (2001, 83) discusses 
how attempts to securitize environment “transform[ed] environmental problems into security issues” and 
led to “the spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic” even when the motivations 
behind this transition were different.  
23
 Charrett 2009. 
24
 Securitization literature is argued to have a “state centric reading of security” (Floyd 2007) which has 
been a source of criticisms raised against the literature as it is argued to be close to the “mainstream 
approaches to security” (Smith 2005). 
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transnational problems.
25
 Some of the most important developments in global politics 
were products of such advocacy efforts. For instance, ICBL
26
 and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions
27
 are vivid examples of how transnational advocacy campaigns can 
trigger a world-wide action to incorporate various concerns into international law.  
 Transnational advocacy campaigns are groups of actors who share normative 
concerns and work internationally with the goal of changing states’ and other actors’ 
behaviors.
28
 Even though transnational advocacy campaigns are guided by moral 
principles, they are also strategic actors.
29
 They need to act strategically not only to 
convince target actors to take action, but also to get ahead of other campaigns with 
similarly worthy causes and get a share from very limited political and economic 
resources that the global community is willing to spare.
30
  
The need to juggle these dynamics across different stages of global agenda setting 
and policy making forces transnational advocacy campaigns to engage in various 
strategies, one of which is framing issues to make them more appealing to target actors’ 
                                                 
25
 Such as epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Parson 2003); think-tanks (Stone 2001); and celebrities 
(Cooper 2007; Huliaras and Tzifakis 2010). 
26
 “The ICBL provided support for national campaigns worldwide, and by May 1996 the ICBL consisted of 
some six hundred NGO members from forty countries. As a direct result of their activities the issue 
received widespread coverage in newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and even comic books. 
Members of the campaign lobbied the editorial boards of major media outlets, and with no small success: 
the New York Times, Washington Post, and Economist, among dozens of others, have endorsed the ban” 
(Price 1998, 621). 
27
 “[T]he international acceptance of this treaty, which commits states to destroy their stockpiles of cluster 
munitions within an eight year timeframe, represents a major accomplishment for the CMC [Cluster 
Munition Coalition]” (Clarke 2008, 10).  
28
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a.  
29
 Keck and Sikkink (1999, 90) describeTANs as “simultaneously principled and strategic actors.”  
Similarly Sell and Prakash (2004, 143) define advocacy networks as interest groups “driven by normative 
ideals and material concerns.” For further discussion on various strategies employed by transnational actors 
see such as Cooley and Ron 2002; Henderson 2002; Sell and Prakash 2004; Bob 2005; Hertel 2006; 
Burnstein 2007; Bloodgood 2011. 
30
 As Cooley and Ron (2002, 6) state “the transnational sector” is characterized by “organizational 
insecurity, competitive pressures, and fiscal uncertainty.” 
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normative and material sensibilities.
31
 Framing can be defined as “the strategic 
packaging of new ideas and interpretations,”32 and it is important not only because 
it gives meaning to issues that have not been previously considered as worthy of 
attention, but also because it determines which actors are included in the issue and 
which ones are left in the margins.
33
   
 The studies that apply the insights of the securitization literature to the study of 
transnational advocacy campaigns treat securitization as a unique process that is different 
from other acts of framing. The studies show that the advocates themselves use security 
frames in various issue areas ranging from women’s rights34 to illegal wildlife trade. 35 
The logic that these studies argue in these attempts to securitize is straightforward: states 
care about their security more than anything else; therefore, appealing to their security 
concerns increases an advocacy campaign’s chances at success.36 For instance, attempts 
on the part of both advocates and policymakers to emphasize the security implications of 
                                                 
31
 As Keck and Sikkink (1999, 90) “…transnational advocacy networks ‘frame’ issues to make them 
comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to ‘fit’ with favourable 
institutional venues.” Also see Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002.  
32
 Joachim 2007, 19. The idea that frames matter was born in sociology (Goffman 1974) and first applied 
by the social movements literature within political science (such as Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 
1988; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). 
33
 Bob 2005; 2008; Carpenter 2005; 2007; Hudson 2010.  
34
 For instance Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) defines the importance of 
women’s rights based on the contribution they would make to peace and suggests that “the exclusion of 
women, women’s rights and gender remains a key impediment to the attainment of sustainable peace and 
human security, and must not be ignored!” (“Gender, Peace and Security,” available at 
<http://www.wilpfinternational.org/what-we-do/gender-peace-and-security/>, accessed 1 February 2015.)  
35
 World Wildlife Fund (WWF), for instance, draws a clear link between wildlife trade and national 
security and asks the states to take immediate action as “the wildlife trade appears to fund terrorist cells in 
unstable African countries – threatening national security – and that the industry often uses the same 
networks and routes as other illegal trades, such as drug trafficking.” (“Illegal wildlife trade 'threatening 
national security', says WWF,” The Guardian, available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/dec/12/wildlife-trafficking-national-security-wwf>, 
accessed 1 December 2014.) 
36
 Securitization accomplishes this goal by “dramatizing” and “presenting” an issue as one of “supreme” 
priority (Trombetta 2011, 138).  
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women’s rights and gender inequality has paved the way to a UNSC Resolution37 which 
in return became a “landmark step in raising awareness of the impact of armed conflict 
on women and girls and acknowledging the vital role of women as agents in conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding.”38  
Despite the straightforward logic that the studies see in the advocates’ use of 
of security frames, we know from a wide array of studies within the TANs literature that 
literature that even though framing is an important component of successfully setting 
setting agendas and initiating global policies, the connection between strategically 
framing an issue and advocacy success is not a direct or an inevitable one. Rather, it 
it depends on the strategic environment within which campaigns operate.
39
  These factors 
factors range from the opportunities and limitations that the broader political context 
context presents
40
 to the attributes of the issue at hand.
41
 Yet the uniqueness attached to 
security frames overlooks these conditions and attempts to explain success based solely 
on the presence of the security discourse.  
Another problem that comes with treating securitization as a unique process rather 
than as an instance of framing is the limited ability that these studies have in explaining 
the advocates’ decision to use security frames in the face of the long-term implications of 
doing so. Despite the level of importance attached to security frames in explaining 
                                                 
37
 S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000. The Resolution “reaffirm[s] the important role of women in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stress[es] the importance of their equal 
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, 
and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution” 
(emphasis in the original). 
38
 Hudson 2009, 58. 
39
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Florini 1999; Higgot et al. 2000; Khagram et al. 2002; Cooley and Ron 2002; 
Ferree et al. 2002; Price 2003; Bob 2005; Davies 2007; Bocşe 2011; Carpenter 2011; 2014; Carpenter et al. 
2014.   
40
 For instance “symbolic events” such as meetings and disasters can provide “windows of opportunity” for 
advocates to alter the agenda (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ferree et al. 2002).  
41
 Problems that have certain qualities, such as ones that create physical damage, are more amenable to 
advocacy work as it is easier to illustrate the damage (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
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advocacy success, the studies that evaluate the long-term policy implications of 
securitization concede that securitization removes the needs and demands of the 
vulnerable populations from the focus of the policy making and replaces them 
security concerns of states. For instance, Elbe claims that securitization of 
significantly narrowed the room for maneuver that civil organizations have in 
to the issue.
42
 From the securitization literature’s perspective, as discussed above, 
negative long-term implications are evaluated as inevitable downsides of 
prioritizing an issue on the global agenda.
43
  
The portrayal of negative long-term implications of using security frames 
as an inevitable price to pay for getting your voice heard does not necessarily 
hold. As TANs literature illustrates transnational advocacy campaigns can 
succeed without using security frames or by effectively de-securitizing their 
causes. For instance, the Child Soldiers campaign succeeded using human rights 
and humanitarian frames
44
 and without resorting to a security frame despite the 
security implications of the use of children for military purposes. The Maternal 
Mortality campaign also thrived as a human rights and development issue and 
found a place on the Millennium Development Goals
45
 alongside the HIV/AIDS 
campaign which did adopt a security frame. Thus, if it is possible to achieve 
success without using a security frame, we need to take a closer look at the 
reasons behind advocates’ framing choices in order to understand why they 
choose such a risky frame.  
                                                 
42
 Elbe 2006.  
43
 Buzan et al. 1998.  
44
 Maslen 1998.  
45
 “The Right to Health,” available at <http://www.care.org/work/health/maternal-health>, accessed 1 May 
2014. 
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While claiming a connection between the use of security frames and successfully 
getting the targets of influence to address an issue, securitization literature itself does not 
claim that every attempt to securitize would succeed.
46
 Securitization literature 
distinguishes between securitizing moves and successful securitization and identifies 
“facilitating factors” that need to exist for such an attempt to succeed.47 Thus, 
securitization literature accounts for unsuccessful attempts to securitize an issue and the 
failure to prioritize an issue on a political agenda as a result of it. Yet the narrow focus of 
the securitization literature limits its ability to account for (i) the issues that find a place 
on the agenda without being securitized; (ii) the issues that get successfully securitized 
but do not trigger political interest or lead to policy change; and (iii) the issues that find a 
place on the agenda once they were de-securitized.  
The successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns, 
combined with the lasting negative implications of using security frames, put the 
straightforward logic that the conventional wisdom presents in explaining the reasons 
behind securitization into question. Rather than disproving the connection between 
securitization and advocacy success, the contradictory evidence highlights the need for a 
rigorous analysis in testing the connection between securitization and success, as well as 
in illustrating the reasons behind advocates’ decisions to use security frames.  
                                                 
46
 Theoretically anybody can utilize the security frame but securitization literature argues that attempts to 
securitize an issue (securitizing moves) would only succeed when security discourse is utilized by those 
who have the capacity to influence the public’s opinion (Buzan et al. 1998).   
47
 According to the securitization literature the mere act of calling something a security threat does not 
automatically translate the issue into one. The success of such an attempt is conditioned upon the 
acceptance of the audience, i.e. the actors whose perceptions and actions that the securitizing actor (i.e. the 
author) aims to change. As Buzan et al. discuss an “issue is securitized only if and when the audience 
accepts it as such,” therefore, “securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience” (Buzan 
et al. 1998; 25, 33). For instance, Salter uses the examples of abandoned American counterterrorism 
programs (The Total Information Awareness Program, the Terrorist Futures Market and Terrorist 
Information Protection System) to illustrate that how even in a fertile atmosphere (war on terror) a 
securitizing move can be rejected by the audience (Salter 2011, 116). 
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What is Missing from the Existing Studies and Why it is Important to Explore This 
Question? 
 
The existing studies fall short of answering these questions due to both 
conceptual and methodological limitations. The dialogue between TANs, framing, 
and securitization literatures is mostly a unidirectional one where the former two 
utilize the insights of the securitization studies. The inadequate dialogue curtails 
the securitization literature’s ability to test their assumptions about the uniqueness 
of security frames and explain the dynamics of securitization.  
The limited information flow is mainly a function of the way the literature 
defines securitization. As Watson summarizes, “securitization theory presents 
‘security’ as a unique discourse with a distinct logic and political effect.”48 Such 
an approach limits the attempts to treat securitization as an instance of framing 
and to identify the complex mechanisms involved in it. Yet, as Vultee discusses 
by comparing Entman and Buzan et al’s arguments, “[f]rames help make clear 
what kind of a problem a problem is, what sort of tools are used for dealing with 
it, and which actors are protagonists.”49 If the main function of framing is “to 
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text,”50 “securitization is a form of framing that highlights the 
existential threat of an issue.”51 
Treating securitization as a unique process rather than as an instance of 
framing is problematic because it limits (i) these studies’ ability to appreciate 
various dynamics that are at play in shaping advocates’ decisions to choose a 
                                                 
48
 Watson 2012, 289. 
49
 Entman 2004. 
50
 Entman 1993, 53. 
51
 Buzan et al. 1998, 22-23; Vultee 2011, 79. 
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security frame over other alternatives, (ii) the studies’ capacity to explain the conditions 
under which such choices translate into advocacy success, and (iii) their ability to account 
for successful examples of non-securitized or de-securitized campaigns.
52
  
Treating securitization as a unique process also limits the insights that the 
literature provides into the dynamics of securitization. The literature’s perception of 
securitization as essentially an “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”53 restricts the attempts to 
systematically explain the conditions that surround the processes of securitization. 
Moreover, the literature also argues that this intersubjective process occurs when a 
securitizing actor (actor that utilizes the security language) convinces an audience (the 
target actor) to tackle an existential threat through the need of immediate action.
54
 Yet the 
literature does not detail out which particular audience that the frame is tailored towards
55
 
and why exactly an audience should be persuaded by the claims put forward by the 
securitizing actor (other than the importance that the audience is expected to attach to its 
security concerns.)
56
 Such an analysis overlooks multiplicity of audiences and alternative 
strategic reasons that an audience might have in accepting claims of security. Applying 
the insights of the TANs and framing literatures would not devalue the contribution of the 
                                                 
52
 For instance, in criticizing the lack of dialogue between framing and securitization literatures Watson 
(2011, 4) uses the example of policies developed as a reaction to 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and he 
suggests that “unparalleled funding from both public and private sources” were mobilized as a result of 
framing of the issue as a humanitarian crisis rather than as a security threat. Similarly, the examples of how 
non-security frames are utilized in justifying the use of extraordinary measures (such as the use of 
humanitarianism “to justify military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, 
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Iraq and Afghanistan”) (Watson 2011, 4; De Waal and Omaar, 1994; Wheeler, 2004; Roth, 2004) 
show the limits of the securitization literature’s analytical purchase.  
53
 Buzan et al. 1998, 25.  
54
 Waever 1995. 
55
 For instance, the security language adopted by the Conflict Diamonds case initially had the diamond 
industry as its target audience (Smillie 2002a). 
56
 Balzacq 2005; 2011.  
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securitization literature; on the contrary, it would help the literature provide more 
nuanced arguments about the inner dynamics of securitization. 
Another limitation comes from the lack of comparative studies that 
role of security frames in transnational advocacy campaigns. The literature is 
composed of single case studies and edited volumes. These studies provide in-
knowledge on the history of different campaigns. For instance, Hudson’s detailed 
on securitization of women’s rights issues not only tracks how the issue found a 
the UNSC agenda, but also discusses the contribution such a venue change made 
for the efforts of the advocates and the policy makers.
57
 Elbe and Vieira analyze 
the securitization of HIV/AIDS and discuss both the opportunities
58
 and the 
limitations
59
 that securitization presented for the advocates in addressing the needs 
and rights of vulnerable populations. Cook,
60
 Huysmans,
61
 Sasse
62
 and Kinney
63
 
present similar analyses for the securitization of human trafficking and 
immigrants’ rights and mostly criticize the long-term implications of reframing 
these issues as security threats. Despite the insights that these studies provide into 
these specific cases, the lack of comparative analysis limits their ability to reliably 
test the extent to which the outcome of the campaign they analyzed was a function 
of the security frame.  
                                                 
57
 Hudson 2010.  
58
 Vieira (2007) traces the role that securitization played in turning the fight with HIV/AIDS to an 
“international norm.” 
59
 Elbe (2006) discusses how securitization of HIV/AIDS narrowed the room for maneuver for NGOs. 
60
 Cook (2010) analyzes the dilemmas that advocates face in promoting human rights for migrants within 
securitized national agendas.  
61
 Huysmans (2006) analyzes the gradual securitization of migration, asylum and refugee issues in the 
European Union in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.  
62
 Sasse (2005, 673) analyzes the “security-right nexus” of minority and migrants issues and argues that 
“minority and migration issues and their conceptual interlock have a clear security dimension, but that 
these concerns are best addressed through rights-based policies.” 
63
 Kinney (2011) tracks the framing choices of the transnational advocacy campaigns against human 
trafficking and analyzes how such choices shape these campaigns’ interactions with different actors.  
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Edited volumes also suffer from similar limitations; they mostly focus on 
providing parallel stories analyzed from a particular perspective rather than testing the 
the validity of claims across cases. For instance, a relatively recent volume edited by 
by Thierry Balzacq
64
 is an attempt to not only contribute to the securitization literature’s 
literature’s theoretical clarity but it is also an attempt to show how securitization was 
was experienced in different issue areas ranging from environment
65
 to HIV/AIDS.
66
 Yet, 
HIV/AIDS.
66
 Yet, while the insights developed by the empirical chapters are utilized to 
illustrate the mechanisms behind the creation and dissolution of security issues, they do 
not systematically test these claims across issue areas. Thus, despite valuable insights 
these studies provide, they fall short of testing the claims about the significance of 
security frames across cases due to their narrow focus and their methodological 
limitations. In order to fill this gap, studies that systematically compare securitized, non-
securitized, and de-securitized examples of successful and unsuccessful advocacy 
campaigns are needed.  
Addressing these limitations is important for securitization, TANs and framing 
literatures. First, we need to get a better sense of what function security frames perform 
and under which conditions they correlate with advocacy success, as gaining these 
insights would enhance the analytical purchase of the securitization literature. Second, 
addressing these limitations is also important in expanding the reach of TANs and 
framing literatures, as testing the arguments developed in these literatures by applying 
them onto securitized examples of advocacy campaigns would provide an opportunity to 
further support the insights gained through them. Third, gaining better perceptions into 
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 Balzacq 2011.  
65
 Trombetta 2011.  
66
 Sjöstedt 2011. 
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the dynamics of securitization have implications for advocates, as well. Keeping 
the potential long-term implications in mind, it is important to test the extent to 
which security frames correlate with advocacy success as overestimations about 
such correlation can influence advocates’ framing choices. 
Contribution of the Study 
The original contribution that this study makes to the literature is a 
function of both its theoretical approach and its methodological choices. 
Analytically, by treating securitization as an instance of framing, the study 
contributes to the literatures by identifying the questions that have been so far 
overlooked as well as by providing better answers for the questions that have been 
asked but not answered properly by the conventional wisdom. Methodologically, 
by applying mix-methods that combine systematic comparison across cases with 
an illustrative case study, this dissertation addresses previously under-tested 
assumptions in the literatures and contributes to the dialogue between them.  
The first contribution of this study is the illustration of the need to develop 
more nuanced arguments within the securitization literature. As discussed above, 
the main assumption that this study is built on is that the limited dialogue between 
securitization literature on the one hand and framing and TANs literatures on the 
other is the main reason behind our limited understanding of why advocacy 
campaigns engage in securitization. Thus, by approaching securitization as an 
instance of framing, the study applies the insights gained from framing and 
transnational advocacy networks’ literatures onto securitization literature and 
provides an opportunity to test the uniqueness attributed to security frames. 
18 
 
By engaging in such an analysis, rather than challenging the main contribution of 
the securitization literature, the study questions the tunnel-vision that these studies have 
in evaluating the role and the importance of security frames. The negative cases that the 
existing studies overlook limits not only the securitization literature’s ability to 
understand why advocates do not choose security frames under certain conditions (or 
choose to de-securitize), but also their ability to explain why securitization does not 
always lead to success. 
 Treating securitization as an instance of framing further contributes to the 
securitization literature by providing deeper insights into the dynamics that the 
securitization literature has identified but fell short of adequately explaining. As 
discussed above, the securitization literature identifies the role that securitizing actors and 
the audience play in translating securitizing attempts to successful securitization. Yet, the 
literature does not explain (i) different motivations that securitizing actors have; (ii) the 
reasons behind audience’s acceptance of the claims put forward by securitizing actors; 
and (iii) the conditions that make such process possible. Thus, this study contributes to 
the securitization literature by providing more nuanced arguments about strategic 
conditions that lead to the decisions to use security frames and the role these factors play 
in translating framing choices into advocacy success.   
 By increasing the dialogue between securitization, TANs and framing literatures, 
the study also contributes to the broader debates within the literature regarding the 
dynamics of norm-building and the role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in it. 
The insights gained into the dynamics of securitized advocacy campaigns further our 
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knowledge on advocacy strategies and lend support to the validity of framing and TANs 
literatures’ arguments by testing their applicability across different issue areas.  
 Methodologically, the study illustrates the importance of comparative analysis in 
testing the assumptions that are taken for granted when conducting single-case studies. 
The dynamics that are perceived to be self-evident when one positive case is examined do 
not necessarily hold when tested across both negative and positive cases. By conducting 
such an analysis this study further illustrates the importance of combining in-depth case 
studies with comparative analyses in order to get better insights into the inner dynamics 
of social processes.  
 The study also has implications for practitioners as well. Advocates are strategic 
actors who search for ways to increase their chances at successfully getting the 
international community to address an issue. Their perceptions about the factors that are 
more likely to lead to success have a role to play in shaping their framing decisions. 
Given the potential long-term negative implications of adopting security frames, 
illustrating the extent to which security frames correlate with advocacy success can play a 
role in shaping their framing choices. More broadly, by providing insights into dynamics 
that translate advocates’ framing choices into advocacy success, the study also helps the 
advocates to better understand the conditions of success and develop their strategies 
accordingly.  
How does This Study Go about Exploring the Research Question? 
The study explores the research question by engaging in a three-stage 
analysis presented in the following five chapters. Based on this analysis I argue 
that both the motivations behind adopting security frames and the role that 
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security frames play in leading to transnational advocacy success are more complicated 
than appreciated by conventional wisdom. It is my claim that rather than being unique 
and correlated to transnational advocacy success, as argued by the literature, security 
frames operate like any other frame, and in order for such framing decisions to translate 
into advocacy success they need to coexist with an enabling strategic environment.  
As the first step of this study’s efforts to illustrate the validity of the arguments 
stated above, the following chapter provides a detailed review of framing, TANs and 
securitization literatures.  The literature review serves several purposes: (i) it introduces 
the field to which this study aims to contribute; (ii) defines the main concepts and 
arguments that form the basis of this study; and (iii) pinpoints the limitations of the 
existing studies and highlights the contribution that this study aims to make. 
In the first stage of the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3, the study aims 
to address one of the important methodological shortcomings of the literature by 
conducting a systematic comparison across thirty-eight cases of transnational advocacy 
campaigns that took place in the aftermath of the Cold War. The chapter starts out by 
introducing the methodology used in conducting this analysis along with a discussion on 
the operationalization of the variables. A detailed discussion on how the data is collected, 
coded and analyzed is presented, and followed by a discussion on the findings of the 
comparative analysis.  
The universe of cases analyzed in this chapter is compiled using the information 
provided by the earlier attempts to list transnational advocacy campaigns
67
 and 
                                                 
67
 The “Transnational Principled Advocacy Movements in the Post-Cold War Era (1990- )” dataset 
presented by Joshua Busby in his book published in 2010 is used as a starting point in compiling the 
universe of cases that this study analyzed. The dataset is not an exhaustive one yet it is utilized as a starting 
point as it is the most extensive one available at this time. The original dataset includes thirty-six cases and 
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complemented with original research to account for potential omissions and latest 
developments.
68
 The cases are compared based on their framing preferences and 
success levels at three different stages of global agenda setting and policy making. 
multi-stage analysis is conducted because, as Finnemore and Sikkink discuss, 
advocates’ attempts to create norms do not necessarily lead to a “norm cascade” 
where “a critical mass of relevant state actors adopt the norm.”69 Therefore, in 
order not to essentialize advocacy success and to account for different dynamics at 
play, the study distinguishes between three stages of global agenda setting and 
policy making (political commitment and policy implementation) in conducting 
the comparative analysis.
70
  
                                                                                                                                                 
provide information on the main goals and the targets of the campaigns, the leading organizations, 
campaign outcomes as well as time frame of the campaign (Busby 2010). Campaigns’ framing choices 
were neither used as a selection criterion nor were one of the variables analyzed by the original dataset 
which sets the foundation for this study’s effort to stay away from selection-bias.  
68
 Not all the cases included in the Busby’s dataset fit the purpose this study: four of the campaigns were 
left out as either the advocacy efforts were too disperse to track (Marine Conservation) or the issue was 
already on the agenda prior to the campaign and the campaign was geared toward reigniting the global 
interest in the issue rather than placing it on the global agenda (Civilian Protection, Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Refugees). The list of cases analyzed is then expanded to account for cases that did not 
find a place in the original dataset either because they did not fit the purpose of Busby’s research or 
because they gained momentum after the original dataset was compiled. Academic and non-academic 
sources were analyzed to account for such cases. Academic sources are analyzed through a survey of major 
academic databases in addition to the survey of major NGOs’ websites with the goal of tracing recent 
campaigns. As a result of this analysis six cases were added to the list of cases to be analyzed for the 
purpose of this study (Avian Influenza, Conflict Diamonds, Climate Refugees, Illegal Wildlife Trade, 
Sexual Violence in Conflict, and Women, Peace and Security). 
69
 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895. 
70
 For the purpose of this study, agenda setting stage refers to the period that passes between the initiation 
of the campaign and placing the issue on the global agenda. A campaign is considered to be successful at 
the agenda setting stage if the issue triggers an action that indicates the acknowledgement of the issue on 
the part of the target actors such as through United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Political 
commitment stage refers to the period between the acknowledgement of the issue by the target actors and 
publicly made commitments to address the issue. The commitment could range from signing of a treaty, 
pledging of funds and agreeing to become a member of a related international organization. The study 
evaluates a campaign as successful if major actors whose actions that the campaign aims to change make a 
commitment. Policy implementation stage refers to the phase where actors are expected to follow through 
with their publicly made commitments and success is evaluated based on the campaign’s ability to lead to 
ratification of treaties, disbursement of pledged funds and initiation of domestic and legal changes. As I 
discuss in detail in Chapter 3, it is not reasonable to expect every single target actor to be responsive to the 
calls of a campaign and change their behavior accordingly. For that reason, in evaluating the success the 
reaction and compliance on the part of the major target actors is used as the benchmark and campaigns are 
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The comparative analysis aims to test the frequency at which security frames are 
used and the extent to which such choices correlate with advocacy success.
71
  By 
illustrating that securitization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success, 
this analysis shows that the reasons provided by the literature in explaining the 
motivations behind using security frames are not enough to account for such choices. 
This is not to suggest that security frames are epiphenomenal; rather, it is to illustrate the 
need for a closer examination of the dynamics behind securitization.  
Based on these initial findings, at the second stage of the analysis, I conduct a 
conduct a comparative case analysis and present it in Chapter 4. Nine cases are selected 
selected among the thirty-eight cases analyzed in Chapter 3 and compared using a 
combination of most-similar and most-different systems designs.
72
 The cases are selected 
selected from four issue areas and the comparison aimed to reflect variation in both their 
                                                                                                                                                 
categorized as failed, successful and partially successful based on their ability to trigger action on the part 
of these actors.  
71
 The universe of cases analyzed include: Anti-GMOs, Anti-smoking, Anti-structural Adjustment, Anti-
Toxics, Anti-War Protests, Avian Influenza, Biodiversity, Child Labor, Child Soldiers, Climate Change, 
Climate Refugees, Cluster Bombs, Conflict Diamonds, Dams, Demilitarization of Outer Space, Female 
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Arms, Sweatshops, Torture, Transparency, Violence against Women, War Crimes Tribunals, Water 
Conservation, Women’s Reproductive Rights, and Women, Peace and Security.  
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use of frames (securitized, de-securitized, non-securitized) and their levels of 
success.
73
 The chapter compares eight cases in pairs and through this comparison 
it highlights the similarities and differences between cases and provides an 
account of the dynamics surrounding the framing processes for each of the case. 
These accounts are followed by a discussion section that highlights the insights 
gained across these comparative analyses. The chapter concludes by taking a 
closer look at the Campaign for Internally Displaced Persons as the ninth case to 
further illustrate the interplay between framing and the strategic environment in 
the context of a non-securitized – less successful campaign. 
The comparative case study that I present in Chapter 4 supports the 
previous chapter by illustrating the interaction between the campaign’s strategic 
environment, which guide the decisions to use different frames, and the factors 
translate such choices into transnational advocacy success. Using the comparison 
of more successful and less successful examples of securitized, non-securitized 
and de-securitized cases of global agenda setting and policy making, I illustrate 
that the motivations behind adopting security frames are more complex than 
appreciated by the securitization literature in two ways: (i) a security frame does 
not have to be tailored toward states or security organizations, it can also be 
                                                 
73
 The cases analyzed in this chapter are (i) health: HIV/AIDS (securitized, more successful) and Maternal 
Mortality (non-securitized, more successful); (ii) humanitarian: Child Soldiers (non-securitized, more 
successful); Sexual Violence in Conflict (securitized, less successful); and Internally Displaced Persons 
(non-securitized, less successful) (iii) environment: Climate Change (securitized, more successful) and 
Climate Refugees (securitized, less successful); (iv) arms control: Landmines (de-securitized, more 
successful) and Small Arms (securitized, less successful). As the Campaign to End Sexual Violence in 
Conflict Zones is an ongoing campaign it is difficult to evaluate the level of success that the campaign will 
eventually reach. Yet, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4, the campaign has been struggling to trigger 
political commitment. Thus, even though the campaign is indicated as “successful,” the level of success 
reached so far is very limited and this limitation forms the basis of the comparison that this study 
investigates. 
24 
 
crafted to get the attention and cooperation of non-state actors; and (ii) a security frame 
might be appealing to the audience not necessarily because of the security threat it voices 
but because of the non-security concerns it silences (such as questioning of human rights 
practices).  
The arguments I develop based on the comparative case analysis also contributes 
contributes to our understanding of the role of framing in norm-creation.  The study lends 
study lends support to the claims in the framing and TANs literatures and argues that the 
strategic environment within which the advocacy campaigns operate shape advocates’ 
framing choices. In addition to the widely cited role of broader political context,
74
 the 
study also finds the advocacy networks’ own dynamics and the advocates’ previous 
experiences and fields of expertise to be important.  
 The study also provides new insights into how TANs function by highlighting the 
complexity of advocates’ motivations in making their framing choices. The study argues 
that advocates engage in multivocalization,
75
 which refers to the inclination of the 
advocates to invoke multiple frames simultaneously to reach out not only to targets of 
influence but also to potential allies with the goal of strengthening their networks.  
The third stage of the analysis is composed of an illustrative case study that I 
conducted on the Conflict Diamonds campaign and presented in Chapter 5. This case 
study is where the insights gained in the previous chapters are analyzed more closely to 
see how they operate and shape the decisions to use security frames. This chapter also 
highlights the implications that such choices have for the success and the direction of the 
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campaign. This analysis shows how insights gained through the analysis of non-
securitized and de-securitized campaigns can be used to better explain the 
securitized campaigns.  
The chapter begins by providing justification for case selection, and 
moves to introduce the campaign to the reader by highlighting the main actors and 
the major turning points of the campaign. The rest of the chapter traces how the 
campaign was framed at different stages of global agenda setting and policy 
making, the dynamics surrounding these choices, and the implications of such 
choices for the direction and the success of the campaign.  
The analysis of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign I present in Chapter 5 
provides an opportunity to test the arguments developed in Chapters 3 and 4 and 
to further illustrate how the above identified dynamics have played out in the 
Conflict Diamonds Campaign. The close analysis of the campaign that is 
supported by interviews with the advocates involved in the campaign reveals that 
security frames can be used by both state and non-state actors and the frames 
could also be tailored toward state and non-state actors. The implications that the 
security language has for the campaign depends on the author of the security 
language (securitizing actor) and the appeal that security frames has for an 
audience might be related to the audience’s non-security interests. Lastly, the 
analysis also illustrates that the sustained use of security frames even when they 
are no longer deemed as desirable by the advocates is a function of the 
institutional structure and network dynamics rather than the uniqueness of the 
security frame itself.  
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Instead of challenging the securitization literature’s fundamental contribution to 
our understanding of the security field, these arguments contribute to the analytical 
purchase of the literature by providing more nuanced arguments through a more rigorous 
analysis of the available evidence. In exploring these questions the study not only 
theoretically and methodologically contributes to the literature but also provides insights 
that can be utilized by advocates in making their framing choices.  
The last chapter serves as a conclusion and provides a summary of the findings 
and a discussion on the theoretical, methodological and policy implications of these 
findings. The chapter also acknowledges the limitations of this dissertation, discusses the 
measures taken in addressing them and identifies venues for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
As questions arise about the definition of security, increasing attention has been 
paid to various aspects of the field of research. As Williams states these efforts have 
forced the security field to, “consider questions surrounding the ‘broadening’ of its 
agenda to include threats beyond the narrow rubric of state and military security, and to 
confront the claim that this agenda must be ‘deepened’ to include the security concerns of 
actors ranging from individuals and sub-state groups … to global concerns such as the 
environment that have often been marginalized within a traditional state-centric and 
military conception.”76  
The securitization literature contributes to this debate by asking, “What really 
makes something a security problem?”77 According to this literature, a threat to security 
is an “outcome of a special process” rather than an “objective condition.”78 Thus, any 
issue can potentially be portrayed and treated as a security threat. The reasoning that the 
securitization literature provides in explaining the actors’ motivations in resorting to such 
an effort is embedded into the very definition of securitization. As Buzan et al. argue, 
security threats have a “special nature” that “… justifies the use of extraordinary 
measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the 
use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take 
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special powers, to handle existential threats.”79 Yet, according to this literature, such a 
portrayal comes with a price as once a state starts to see an issue as a threat to its security 
it takes measures accordingly, which in return may end up hurting the very goal of 
solving the problem at hand.
80
  
Studies that aim to explore the dynamics of global politics utilize the 
securitization literature’s insights and analyzed the extent to which securitization plays a 
role in global politics, especially in shaping the transnational advocacy campaigns’ 
attempts to force the international community to address transnational social problems. 
The increased use of security language in promoting issues ranging from women’s 
rights
81
 to HIV/AIDS
82
 by the advocacy campaigns themselves encouraged the scholars 
to analyze the reasons behind such choices. These studies argued that using security 
frames are instrumental for advocacy campaigns’ efforts in creating global agendas and 
initiating global policies as states are highly responsive to issues that they perceive as 
security threats.
83
 Thus, the decision to use security frames by the advocates is almost 
treated as self-explanatory. Yet, these efforts create a problem of essentializing the use of 
security frames by building their analysis on the uniqueness that securitization literature 
attributes to security frames. However, when approached from this perspective neither 
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the extent to which security frames correlate with success nor the reasons behind 
adopting such a frame get adequately tested. 
 While these studies provide insights into the successful examples of securitized 
transnational advocacy campaigns they do not adequately answer the question of why 
securitize. The reasons for adopting a security frames remain obscured because (i) as the 
securitization literature itself acknowledges, securitization comes with long-term negative 
costs; (ii) adopting security frames may not lead to success as evidenced by the failed 
examples of securitized campaigns; and (iii) securitization may not be necessary for 
success as exemplified by the successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized 
transnational advocacy campaigns. These potentially contradictory insights create a 
puzzle that needs to be studied if we want to better explore why advocates engage in 
securitization. 
 The existing studies fall short of adequately answering this question for 
conceptual and methodological reasons. Conceptually, the uniqueness of security frames 
and the uncontested position security concerns occupy on states’ agendas are embedded 
in the very definition and logic of securitization literature and therefore, remain under-
analyzed. In addition to this conceptual limitation, neither the securitization literature 
itself nor studies that apply securitization literature’s insights to transnational advocacy 
campaigns have so far conducted enough systematic research on when and how 
securitization works and why it is not only sometimes used.  
 This dissertation addresses these shortcomings by treating securitization as an 
instance of framing and thereby shedding light onto the strategic environment in which 
TANs operate as well as their strategies in order to distill (i) the motivations that 
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advocates have in using security frames; (ii) the conditions that translate the framing 
choices into success; and (iii) the factors that shape security frames’ implications for the 
advocacy campaign in the long-run.  
Approaching securitization as an instance of framing and combining a systematic 
comparison of successful and unsuccessful examples of securitized, non-securitized and 
de-securitized cases with a closer analysis of a smaller number of campaigns allow me to 
better explain why advocates use security frames. I conclude that the strategic 
environment within which campaigns operate shape advocates’ decisions to use security 
frames and their decisions are based on a more complex reasoning than explored by the 
literature. As opposed to the state oriented approach of the conventional wisdom, actors’ 
decisions to use a security frame could be tailored towards non-state as well as state 
actors, and framing choices can be aimed at appealing to non-security as well as security 
concerns of the audience.   
I assert that advocates tend to use a number of frames simultaneously even when 
they securitize an issue to not only appeal to the targets of influence, but also to potential 
allies with the goal of strengthening their networks. Relatedly, the acceptance of the 
security frame by a target audience (potential allies or targets of influence) could be a 
consequence of varying strategic and normative calculations on the part of the audience 
rather than their security concerns. Lastly, the sustained use of security frames even when 
they are no longer deemed desirable have so far been explained by existing studies as a 
byproduct of the uniqueness of securitization; yet as I show through the comparative 
analysis, the sustained use of frames is neither unique to security frames nor a function of 
their peculiarities.  
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This chapter reviews the literature to build the theoretical foundation that makes 
this study’s research question (why transnational advocacy campaigns use security 
frames?) valuable. The chapter starts by reviewing the contribution that securitization 
literature makes to our understanding of the security field and provides a discussion of 
the limitations of these insights. Securitization literature is important because it makes 
this inquiry possible by acknowledging that issues can, through language, be turned into 
security concerns. Yet, the uniqueness this literature attributes to security frames limits 
the insights we gain into when and why such attempts succeed.  
The second literature that makes the research question worthy of attention is the 
one that illustrates that transnational advocacy campaigns matter. Transnational advocacy 
campaigns literature is reviewed below to illustrate under which conditions and through 
which strategies these campaigns can influence global politics. One of the most important 
strategies at advocates’ disposal is identified as strategically framing issues to increase 
their appeal to the audience. Yet, as the review of the literature illustrates, framing is a 
complex and a contested process and it is important to highlight these dynamics as they 
form the basis of this study’s attempt to explain securitization from a framing 
perspective.  
The chapter then goes on to review the studies that attempt to explain the 
securitized transnational campaigns. These studies expand on the securitization literature 
by illustrating that non-state actors can also be the authors of the security language and 
they contribute to the TANs literature by investigating the securitized examples of 
advocacy campaigns. Yet, these studies suffer from an inherent limitation that comes 
from their treatment of securitization as a unique process rather than as act of framing. As 
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discussed in the end of the chapter, there are significant insights to be gained by 
approaching securitization from a framing perspective which is the basis of this study’s 
contribution to the literature.  
Securitization  
Securitization can be defined as the, “positioning through language of a particular 
issue as an existential threat to security.”84 The concept of securitization was championed 
by the Copenhagen School and it is based on the premise that a security threat is not an 
objective reality but rather a result of an interactive process where any issue can be 
framed as such. However, not every attempt to securitize an issue succeeds and the 
success depends on both the actors involved (the securitizing actor
85
 and the audience
86
) 
and the venue that securitization takes place in.   
While the securitization literature contributes to our understanding of the security 
field, the intrinsic value the literature attaches to security frames shapes (and limits) the 
insights that the literature provides into (i) the varying reasons that actors have in 
resorting to a security discourse; (ii) the motivations that the audience have in accepting 
their claims; and (iii) the conditions needed for such process to succeed. This section 
describes both the contribution that the securitization literature makes to our 
understanding of the security field, and its major limitations – which this study addresses 
by challenging the uniqueness attributed to security frames.  
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Defining Securitization and Its Contribution to Security Studies 
Securitization literature both contributes to and challenges the traditional 
understanding of security in international relations. On the one hand, it contributes to 
traditional studies by acknowledging security concerns as states’ primary interests. On 
the other hand, it challenges the traditional understanding by widening and deepening the 
scope of what can be categorized as a security threat. 
Securitization literature agrees with the traditional conceptions of security on the 
idea that security concerns are the primary interests of nation states. In international 
relations theory, security is traditionally interpreted as “war and the military capacity to 
respond to external threats to the states.”87 The core of “national interest” is considered to 
be the protection of “sovereignty and territoriality.”88 Replicating this perception, 
securitization literature suggests that states react to security threats and therefore, that 
appealing to security concerns is useful in placing an issue on states’ agendas.  
The second point in which the securitization literature agrees with the traditional 
understanding of security is the idea that the principle object of international security is 
the state.
89
 In other words, existing studies accept that, historically, the state is the actor 
whose security is to be protected. This perception distinguishes securitization literature 
from other critical theories as these theories suggest that the object of security should be 
the individual.
90
 However, securitization literature argues that this understanding of 
security is neither natural nor inevitable. As Buzan and Waever state, “[w]hat is or is not 
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prime in international security, including the state, depends on historical conditions.”91 
Thus, while taking the state as the key actor whose security is to be protected, the 
securitization literature does so without essentializing the primacy of nation-states.  
While agreeing with the traditional approaches on states’ primacy in international 
relations, securitization literature also diverges from this perspective in its understanding 
of what constitutes a security threat. In the traditional understanding, “military threats 
from states against other states” are considered to be the main security concerns.92 
Securitization literature challenges this by expanding the scope of security threats to 
include non-military threats originating from non-state actors.
93
 Securitization literature 
suggests that the field of security needs 
“broadening” of its agenda to include threats beyond the narrow rubric of state 
and military security, and to confront the claim that this agenda must also be 
“deepened” to include the security concerns of actors ranging from individuals 
and sub-state groups (often now formulated under the rubric of “human security”) 
to global concerns such as the environment that have often been marginalized 
within a traditional state-centric and military conception.
94
  
 
The earlier works within the Copenhagen School defined security as a speech 
act.
95
 In the words of Waever, “it is by labeling something a security issue that it becomes 
one.”96 Thus, according to this argument, regardless of the nature of the issue, anything 
can be framed as a security threat; however, it is not a random act but rather a deliberate 
choice that is aimed at a specific political goal.
97 
This particular speech act is performed 
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with the goal of “produc[ing] hierarchical conditions in which security issues are 
dramatized and presented as supreme priorities of the state or the actor in question.”98 
Thus, the primary purpose of securitizing an issue is to prioritize it on an actor’s agenda.  
The scholars who perceive securitization as a speech act do not suggest that the 
mere act of calling an issue a security threat automatically turns it into one.
99
 As Buzan et 
al. state, “the security speech act is not defined by the uttering the word security. What is 
essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special 
measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.”100 Any actor 
can attempt to frame any issue as a security threat. These kinds of attempts are called 
“securitizing moves”; however, an issue is considered to be successfully securitized only 
“once an actor has convinced an audience of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise 
binding rules and regulations”.101 Therefore, in order for an issue to be categorized as a 
security threat the audience needs to accept the legitimacy of such a claim and consent to 
the use of non-political measures in addressing it.  
While scholars have different takes on the exact processes through which 
securitization occurs, there is more or less an agreement as to why securitization takes 
place. The framing of various issues as security threats is attributed to the special role that 
security occupies on states’ agendas. Scholars argue that security language has been 
increasingly used as a tool for “prioritizing unconventional security issues.”102 This is 
based on the premise that “everyone agrees that ‘security issues’ are important and 
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deserving of national prominence and financial support.”103 As such, issues that have not 
been previously categorized as security threats get appropriated into security frames. This 
shift is argued to be exemplified with the rise of various concepts such as “food 
security,”104 and “environmental security”105 as well as the increasing emphasis placed on 
the security dimensions of non-security issues such as migration
106
 and health
107
 which 
will be discussed in detail below.  
Even though the earlier works within the securitization literature heavily relied on 
the speech act theory,
108
 as the literature evolved, more emphasis started to be put on 
explaining securitization as a process.
109
 The approaches that were based on speech act 
theory required the utterance of the words “security” or “threat” to consider an issue to be 
securitized.
110
 However, as the literature developed, the scholars moved away from this 
perception and started to look for alternative indicators. For instance, Balzacq highlighted 
the importance of “non-linguistic processes of securitization” and suggested that 
securitization should also be traced in the policy tools and instruments.
111
 Such an 
approach does not disregard the role of the discourse but rather it suggests that framing of 
an issue as a security threat can take multiple forms. Following this approach, for 
instance, in analyzing the securitization of asylum and immigration issues Huysmans 
suggests that, “even when not directly spoken off as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a 
security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy 
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frameworks that emphasize policing and defense.”112 Following this logic, Huysmans 
suggests that European Union securitized the issues of immigration and asylum not by 
explicitly calling them security threats but by focusing on policies that would defend host 
countries from “collective dangerous force of migrants.”113  
It is important to note that securitization literature has an explicitly stated 
normative stance on framing issues as security threats. This normative stance can be 
summarized as “less security, more politics!”114 Securitization literature suggests that 
securitization is likely to create “security traps” where attempts to attract attention to an 
issue by framing it as a security threat moves the policy outcome away from the 
“underlying intentions.”115 As a result, while claiming that security frames are essential in 
getting states to react to an issue, securitization literature also concentrates on providing 
recommendations for de-securitization rather than treating securitization as a desirable or 
a natural process.
116
  
Limitations of the Securitization Literature 
The distance that the literature has come in operationalizing securitization has not 
been enough to defeat criticisms. Most importantly, the reliance of the earlier work on the 
speech-act theory has made it difficult to understand the role that the audience plays in 
the securitization process. As Balzacq criticizes, Waever’s earlier work posits 
securitization as a “self-referential” practice where the mere act of calling something a 
security threat is what triggers securitization.
117
 This perception is argued to contradict 
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with the literature’s claim of securitization as an “intersubjective process” between the 
securitizing-actor and the audience and limits the ability of the literature to explain under 
what conditions and for what reasons an audience is more likely to accept the claims of 
security.
118
  
The later works attempted to compensate for this shortcoming by analyzing the 
role that the audience has in securitization.
119
 The critics highlighted both the need to 
acknowledge the agency that audience has
120
 and the need to account for the fact that 
there might be “multiple audiences.”121 Yet the uniqueness that the literature attaches to 
security concerns limits these studies’ scope and prevents them from taking audiences’ 
non-security concerns into consideration in explaining their willingness to accept the 
claims of security (upon which this study aims to shed light).  
The uniqueness that the literature attributes to security frames limits the 
literature’s ability to explain the conditions under which attempts to securitize an issue 
succeed.  The earlier lack of interest in the context within which securitization occurs was 
a function of the assumption that, when done successfully, securitization modifies the 
context in which it takes place and in return makes the pre-existing conditions 
irrelevant.
122
 Balzacq, in an attempt to account for this omission, argued that security 
language resonates with the audience only if the securitizing actor is able to relate its 
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claims to the “external reality.”123 Thus, the existence of a “perceptive environment” is a 
necessary condition for the success of an attempt to securitize.
124
 
While these studies contribute to the analytical purchase of the securitization 
literature, they still operate within the assumption that security has its unique role and 
dynamics in shaping actors’ perceptions, agendas, and actions. This predisposition then 
limits their interest to the successful instances of securitization and makes them overlook 
the cases where securitization could have been initiated but did not, or the cases where an 
audience was convinced to pay attention to an unlikely issue without necessarily being 
convinced about the security implications of it.  
The securitization literature’s portrayal of the “securitizing actors” is also a point 
of controversy. According to the literature, any issue can be framed as a security threat 
yet not every actor has the capacity to successfully invoke a security language. As 
Charrett discusses, “no one is excluded from attempts to articulate alternative 
interpretations of security,” but as a result of the power structures within the field of 
security, certain actors, typically state elites, hold an advantaged position over defining 
security threats.”125 Such an approach is problematic because it leaves the non-state 
actors’ role in framing security concerns out of the picture and limits the framing capacity 
to the elites and presents a statist approach to security.
126
  
As is discussed below, the attempts to use securitization theory in explaining 
transnational advocacy campaigns’ success contribute to the securitization literature by 
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acknowledging the non-state actors as “securitizing actors” and by treating states as the 
“audience.” Yet, these studies are also based on the assumption that securitization has its 
own logic and consequences, and therefore, their ability to explain the complex dynamics 
surrounding the decisions to securitize remains limited. These limitations could, however, 
be overcome by treating securitization as an instance of framing and applying the insights 
developed by literature on framing and TANs to the study of securitized examples of 
transnational advocacy campaigns.  
Securitization as Framing and the Strategic Environment for TANs 
 The goal of this study is to explain why transnational advocacy campaigns use 
security frames. The openness that the securitization literature brings to the field of 
security makes this line of questioning possible. Yet, exploring this question requires us 
to look beyond the arguments of the securitization literature and overcome the limitations 
identified above.  
The validity of this research question relies on two assumptions: (i) what 
transnational advocacy campaigns do matters for global politics; (ii) framing is an 
important part of what advocacy campaigns do and have an impact on their capacity to 
shape global politics. Based on these assumptions this study argues that, as opposed to 
what securitization theory implies, securitization is an act of framing that is bound by the 
same dynamics that shape alternative framing choices.  
 This section reviews the literature to ground the above listed assumptions and 
provides justification for both the assumptions and the research question. For that reason, 
it is important to begin by illustrating that transnational advocacy campaigns matter for 
global politics. Since not every advocacy campaign manages to influence global politics, 
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it becomes important to understand the factors that shape their level of impact. Here, a 
dual dynamic appears: transnational advocacy campaigns are bounded by the strategic 
environment within which they operate and they in return engage in strategies to utilize 
their strategic environment to their benefit. Framing is one of the most important 
strategies but, as the TANs literature shows us, it is a contested process and the impact it 
has on the success of an advocacy campaign is not automatic, but rather mediated by 
other factors.  
There is an increasing attention paid to the contribution that using security as a 
strategic frame makes to the success of advocacy campaigns. In analyzing these cases, 
the studies mostly operate based on the securitization literature’s premises and treat 
securitization as a unique instance rather than a form of framing which is bound by the 
same dynamics that surround other acts of framing. Not utilizing the insights of the 
framing and TANs literatures curtails the analytical purchase of these studies which I aim 
to address in this dissertation.  
Transnational Advocacy Campaigns
127
 
TANs are networks that involve “relevant actors working internationally on an 
issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and services.”128 TANs are argued to play a role in shaping 
global politics along with a number of other actors such as epistemic communities,
129
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intergovernmental organizations,
130
 celebrities,
131
 and think-tanks.
132
 These networks 
engage in transnational campaigns with the goal of changing states’ and international 
organizations’ behavior.133 To realize this change TANs “bring in new ideas, norms, and 
discourses into policy debates; ... serve as sources of information and testimony; ... [and] 
promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by 
monitoring compliance with international standards.”134  
The increasing presence of transnational advocacy networks in global politics first 
paved the way to a number of studies that focused on illustrating that these networks 
matter. Starting with the groundbreaking work of Keck and Sikkink
135
 an important 
literature was developed in explaining the role that transnational advocacy campaigns 
play in shaping global politics.
136
 The role these actors play is argued to be based on their 
ability to “multiply the channels of access to the international system”137 and to “disrupt 
hierarchies” by shifting power relations among various actors.138  
After initial work that focused on illustrating the importance of transnational 
advocacy networks, the field shifted focus and started looking into different ways through 
which these networks influence global politics and the factors that shape their 
effectiveness.
139
 More recently, studies expanded their scope and started to question why 
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advocacy networks choose certain issues to campaign on while leaving the others 
behind.
140
  
The mounting scholarly work has shown that transnational advocacy campaigns 
have played a significant role in leading to international agreements ranging from the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997)
141
 to the Rome Treaty of the International 
Criminal Court (2002).
142
 The literature also shows that the transnational advocacy 
campaigns’ role is not limited to the creation of agendas and initiation of agreements but 
extends to the monitoring role they play once the states commit to taking action. For 
instance, the “Civil Society Coalition” has an institutionalized role within the Kimberley 
Process which was established to keep the diamond industry clean from conflict 
diamonds.
143
 Similarly, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines shifted their focus 
once the treaty was signed and focused on monitoring the states’ compliance through 
their regular reports.
144
  
The literature establishes the role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in 
changing how the international community perceives and chooses to address a 
transnational problem. Yet, even the most successful examples transnational advocacy 
campaigns do not necessarily lead to the elimination of the problem at hand. The road to 
the complete elimination of a problem is a complex and a multi-stage one, and 
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succeeding at one stage does not guarantee the same at the next one.  Placing an issue on 
the global agenda (making the targets actors recognize the problem) is a necessary step 
for successfully solving it; however, agenda setting success does not guarantee that states 
will act on the issue
145
 or follow through with their commitments.
146
  
As Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish in their argument on “norm life-cycles,” 
norm emergence (where the norm entrepreneurs try to persuade a critical number of 
states to the importance of a norm) is different from “norm cascade” (where other states 
are convinced to become norm followers). Only in the far end of this life-cycle the norms 
are internalized by the states and the “completion of the “life-cycle” is not an inevitable 
process.”147  Many issues advocated by the transnational campaigns have found a place on 
the global agenda yet failed to initiate action on the part of the target actors or ensure 
compliance. For instance, the advocacy campaign succeeded in getting the issue of 
cluster munitions on the global agenda
148
 and led to political commitment (the 
Convention on the Cluster Munitions) yet it failed to successfully change the target 
actors’ behavior.149   
Acknowledging the complexity of the stages that a transnational advocacy 
campaign needs to go through to successfully solve a transnational social problem is 
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rather easy. What is difficult to identify is what counts as success. Measuring success is 
difficult as not every policy instrument is equally effective in shaping behavior; and it is 
not possible to create a norm where every target actor, without exception, commits to the 
norm that is being advocated and complies with its requirements without any divergence. 
Therefore, finding an answer to the question of whose commitment and compliance 
matters and how we know if they are complying is complicated. For instance, as Busby 
discusses, “in policy terms, a non-binding agreement such as the 1992 UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change is very different from the 1997 binding Kyoto Protocol. 
Nonetheless, in political terms, the non-participation of the United States in the Kyoto 
Protocol makes the agreement less of a political success (though one could argue the 
support of a majority of the world’s countries and major greenhouse emitters still 
qualifies as a victory).”150 Thus, in measuring success of a political commitment one 
needs to weigh both the nature of the agreed commitment and also its reach, which is 
what this study bases its measure of political success on as I discuss in Chapter 3.  
Measuring success is difficult also because even when the target actors initiate 
domestic policies in line with the advocated norm
151
 whether these policies will succeed 
in completely erasing the problem requires a very long time-lag as both the root-causes 
and the implications of the problems run too deep to tackle in the short-term. Thus, a 
more tangible measure of policy implementation success is “whether or not countries 
important for implementation have accepted the policy that advocates are pursuing 
through some domestic decision making process.”152  
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The role that transnational advocacy campaigns play in shaping global politics 
and the complex dynamics that determine their influence require us to take a closer look 
at the strategic environment within which advocates operate and the strategies they 
develop. This analysis is important in testing whether securitization really provides a 
“magical formula” for success as argued by the securitization literature or whether 
securitization operates like any other frame and bounded by the same dynamics.  
Strategic Environment 
The literature on transnational advocacy campaigns highlights two sets of factors 
in explaining why some campaigns succeed while the others fail. The first set of factors is 
regarding the structural and non-structural conditions and mechanisms that shape the 
context in which advocates operate, whereas the second set of factors is about various 
strategies and tools employed by the advocates in trying to maximize their influence.  
Understanding the factors that affect advocacy campaigns’ success in shaping 
global agendas and initiating policy responses requires us to first look at the structural 
and non-structural conditions surrounding the advocacy efforts. Since the advocates do 
not function within a political or an ideological vacuum, the constraints and the 
opportunities that these structural and non-structural factors present need to be taken into 
account.
153
 This subsection focuses on explaining the strategic environment within which 
advocates operate while the following subsection focuses on exploring advocates’ 
strategies.  
The factor that has been most cited by the literature in explaining advocacy 
campaign effectiveness is the broader political context within which campaigns operate. 
As Cooley and Ron argue, “the incentives and constraints produced by the transnational 
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sector’s institutional environment”154 play a role in shaping both the extent to which and 
also the strategies through which advocates work toward exerting their power.
155
 Yet, 
neither the political context nor the impact it has on advocacy campaigns is static. While 
certain characteristics of the broader political context (such as the political structure) are 
more permanent, the others (such as symbolic events) are rather flexible. These factors 
can either provide a fertile ground for advocacy campaigns or hinder their efforts.  
The political structures are first crucial in shaping the playing field within which 
campaigns operate. The more access points that advocacy campaigns have the better their 
chances are in exerting their influence onto global politics.
156
 In that respect as Tarrow 
and Smith highlight, operating within issue areas where there are established international 
organizations and regimes are important in creating policy spaces for advocates to 
organize and mobilize.
157
 For instance, Geddes, among others, illustrates the role of the 
European Union’s (EU) institutional structure and claims it to be conducive to advocacy 
efforts as it provides additional points of access for advocacy groups.
158
  
 In addition to the political structures, the dynamic components of broader 
political contexts can also create a fertile ground, “windows of opportunity”159 for 
advocates to utilize. For instance, “symbolic events” such as meetings and human-made 
or natural disasters can provide windows of opportunity for advocates to further their 
agendas
160
 as these events have the potential to “recast or challenge prevailing definitions 
of the situation, thus changing perceptions of costs and benefits of policies and programs 
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and the perception of injustice of the status quo.”161 For instance, in analyzing the success 
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Shawki concludes that it was 
the review process that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) was 
undergoing at the time that “allowed the ICBL access to the global public policy process 
by creating a target and a focal point for activism surrounding landmines to frame the 
landmine problem as a humanitarian crisis.”162 Similarly, studies that comparatively 
analyze the successful campaigns that took place in 1990s suggest that “left-of center 
governments coming to power throughout Western democracies” created a fertile ground 
for a number of accomplishments such as International Criminal Court and the Kyoto 
Protocol to take place.
163
   
The broader context within which advocates operate could also function as an 
obstacle in front of advocates’ efforts; economic constraints can be listed as one of these 
limitations. As Haas, Andresen and Kanie explain, lack of stable financial resources 
makes NGOs dependent on outside contributions such as those coming from 
“foundations and foreign-aid agencies” as well as members’ contributions. Such reliance 
functions as a limitation as “the NGOs are faced with incentives to differentiate 
themselves for funders, and to constantly present themselves as offering a new agenda or 
approach.”164  
Similar to the way political structures function, the changing dynamics within the 
broader political context can also create obstacles in front of the campaigning efforts. As 
Humphreys contends, during the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
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Development (UNCED) Forest Negotiations the polarization between developed and 
developing countries limited advocates’ ability to shape the agenda as the states were 
focused on resolving the disagreements among each other. This division in return limited 
the room for maneuver for the environmental activists.
165
 
It is important to note that the changes within the political context are not 
necessarily exogenous to advocacy campaigns. Advocates themselves through their 
actions expand the opportunities that the political structures present to them. For instance 
in their study, Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler trace NGO involvement in UN thematic 
conferences on environment and human rights and observe that there have been 
“significant advances in both the quantity and the quality of their [NGOs’] 
participation.”166 The authors argue this change to be a consequence of the widening in 
the NGOs’ repertoire of action which provided them with an increased number of access 
points in their attempts to influence global policy making. Similarly in analyzing the 
changes in the working of the International Whaling Commission, Skodvin and Andresen 
argue that the moratorium decision of 1982 that banned whaling for commercial purposes 
was a product of the environmental and animal rights NGOs’ ability to mobilize 
support.
167
 Such success is not limited to environmental campaigns, either. Similarly 
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securing a permanent observer status within the Kimberley Process changed the political 
context significantly and provided the Conflict Diamonds Campaign an official and 
permanent access point to exert their influence.
168
 
In addition to the role that the broader political context plays in shaping the 
success of advocacy efforts, the literature also highlights that the issues themselves have 
specific ‘attributes’ (or characteristics) that make it easier or more difficult for advocates 
to garner support. For instance, issues where there is an identifiable perpetrator and issues 
where there is a short causal link between the act and the harm it creates are easier for the 
campaigns to attract global actors’ attention.169 The same is also true for cases where the 
damage caused can be quantified and illustrated through widely distributed reports.
170 
The advocacy efforts are also argued to have a better chance at succeeding if the harm 
inflicted on the victims is a physical and therefore an observable one.
171
 For instance, 
Keck and Sikkink argue that, “torture and disappearance have been more tractable than 
some other human rights issues, and protesting torture of political prisoners more 
effective than protesting torture of common criminals or capital punishment.”172 That is 
because in the case of torture the damage is physical and in the case of political prisoners 
the claim of innocence is easier to make. Following this logic, Stone argues that an 
advocacy campaign has a better chance at succeeding if the problem is perceived to be 
amenable to human action rather than unavoidable bad fortune.
173
 
                                                 
168
 Smillie 2001.  
169
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a. 
170
 Carpenter 2005; 2010; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Stone 2006. 
171
 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998. 
172
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a, 27. 
173
 Stone 2006.  
51 
 
As discussed below, the issue attributes are not set in stone, either. Not only the 
nature of the issue changes over time but also the advocates engage in various strategies 
to reframe the perceived attributes of the issue. The following subsection discusses 
various strategies employed by the advocates to make the most out of the strategic 
environment within which they operate and change them when necessary and possible.  
Advocacy Strategies
174
  
 The literature on transnational advocacy campaigns has paid a significant amount 
of attention to the strategies that transnational advocacy campaigns utilize in explaining 
the varying degree of campaigns’ successes. These tools are critical in not only defining 
campaigns’ power in global policy making but also distinguishing them from other 
actors. Reviewing the tools that are available at the transnational advocacy campaigns’ 
disposal is crucial in appreciating the role and importance of framing for advocacy 
campaigns as well as the complex dynamics surrounding their utilization.   
While different networks have different tools at their disposal, the lack of military 
and (most of the time) economic power distinguishes transnational advocacy campaigns 
from states and corporations while the lack of violence in their methods separates them 
from terrorist groups.
175
 In the absence of these traditional sources of power, advocates 
are forced to engage in creative ways to realize their goals.  The strategies that advocates 
utilize in promoting their causes take multiple forms and they range from “framing issues 
to win the hearts and minds of others to their cause; mobilising reliable information and 
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expertise on an issue in ways conducive to influencing policy and norms; or naming and 
shaming states for unethical practices.”176 
What Keck and Sikkink refer to as “information politics” i.e. “collecting credible 
information and deploying it strategically at carefully selected sites”177 is one of the 
frequently used advocacy strategies. For instance, Ron et al. analyzed the Amnesty 
International’s (AI) reporting of human rights abuses and concluded that “the group [AI] 
produce[d] more written work on some countries than others to maximize advocacy 
opportunities, shape international standards, promote greater awareness, and raise its 
profile.”178 Successfully engaging in information politics on the one hand, includes 
collecting and disseminating credible, verifiable and reliable information and on the other 
hand, it requires the information to be presented in a timely and dramatic manner.
179
 In 
order to utilize this function to its maximum, advocates not only collect and disseminate 
testimonies but also support them with statistical and technical information they collect 
themselves.
180
 As a successful example of this, Conflict Diamonds Campaign managed to 
get the UNSC’s attention by reliably reporting the severity of the conflict diamonds 
problem in Angola
181
 and Sierra Leone.
182
  
The second strategy that advocacy networks utilize is “symbolic politics,” which 
refers to advocates’ “ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a 
situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away.”183 For instance, sending 
fake diamonds covered with fake blood to newspaper editors was one of the strategies 
                                                 
176
 Davy 2012, 76. 
177
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a; 1998b, 226. 
178
 Ron, Ramos and Rodger 2005, 557. 
179
 Keck and Sikkink 1998b.  
180
 Keck and Sikkink 1998a. 
181
 Global Witness 1998.  
182
 Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton  2000. 
183
 Keck and Sikkink 1998; 1999, 95. 
53 
 
employed by the conflict diamonds network in getting the media to pay attention to the 
issue.
184
 International Campaign to Ban Landmines similarly put together shoe piles to 
represent the lost limbs which turned out to be a very effective strategy in attracting 
international attention to the issue.
185
 The anti-sweatshop campaign was also successful 
in employing symbolic politics by “successfully linking Nike’s brand with the use of 
sweatshop labor.”186  
The third strategy is “leverage politics” or “boomerang strategy” which is “the 
ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a 
network are unlikely to have influence.”187 Bocşe highlights this strategy by illustrating 
how Hungarian campaigners pressured the Romanian government to help them convince 
the Hungarian government to ban the use of cyanide.
188
 Similarly, Yanacopulos discusses 
how some smaller NGOs utilized NGO Working Group on the World Bank to get their 
voices heard by the World Bank.
189
  
The fourth strategy is “accountability politics”190 and refers to the advocates’ 
ability to monitor target actors’ actions to make sure that they comply with their 
previously made commitments by “naming and shaming” the violations. Advocates 
utilize this strategy in various ways. For instance, ICBL puts countries onto lists based on 
their landmine policies to keep the spotlight on those who perform badly.
191
 Advocates 
also play important roles in ensuring compliance by conducting monitoring functions in a 
number of issue areas ranging from World Bank funded development projects to child 
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labor regulations.
192
 Similarly, in analyzing the role of advocates in limiting state-
sponsored killings, DeMeritt finds a positive correlation to exist between NGO reporting 
of violations and state practices.
193
  
 The frequency at which each of these strategies are utilized by the campaigns 
change both based on their goals as well as based on the opportunities and constraints 
that their strategic environment presents. Despite these variations, one very important 
strategy that advocates employ throughout all stages of global agenda setting and policy 
making and one that plays an important role in shaping campaigns’ capacity to utilize 
opportunities is framing.   
Framing as an Advocacy Strategy 
Framing can be defined as “the strategic packaging of new ideas and 
interpretations.”194 The idea that frames matter was born in sociology195 and it was first 
applied to the social movements literature within political science.
196
 Framing is a 
“processual phenomenon” through which meanings are constructed.197 This process is 
“active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in the sense of a 
dynamic, evolving process.”198 
Frames are “interpretive schemata[s] that simplif[y] and condense the ‘world out 
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, 
and sequences of action within one’s present or past environment.”199 Thus, framing is 
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not particular to collective actions, but it is also deemed necessary for individuals to 
“locate, perceive, identify and label” the events they are experiencing.200 Nevertheless, 
frames have a special role to play in collective actions, such as transnational advocacy 
campaigns. Framing is important for advocacy campaigns not only because it gives 
meaning to issues that have not been previously considered as worthy of attention, but 
also because it determines which actors would gain power and which ones would be left 
in the margins.
201
 In other words, framing is crucial not only because “it determines 
whether and how issues get onto the political agenda” but also because they shape “how 
issues are given meaning, operationalized, and adopted into the norm-building process 
even before becoming part of the official agenda.”202  
As framing was identified as one of the key advocacy strategies by the literature 
very early on, a number of insights have been developed so far in explaining the 
dynamics of framing, as well as framing’s role in leading to advocacy success. 
Reviewing this literature is crucial in understanding why advocates use a particular frame 
and how they choose it, as well as in forming a basis of comparison to use in testing the 
extent to which security frames resemble to other instances of framing.  
The most important insights pertaining to the purpose of this study is two-fold. 
First, issues are framed not only based on moral concerns but also based on material 
calculations and second, framing has implications not only for the audience but also for 
the advocates themselves. The following subsections discuss the insights that the 
literature provides about advocates’ normative and material motivations in tailoring their 
framing preferences as well as the complex dynamics that surround these decisions. It is 
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important to review these dynamics as treating securitization as an act of framing will 
require this study to trace these dynamics within securitization processes.  
How do Advocates Choose Their Frames and Why it Matters? 
Almost no issue naturally falls into a “frame,” thus framing requires a conscious 
and strategic act on the part of the actors that are involved in “packaging” of the issue. 
Through framing, advocacy campaigns have the capacity to “highlight particular aspects 
of a problem such as the driving causes and/or who has the responsibility to act, thereby 
establishing the boundaries within which states must formulate their responses.”203 For 
that reason, framing has both a normative and an instrumental function and it reflects 
what advocates believe in, how they think they can get the others to react, and how they 
can make the most out of their limited resources. To achieve these goals, advocates tailor 
their frames not only for the targets of influence whose actions they aim to change, but 
they also tailor the frames for potential allies with the goal of strengthening their efforts. 
Yet, as the literature illustrates, none of these efforts, even when they succeed, guarantee 
advocacy success. Nevertheless, rather than aiming to show the limits of framing, the 
below presented review highlights the complex dynamics that needs to be taken into 
consideration when analyzing advocates’ framing choices. 
First, advocates engage in framing in order to appeal to targets actors’ normative 
concerns.
204
 As Keck and Sikkink put it, an issue is more likely to be picked up and used 
in norm creation if the way it is framed resonates with the already existing norms.
205
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Such a resemblance increases issue entrepreneurs’ chances of grafting their concerns onto 
the target actors’ agendas.206 For instance, in analyzing the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines, Price illustrates that the campaign’s success was a function of its ability 
to graft the issue onto the existing norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
By emphasizing the indiscriminate nature of the harm that landmines cause, the 
Campaign successfully turned what used to be considered as a conventional weapon with 
no specific ill-repute into a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to be eliminated.
207
 
Similarly, by framing human trafficking as “modern day slavery,” the advocates worked 
to trigger states’ sensibilities about slavery.208  
While appealing to target actors’ normative concerns is one of the main goals of 
framing, the compatibility of the suggested frames with the existing normative 
perspectives also has the potential to work as an impediment. If the issue is grafted onto 
an existing norm that has been on the agenda for a long-time, it might create the sense 
that the issue has already been addressed sufficiently. For instance, the media coverage of 
the “Amazon issue” peaked in 1980s and this created the perception that the issue was 
already addressed and that it was “being tackled and resolved by the established legal and 
governmental authorities.”209 This perception in turn worked as an impediment in front of 
the mahogany campaign, the campaign that targeted to regulate the trade of mahogany – 
a rare tree with high commercial value from Brazil to Britain, in early 1990s. It was only 
when the advocates took the issue out of the environmental frame and placed it into the 
human rights frame (protection of indigenous people) they succeeded in convincing the 
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target actors that the issue was a “new and real threat to the Amazon” [emphasis in the 
original].
210
   
In certain occasions, especially when the existing normative stance of the 
decision-makers is perceived to be counterproductive, the advocates deliberately choose 
frames that aim to alter the perception of the decision makers rather than attaching their 
cause onto the existing frames. One of the examples of successfully reframing an issue by 
cutting its links with existing norms is the campaign to ban female genital mutilation. 
When the campaign first started in 1970s the advocates used more neutral terms such as 
“female circumcision, clitoridectomy, or infibulation”211 which did not trigger any major 
reaction. This was argued to be mainly a consequence of the existing norms about male 
circumcision. The campaign succeeded only when it reframed the issue as “female 
genital mutilation” because “by reframing the practice, the network broke the linkage 
with male circumcision (seen as a personal medical or cultural decision), implied a 
linkage with the more feared procedure – castration – and reframed the issue as one of 
violence against women. It thus resituated the problem as a human rights violation.”212 
The strategic function of framing is not limited to its role in appealing to target 
actors’ normative concerns. Advocates could also strategically adopt a frame to appeal to 
target actors’ material concerns, as well. In other words, framing could also be a tool in 
advocates’ hands in encouraging or coercing target actors to take action rather than 
convincing them of the issue’s normative importance. Such coercion could happen when 
advocates, by strategically packaging the problem, implicitly or explicitly “link the issue 
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of concern to money, trade, or prestige.”213 Framing the sweatshops problem as a human 
rights issue and linking it to the industry’s image to get them to react is an example of 
such calculation.
214
  
While most of the studies seek to explain advocates’ framing choices with their 
pursuit of attracting targets of influence, some studies acknowledge that advocates’ 
framing choices are not necessarily tailored toward them. Advocates framing choices can 
also be informed by their desire to attract potential allies to the campaign. As discussed 
above, even though NGOs are generally categorized as “principled actors,” as a growing 
literature illustrates, they are not only normative but also instrumental actors.
215
 Thus, 
they engage in strategic acts to maximize their reach and influence over other actors. An 
important component of such a strategy is to find a fertile ground that would provide a 
“receptive ear” for the advocates’ concerns to be heard. Most of the time, advocates’ 
limited material capacities prevent them from having direct impact on targets of 
influence. For this reason, they seek to get the attention of potential allies, actors with 
political capital and material leverage. As a number of scholars pointed out, getting the 
support of the “gatekeepers” is crucial for campaign success.216 Depending on the issue 
as well as on the advocates’ goals, a number of actors might be pursued as potential 
allies. These actors include states,
217
 international organizations,
218
 other NGOs as well as 
the media.
219
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Getting the allies “to take [the advocates’] side”220 is crucial for two reasons. 
First, the political capital as well as other material sources that these actors have at their 
disposal strengthens the material capacity of the advocates. The advocates engage in the 
above discussed “boomerang strategy,” where they appeal to more powerful actors and 
get them to put pressure on the targets of influence.
221
 In doing so the advocates engage 
in a double-strategy where they “keep pressure on decision-makers at home while 
simultaneously lobbying intergovernmental organisations’ and other states’ decision-
makers to put pressure on the state from the outside.”222 Second, getting the support of 
allies is crucial as, in addition to material resources, these allies also possess non-material 
resources such as institutional prestige which help the advocates legitimize their 
frames.
223
  
Despite the growing recognition of the role that gatekeepers play in shaping the 
success of advocacy campaigns, a very limited number of studies have looked at 
advocates’ framing choices from this perspective.224 Most notably, Clifford Bob looks 
into how insurgent movements frame their causes to match them to the gatekeeper 
organizations’ characteristics, and argues that these movements’ ability to “market” 
themselves to the gatekeepers was crucial in garnering gatekeeper support.
225
 Yet, more 
studies are needed to understand the dynamics of tailoring frames toward potential allies 
– an area to which this study contributes.  
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As discussed above, in choosing their frames advocates make strategic 
calculations about the normative and material concerns to which target actors and 
potential allies are most likely to be responsive. Yet, the advocates do not make these 
choices solely based on their evaluation of the strategic environment. Advocates’ fields 
of expertise and the information they have about campaigns that succeeded before them 
can also factor into advocates’ calculations in making their framing choices. For instance, 
Snyder argues that the advocates who took part in the ICBL learned from their 
experiences and worked to replicate those frames for International Action Network on 
Small Arms (IANSA).
226
 
The above presented review illustrated that advocates have normative and 
material calculations in choosing their frames. The review also further highlighted the 
delicateness of these choices as it showed that “resonance” guarantees neither framing 
nor advocacy success. Thus, the review discussed what motivates advocates’ framing 
choices, yet, it did not explain the processes through which advocates choose a particular 
frame over the others.   
Dynamics of Framing 
The ways in which issues are framed not only have implications for advocates’ 
ability to reach out to targets of influence and to potential allies but it also has 
implications for advocates themselves. As Corell and Betsill argue, once an issue makes 
it to the global agenda, issue frames shape the role that advocates play in the making of 
the policies as they “creat[e] a demand for a particular type of information, thereby 
privileging some actors and limiting which proposals delegates consider seriously.”227 
                                                 
226
 Snyder 2001. 
227
 Corell and Betsill 2008, 41. 
62 
 
For that reason framing is essentially a contested process among the advocates and it 
reflects the network dynamics.
228
 Yet, resolving this contestation early on is necessary if 
a campaign wants to succeed. This subsection discusses the process of framing and 
illustrates both the dynamics of contestation and its implications for the advocacy 
campaigns.  
The frames that advocacy campaigns use are “not a given, but rather a product of 
the struggle over meaning and ideas that occur among movement actors and between 
them and their antagonists.”229 On the one hand, framing is a source of competition 
among different advocates who agree on the importance of the issue yet disagree either 
on the reasons for its importance or on the actions that need to be taken in addressing the 
problem. These divergences lead to different frames to be invoked by different 
advocates.
230
 Resolving this contestation early on is important as not doing so has a 
potential to damage the advocates’ ability to put together a strong campaign. For 
instance, Ferrari observes in her comparative analysis of frames used by Catholic and 
non-Catholic NGOs that the discrepancy in their framing preferences functions as a major 
impediment in front of potential collaborative efforts and has a negative impact on their 
effectiveness.
231
  
A similar contestation is also observed between different actors within the anti-
human trafficking movement. Building on earlier work on this movement,
232
 Hernandez 
distinguishes between two framing approaches within the anti-human trafficking 
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campaign. While the first frame approaches the issue of human trafficking as a “gendered 
social problem,” the second approach frames the issue as a “direct result of structural 
economic conditions that support the exploitation of vulnerable peoples.”233 The 
contradicting approaches are important as they also offer contradicting solutions to the 
problem. While the former suggests that the trafficking, especially sex trafficking, can be 
tackled only if the demand is dismantled, the latter argues that the underlying economic 
consequences that pushes people into the hands of traffickers need to be addressed if a 
permanent solution to the problem is sought.
234
 A similar frame contestation also 
occurred during the female genital mutilation campaign. In order to tackle the earlier lack 
of interest to the campaign, some of the advocates wanted to replace “female 
circumcision” with “female genital mutilation.” Yet such efforts initially faced resistance 
from those who argued that such reframing would be a reflection of “cultural 
imperialism” and would result in the imposition of Western norms on local cultures; 
trying to resolve this disagreement cost the campaign valuable time.
235
  
While frame contestation can occur between actors who agree on the need to 
address the issue at hand but disagree on the methods and venues of doing so, such 
contestation can also occur between those who want to bring the issue onto the global 
agenda and those who want to keep it out of the spotlight. At this point the existence of 
counter-frames becomes even more important when each side has contradictory goals. 
For instance, as Shawki puts forward, one of the factors that limited the success of the 
IANSA was the National Rifle Association’s (NRA) ability to frame the issue around 
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“the right to bear arms” which contradicted the IANSA’s efforts to frame the issue as a 
threat to human wellbeing.
236
  
Target actors could also engage in counter-framing efforts to either stop a 
campaign or to re-channel the campaign to a less damaging trajectory for their interests. 
For instance, as a response to the “indigenous people’s rights” frame that the “Amazon 
forests campaign” promoted, the Timber Trade Foundation started a public relations 
campaign called Forests Forever: a campaign for wood where they aimed to reframe the 
trade and use of timber as an “environmentally friendly” choice.237  
While it is important to resolve frame contestation for the success of advocacy 
campaigns, multivocalization is a different activity that should not be confused with 
contestation. Multivocalization can be described as “the effort to speak simultaneously to 
multiple audiences”238 and it is a strategic act on the part of the advocates to better their 
chances of success. What distinguishes multivocalization is that it is a deliberate act on 
the part of the advocates to be “strategically ambiguous in their framing in an effort to 
say the same thing with different meaning for different groups.”239 For instance, Busby 
suggests that the HIV/AIDS campaign has deliberately framed the issue as a “public 
health issue, a human rights issue, a justice issue, a moral problem, an issue of 
intellectual property rights, and a security problem.”240 Similarly, Merry argues that 
human rights advocates engage in multivocalization when they are working to get states 
to abide by the established rules and norms. As Merry explains the advocates do so 
because on the one hand, they feel the need to appeal to the priorities of the international 
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community, and on the other hand they feel the need to reframe their arguments to make 
them acceptable for local communities.
241
 
As seen from the above review of the literature, the way in which issues are 
framed is crucial in determining transnational advocacy campaigns’ ability to place them 
on political agendas, and deciding on a frame is a complex process. Yet, despite the 
complexities identified by the TANs and framing literatures, those who analyze the 
securitized examples of transnational advocacy campaigns treat them as unique instances. 
The following review summarizes their arguments and shows how their insights can be 
developed further by treating securitization as an instance of framing  
Securitization as Framing 
Why do transnational advocacy campaigns adopt security frames? Following the 
arguments developed within the securitization literature, a number of studies analyzed the 
adoption of security discourses by advocacy campaigns and made claims about their role 
in attracting states’ attention and creating political change. Yet, these studies conducted 
such analyses based on the assumption that security frames have unique characteristics 
and implications that distinguish this type of framing from other instances of the activity.  
As a result of this approach, while highlighting important insights about 
successful examples of securitized campaigns, these studies fall short of appreciating the 
complex motivations behind advocates’ use of security frames; the reasons that audience 
has in accepting such claims; and the various impact that securitization could have on 
both the direction and the success of a transnational advocacy campaign. This subsection 
reviews the contributions that these studies provide into the role of securitization in 
transnational advocacy campaigns; the limitations of these arguments and the insights to 
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be gained by treating securitization as an instance of framing rather than a unique 
process.  
In analyzing the role of securitization in advocacy campaigns only a few scholars 
perceive it to be natural development that is based on the factual connections between the 
issue at hand and its security implications, whereas most of the studies evaluate 
securitization as a strategic act on the part of the advocates. For instance, in analyzing the 
securitization of environmental problems, some scholars suggest a causal link between 
environmental problems and security threats.
242
 For these researchers the link drawn 
between environmental problems and security is not a strategic one that was utilized to 
prioritize environmental issues on the agenda, but rather a factual one. For instance, 
Homer-Dixon suggests that “environmental change may contribute to conflicts as diverse 
as war, terrorism, or diplomatic and trade disputes… it may have different causal roles: in 
some cases, it may be a proximate and powerful cause; in others, it may only be a minor 
and distant player in a tangled story that involves many political, economic and physical 
factors.”243 Similarly the Acute Conflict Project that brought together forty researchers 
from different continents concluded that “although environmental scarcities are often 
hidden by immediate political, ethnic, or ideological factors, they are already-
contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world.”244 
 If we were to analyze these studies’ approach from the TANs and framing 
literatures’ perspective, securitization appears to be a reflection of the strategic 
environment within which the campaign operates. In other words, the argued security 
implications are reflections of the “issue attributes” that were discussed above rather than 
                                                 
242
 Such as Gleick 1989; Tuchman-Mathews 1989; Brown 1990; Lipschutz and Holdren 1990.  
243
 Homer-Dixon 1991, 77.  
244
 Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon 1995, 27. 
67 
 
a strategic act on the part of the advocates. The agency of the actors here is limited to 
utilizing the issue attributes in support of their efforts rather than strategically packaging 
the issue.   
Yet, most of the scholars believe that securitization of different issues is a result 
of strategic calculations rather than a reflection of observable and undeniable connections 
between the issue at hand and the security threats that it is argued to present. These 
approaches imply agency for the “securitizing actors” (both state and non-state) and 
acknowledge the strategic reasoning behind these framing choices. One of the issue areas 
where we see such evaluation is the environmental issues.
245
 Most notably, the efforts to 
bring climate change onto the forefront of the global agenda have raised heated debates 
on the security implications of environmental issues. As a part of the efforts to attract 
attention to climate change, the issue was first framed as an environmental issue but then 
got securitized over time. As Scott suggests “the framing of climate change as a threat to 
security, as opposed to solely an environmental or political challenge, is one example of 
the recent broadening of the concept of security beyond the traditional realm of external 
military threats to a State.”246 The perceived link between security and climate change 
stems from the proposition that climate change creates failed and weak states.  These 
states, in return, are argued to function as “safe havens” for terrorists.247 Such an 
approach treats securitization as a strategic act on the part of the actors and in that respect 
replicates the basic logic of framing.  
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As opposed to the implicit and explicit similarities between the arguments of 
framing and securitization studies discussed above, the dialogue comes to a halt when the 
studies go onto explain the reasons behind using security frames and the implications of 
such uses for the success of advocacy campaigns both in the short and the long-run.  
The studies informed by the insights of the securitization literature treat 
securitization as a strategic act but almost as an inevitable one given the implications it 
has. The unique role that security concerns are theorized to occupy on actors’ agendas is 
treated to be enough of a reason to explain the advocates’ motivations in using security 
frames and hence this approach distinguishes securitization from other strategic acts of 
framing. As Hudson quotes from her interview with a UN official “… the political 
establishment, not just the establishment, but political people who are in politics in 
general… they respond, their lights go up when they hear security aspects… and so, then 
what is left to strategizers… [is] to remind them… on the threat of security.”248  
However, treating the motivations behind securitization as self-explanatory leaves 
the insights that the framing literature provide (such as the role of the strategic 
environment, issue attributes, network dynamics) out. Not incorporating this information 
is an important omission because, as discussed above, not every advocacy campaign 
resorts to security frames and, as it is discussed in the following chapters, not all 
securitized campaigns succeed.  Thus, expanding the analytical purchase of the claims 
made about the reasons behind using security frames requires us to look at the broader 
picture and comparatively analyze securitized cases with non-securitized ones in order to 
appreciate the strategic motivations behind using them.  
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The “not just another frame” approach implied in the securitization studies’ 
premises also finds its reflection in the literature’s evaluation of the long-term 
implications of using security frames. The studies that analyze the implications of 
securitizing advocacy campaigns illustrate the trade-off between the short-term 
advantages of using security frames versus the long-term implications of such choices for 
the content and the reach of the policy outcomes. The arguments about the long-term 
negative implications of using security frames are explained away with the uniqueness 
attributed to security frames by this literature. The securitization is argued to inevitably 
lead to the removal of the issue from the realm of normal politics and legitimization of 
extraordinary measures which is not a desired outcome from a democratic perspective. 
Yet, essentializing the consequences of using security frames limits our ability to 
appreciate varying implications that securitization might have for both the direction and 
the success of a campaign.  
The arguments about the long-term negative implications of securitization that are 
based on the uniqueness of the security frames find their reflections in the studies ranging 
from environment, migration and international aid to HIV/AIDS. For instance, Levy 
suggests in analyzing the potential threats that environmental problems pose for the 
USA’s security that:  
ozone depletion and climate change are the only significant environmental 
problems that currently pose a direct physical harm to U.S. interests. While both 
problems can thus properly be considered as security problems, and both warrant 
serious responses, it is not clear whether engaging in the first task facilitates the 
second. Although many analysts accept in principle the connection between these 
environmental risks and security, there is no evidence that this affects in any way 
the kind of research they undertake or the kind of recommendations they make. 
The equation does not appear to do any great good, and the ozone example 
suggests that in some cases better results can be obtained without it.
249
  
                                                 
249
 Levy 1995, 61. 
70 
 
 
Deudney has a similar approach and claims that securitization of environmental 
issues are damaging both to national security and also to the environment. Deudney takes 
a strong stance on the issue and suggests that:  
Another motive for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to natural 
security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a 
sense of urgency. But before harnessing the old horse of national security to pull 
the heavy new environmental wagon, one must examine its temperament... Yet 
the national security mentality engenders an enviable sense of urgency, and a 
corresponding willingness to accept great personal sacrifice. Unfortunately, these 
emotions may be difficult to sustain. Crises call for resolution, and the patience of 
a mobilized populace is rarely long. A cycle of arousal and somnolence is unlikely 
to establish permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior, and “crash” 
solutions are often bad ones.
250
 
 
In analyzing the securitization of environmental issues neither of these authors questions 
either the potential variation in the long-term implications of using security frames nor 
the potential role of alternative reasons (other than securitization) in leading to these 
negative outcomes (such as lack of public interest (audience’s priorities), lack of 
international cooperation (network dynamics), the problems’ own dynamics that makes 
the issue difficult to solve (issue attributes).  
The studies that analyze the securitization of international development aid also 
adopt a mostly uncritical approach to the implications of securitization. During 1990s, 
international development aid was framed as a human rights and development concern, 
yet as the literature contends, a drastic shift towards the adoption of a security frame took 
place in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
251
 The appropriation of the issue 
within a security frame is argued to have changed the nature of the international aid 
where the recipients were decided not based on need but based on the security threats that 
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countries are believed to present.
252
 In analyzing the securitization of development aid, 
the literature criticizes the use of security language by calling it the “dark side” of aid253 
where “prepackaged democratic transitions often results in violence and deterioration of 
the rule of law.”254 While these studies underscore into the implications of securitization 
for those who are in need of international aid, treating the use of the security language as 
self-explanatory in the post-September 11 political context limits the explanatory power 
of this approach as not every issue has been securitized in this context. Thus, the strategic 
environment within which campaigns operate inform advocates’ strategies and affect the 
direction that campaigns take but, as the framing literature explains, these factors by 
themselves do not dictate the success of an advocacy campaign.  
Similar limitations also appear in the studies that analyze the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS. When we look at the history of the HIV/AIDS campaign, we observe that the 
campaign succeeded once it started using a combination of human rights and 
development frames. The campaign resulted in the recognition of the fight against 
HIV/AIDS as one of the six Millennium Development Goals. The use of security frames 
came at the later stages of global policy making – after the issue found a place on the 
global agenda. In 2000, UNSC held a meeting to discuss the threat that HIV/AIDS poses 
to international security which concluded with a resolution stating that “if unchecked, 
[HIV/AIDS] may pose a risk to stability and security.”255 Al Gore, in addressing the 
meeting suggested that “the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa is not just a 
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humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis because it threatens not just individual citizens, 
but the very institutions that define and defend the character of a society.”256  
When approached from the securitization literature’s perspective the reason 
behind these actors’ adoption of the security language is to justify the use of 
extraordinary measures in addressing the problem. It is true that, like any other instance 
of framing, securitization shaped the direction of the campaign by emphasizing one 
aspect of the issue over the others. This act of packaging the issue then, as also argued by 
the framing and TANs literatures, informed the policies developed. Yet, as we see in the 
case of the HIV/AIDS, the policies developed based on a security frame are not 
necessarily the military ones. Recognizing this does not take away from the criticisms 
waged against the implications of the policies developed. As Elbe argues, the recent shift 
from a human rights frame to a security frame moved the issue away from civil society 
groups (which traditionally stood at the center of the efforts to eradicate HIV/AIDS) to 
state institutions and replaced the concerns about human rights with that of state 
security.
257
 However, we benefit from an analysis of securitization through framing 
because it highlights the varying policy implications that securitization might lead to.  
In the above reviewed studies securitization is argued to be an undesirable process 
as it is expected to lead to the use of extraordinary measures. Yet, not everybody agrees 
with this assumption, for instance, Maertens argue that securitization of the 
environmental issues could lead to a different type of de-politicization where the 
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emphasis on the security implications of these issues open up more room for non-
politicized scientific approaches to be heard.
258
  
It is also important to note that not all studies suggest that the use of security 
frames lead to development of undesired global policies. For instance, in the case of 
women’s rights, Hudson suggests that the securitization of women’s rights issues paved 
the way to the signing of UNSC Resolution 1325 which recognizes “the importance of 
women in international peace and security, making women and women’s needs relevant 
to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations, 
reconstructing war torn societies, and ultimately making gender equality relevant to every 
single Security Council action,”259and therefore securitization led to a positive outcome.  
Approaching the issue from these studies’ perspective highlights two factors: (i) 
security frames provide a unique opportunity to get states’ attention to an issue that they 
would not otherwise be willing to address, and (ii) using security frames come with a 
price to pay in the long-run. Comparing these insights with the above discussed 
successful examples of non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns begs the question: 
if a campaign can succeed without a security frame and if securitizing an issue comes 
with a price, then why do advocates use such frames? Approaching securitization as an 
instance of framing and utilizing the lessons gained through framing and TANs literatures 
would help us explore these questions.  
Attempts to Start a Dialogue between Securitization and Framing Literatures 
The brief overview presented above illustrates that a number of case studies 
applied the insights gained from securitization literature in their attempts to explain the 
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role of security frames in leading to advocacy success. Nevertheless, these studies’ 
contributions remain limited as they conducted their analysis by treating securitization as 
a unique process to be distinguished from other instances of framing. The studies that 
analyzed securitization of advocacy campaigns mostly replicated the insights and the 
premises of securitization literature onto their subject of analysis rather than combining 
them with those of framing literature. This resulted in the treatment of securitization as a 
distinct process rather than an instance of framing which in return led to under-analyzed 
assumptions to be made about the importance and dynamics of securitization.  
 A small number of scholars started to take an issue with this approach and 
problematized the limited dialogue between securitization and framing literatures.
260
 
Their main concern is the securitization literature’s portrayal of “security as a unique 
discourse with a distinct logic and political effect.”261 This attributed uniqueness is a 
reflection of the assumption that securitizing an issue brings it out of the realm of normal 
politics and into the “realm of exception.”262 Yet, as critics highlight what constitutes 
normal realm of politics is problematic as it is not a definitive arena.
263
 For that reason, 
security, according to these critics, can be considered as another “master frame” that 
leads to particular set of actions just like other master frames.
264
  
Those who call for further collaboration between framing and securitization 
literatures also argue that even though these two fields tend to keep their approaches 
separate, significant commonalities exist between the two. As Entman puts it, framing is, 
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“selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”265 In that respect, as 
Watson evaluates, securitization is an example of such process with a specific focus on 
defining a problem as a security threat and it needs to be treated as such.
266
  
This study builds on the lessons of this newly developing approach and conducts 
its analysis by applying the insights gained from the framing literature to the study of 
securitization of transnational advocacy campaigns. By adopting such an approach the 
study aims to test whether the uniqueness attributed to security is a consequence of the 
myopic focus of the securitization literature and, if that is the case, which factors can 
better explain advocates’ decisions to use these frames. 
Limitations of Using Securitization Theory in Explaining Advocacy Success 
The literature has provided important insights into the inner dynamics of 
transnational advocacy campaigns and the role they play in shaping global politics. 
However, despite the recent attempts to create a dialogue between framing and 
securitization literatures, in its current state, the literature suffers from conceptual and 
methodological limitations in illustrating the role that security frames play in the success 
of advocacy campaigns.  
The limited dialogue between securitization, framing and TANs literatures curtails 
the securitization literature’s ability to explain the motivations behind adopting a security 
frame and the conditions that translate such choices into campaign success. In its current 
state, the answer that the securitization literature provides for such an inquiry is relatively 
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straight forward: actors resort to security frames in appealing to states’ agendas and such 
an attempt brings success (given that the audience is convinced about the security 
implications of the issue at hand) because states prioritize security concerns over 
everything else. Yet as explained in detail above, the framing and TANs literatures 
illustrate that: (i) advocates can have a number of motivations when framing an issue in a 
particular way; (ii) advocates might have different audiences that they want to influence; 
and (iii) states might be more receptive of different frames for varying reasons (such as 
moral, economic, and political factors). Limitedness of studies that employ these insights 
into the study of securitized transnational advocacy campaigns creates the risk of 
overlooking these dynamics.   
Similarly, these studies also run the risk of overlooking previously failed attempts 
to securitize an issue. Lack of such insights can create the illusion that securitization of an 
issue was inevitable or that securitization played a determining role in the success of a 
campaign, which may not have been the case. For instance, Elbe presents a detailed 
analysis of how HIV/AIDS has been recently securitized and discusses the implications 
of such securitization.
267
 While Elbe’s study tells us a great deal about the impact that 
security frames had at the policy implementation stage, it overlooks the previously failed 
attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS.  Similarly, in her discussion of women’s rights, Hudson 
limits her analysis to what this study refers to as political commitment stage by focusing 
on how women’s rights issues are framed as security threats and found their way to 
UNSC resolutions.
268
 While Hudson’s study affords a detailed account of how and why 
the issue was framed as a security threat at that particular stage, its limited focus on one 
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stage curtails its ability to fully appreciate the framing efforts leading up to the political 
commitment stage, as well as the implications of security frames in shaping the policies 
developed after the UNSC Resolution.  
The existing works on securitized examples of transnational advocacy campaigns 
also suffer from methodological shortcomings. The studies in the literature are generally 
composed of single-case studies
269
 or edited volumes.
270
 While case studies contribute to 
our understanding of social phenomena,
271
 relying solely on case-study method limits the 
“opportunities for systematically testing hypotheses.”272 The lack of comparative studies 
presents a problem as it makes it difficult for us to observe “the dogs that didn’t bark.” In 
other words, the lack of systematic comparison across cases limits our ability to identify 
the cases where either attempts to securitize did not hold, or cases where securitized 
campaigns fell short of claiming a place on the global agenda. 
The lack of systematic comparison across cases also means that the campaigns 
where success reached without resorting to a security frame get overlooked. This, in 
return, results in the formulation of untested assumptions about both the frequency at 
which security frames are used and the extent to which securitization positively correlates 
with the success of transnational advocacy efforts. As discussed above, many campaigns 
such as Female Genital Mutilation, Maternal Mortality, Child Labor and International 
Criminal Court (ICC) have reached considerable levels of success in creating global 
policies without resorting to a security frame. The lack of systematic comparison 
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overlooks cases like these and creates a misleadingly positive perception about the extent 
to which securitization matters.  
It is important to address the shortcomings of the literature and understand 
whether securitization matters for three main reasons. First, it is critical for our ability to 
move the theoretical discussion forward. The widening and deepening of the field of 
security has been both a significant and a risky direction to take. While this approach 
allows us to appreciate the dynamic nature of the security field, it also runs the risk of 
categorizing anything and everything as a security threat. This in turn, can potentially 
eliminate the securitization literature’s analytical leverage and turn the concept of 
security into an empty signifier.  
Second, testing the positive assumptions made by the securitization literature 
about the role that security frames play in bringing success to advocacy campaigns is 
important in improving our understanding of advocacy campaigns; the advocates’ 
framing choices; and the dynamics that translate these choices into success.  
Third, it is important to consider the question of “why securitize” because it has 
real world implications. As the above presented discussion reveals, framing an issue in a 
particular way shapes whether the issue gets attention and if it does, in which venues and 
through which policies. Securitization “often does more than just potentially open the 
political scene to groups from the extreme right, for example. It entails structural effects 
by reconfiguring and ordering societies on the model of emergency and exception.”273 
Therefore, in dealing with an issue that has a potential to create a lasting impact on how 
we perceive and conduct politics, it is crucial to discern the nuances that are otherwise 
disregarded.  
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The Study’s Contribution to the Literature 
The above review of the literature illustrates that applying the lessons of the 
securitization literature has been useful for both the study of transnational advocacy 
campaigns and also for the securitization literature itself. The former benefitted from the 
detailed analysis of securitized advocacy campaigns, whereas the latter benefitted from 
the application of the theory at the transnational level. Yet these studies’ contribution to 
our understanding of why advocacy campaigns use security frames remain to be as 
limited as the premises on which they establish their insights. These limitations prevent 
the studies from questioning multiple dynamics that shape the decisions to use security 
frames and varying implications such decisions have on the direction and the success 
level of a campaign.  
The conventional answer to this study’s research question is that security frames 
are uniquely powerful in bringing success to transnational advocacy campaigns. Yet, 
such an answer begs the question of why security frames are chosen only under certain 
conditions and why not all securitized campaigns succeed. It is not possible to credibly 
answer these questions by the existing studies as there are not enough comparative 
studies to test their validity.  
I explore these questions by treating securitization as an instance of framing and 
by applying the insights and arguments developed in the TANs and framing literatures to 
test those of securitization literature. The study puts the uniqueness attributed to security 
frames into question. In doing so, rather than claiming security frames to be 
epiphenomenal, the study illustrates the importance of developing a more nuanced 
understanding of securitization by showing the similarities between how security frames 
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and other frames function. On the one hand, such analysis provides a chance to 
recalibrate the importance attached to security frames and better situate them within the 
broader field of advocacy frames. Such an approach is especially important in 
reevaluating the reasons behind the sustained use of security frames even when the frame 
is no longer perceived to be desirable. On the other hand, the analysis betters our 
understanding of securitization by deepening our knowledge about the dynamics and 
motivations surrounding the decisions to adopt such frames.  
The study’s contribution to the literature is not limited to the securitization 
studies. The study also contributes to the framing and TANs literatures by expanding our 
knowledge of how TANs function as well as by deepening our insights into the dynamics 
of norm-building. The study presents evidence that highlights the role of complex set of 
structural and non-structural factors in shaping not only the advocates’ framing choices 
but also determining the level of impact that framing choices have on the success of 
advocacy campaigns. In addition to these theoretical implications, the study also makes 
methodological contributions and illustrates the importance of conducting more 
systematic case comparisons to better explain the claims that single-case studies fall short 
of adequately testing.  
The study conducts its analysis in three stages and each stage helps this 
dissertation make the above listed arguments from a different angle. The medium-n 
comparison discussed in the following chapter challenges the claims about the 
uniqueness of security frames and shows the importance of comparative analysis. The 
comparative case study that follows further tests the role of security frames and also 
provides insights into dynamics and mechanisms of framing. The in-depth analysis of the 
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Conflict Diamonds campaign then presents a closer look at a securitized advocacy 
campaign and allows us to test whether the insights gained from the literature (that are 
also evidenced in Chapter Four) can be used in explaining the dynamics of securitized 
advocacy campaigns.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY 
CAMPAIGNS’ USE OF SECURITY FRAMES 
 
Introduction 
 This study addresses the question of “why securitize” in three stages. In the first 
stage, the study tests the assumption that suggests a correlation between the use of 
security frames and successfully addressing a transnational problem. The second stage 
engages in a comparative analysis of nine securitized, non-securitized and de-securitized 
cases in order to better understand the factors that shape advocates’ framing choices and 
how such choices translate into advocacy success. Based on the findings of the first two 
stages, the third stage conducts a detailed analysis of a securitized case (Conflict 
Diamonds) to reveal how the dynamics identified in the previous chapters play out in a 
securitized campaign.  
This chapter is dedicated to the first stage of the analysis and it engages in a 
systematic comparison of thirty-eight cases of global advocacy campaigns to disclose 
whether securitized campaigns are more likely to succeed than non-securitized ones.  
In doing so, the chapter discusses the case selection, coding and the analysis of the data. 
The findings challenge the importance and the uniqueness attributed to security frames in 
three ways: first, the comparative analysis shows that advocacy campaigns do not resort 
to security frames as frequently as implied by the literature. Second, even when security 
language is adopted, evidence does not show a clear link between the adoption of a 
security frame and success at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making. Thus, 
as the next chapter will further elaborate, adopting a security frame is revealed to be 
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neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for success. Lastly, the findings also 
illustrate that the sustained use of frames in transitioning from the political commitment 
stage to policy implementation stage is not unique to security frames and the impact it 
has on policy making. 
Case Selection 
Defining a “case” 
 In compiling the comparative part of the study, the first order of business was to 
define which campaigns would be counted as a “case” for the purpose of this study. 
There are a countless number of transnational problems and consequently there are a 
number of efforts – ranging from scattered to coordinated – to address them. However, 
analyzing all of these issues together is neither practical nor analytically useful. Thus, I 
have begun by elaborating the criteria on which the universe of cases was compiled.  
 The first criterion in defining the universe of cases was the time period during 
which the advocacy efforts took place. The divided nature of the Cold War politics 
confined the efforts to address transnational problems into limited geographies. For that 
reason, to be able to talk about ‘global’ agenda setting and policy making, I have decided 
to focus on agenda setting and policy making efforts that either started or were/are active 
in the post-Cold War era.  
 The second criterion was regarding the nature of the efforts in addressing a 
transnational problem. Since my goal in this study is to understand the effects of adopting 
a security language for advocacy campaigns, I needed to focus on cases where we 
observe a coordinated campaign. Transnational advocacy campaigns are not the only 
actors that initiate global agenda setting and policy making. States themselves do take 
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initiatives in prioritizing transnational problems on their agendas and they sometimes 
resort to security frames in doing so. For instance, the recent Ebola outbreak was quick to 
become a priority on the global agenda and has also undergone a rapid process of 
securitization, wherein a number of political leaders openly called it a threat to national 
and international security.
274
 However, such agenda setting and policy making was not 
initiated by cross-sectorial global advocacy efforts. Since the goal of the research is to 
understand the impact that security frames have on global agenda setting and policy 
making efforts, the Ebola issue is not counted as a case for the purpose of this study.  
 The third criterion was the level of initial success reached by the advocacy efforts. 
There are a countless number of attempts to start transnational campaigns in addressing 
various transnational problems. However, most of these efforts have not garnered enough 
support to claim a place on the global agenda, and hence remained to be “non-issues.”275 
Since the primary purpose of this study is to understand the link between the use of 
security frames and success, rather than focusing on cases that failed from the start, I 
chose to focus on cases that reached at least an initial level of success.
276
  
Compiling the universe of cases 
Having set the basic criteria for choosing the cases and given the scope and the 
purposes of this study, Joshua Busby’s dataset was used as a starting point in determining 
the universe of cases to be analyzed. Busby’s dataset (2010) is titled “Transnational 
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Principled Advocacy Movements in the Post-Cold War Era (1990 - )” and it is composed 
of information regarding thirty-six transnational advocacy movements with varying 
degrees of agenda setting and “political success.”277 The list of cases provided by Busby 
(2010) is an extensive but not an exhaustive one.
278
 Nonetheless, it is still the most 
systematic medium-N dataset available at this time.  
The original dataset developed by Busby does not aim to identify or compare 
advocacy frames used by “moral movements.” Rather it aims to present a list of all major 
global advocacy campaigns conducted in the aftermath of the Cold War. Since frames 
played no role in the composition of the original dataset, using it as the starting point 
helps this study to stay away from a potential “selection bias.”  
Since I used Busby’s dataset only as a starting point and since it did not provide 
information on the frames used by the campaigns, I expanded the dataset in a number of 
ways. As a first step, the dataset was used only as a starting point to compile a list of 
cases to include in the study and not as the primary source of information on any of the 
major indicators pertaining to this study’s analysis. Additionally, to ensure validity, the 
original dataset was cross-checked to highlight any differences of opinion or 
contradictory evidence that might exist in the literature.
279
 As the focus of Busby’s 
dataset was not security frames in particular, or frames in general, I conducted an 
extensive analysis of the available sources to identify and add any campaigns that (i) 
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were left out of the original dataset as they did not fit the criteria used by Busby, or (ii) 
gained momentum after the original dataset was compiled.  
In an effort to track down the missing cases, I surveyed various academic sources 
to identify the works written on transnational advocacy campaigns and securitization. I 
surveyed Academic Search Premier, Social Science Citation Index, ProQuest Political 
Science, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), Project MUSE, Peace Research 
Abstracts, LexisNexis Academic and Google Scholar databases searching for “campaign,” 
“global,” “transnational advocacy/issue networks,” “framing,” “securitization,” 
“security,” and “threat” separately as keywords. I then read through the identified 
scholarly work and the works cited by them to track down understudied cases.  
As is discussed in detail below, finding a place on the UN Security Council’s 
agenda is one of the indicators of securitization used for the purpose of this study. 
Therefore, to supplement the above explained survey, I have gone through the UN 
Security Council Resolutions since 1990
280
 and looked for non-traditional security issues 
that found a place on the Council’s agenda. When such instances are detected, I have 
conducted a search on worldwide web to see if any campaign could be associated with 
the issue at hand.  
I have also gone through the websites of the NGOs who played a central role in 
the campaigns analyzed by this study to ascertain whether there are any new issues where 
the NGOs use a security language in explaining or advocating and that has not been 
studied academically.
281
 When security language is identified, a closer reading of the 
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material was conducted to see (i) whether the context of the security language was 
national/international security, and (ii) whether the issue has garnered enough support to 
be counted as a “case” for the purpose of this study. In determining the level of support 
that such campaigns received, I looked into (i) whether any other non-governmental or 
governmental organization has picked the issue up or lent support to it or (ii) given that 
an issue could be brought to global agenda by the efforts of only one NGO, whether the 
issue has found a place on the UN agenda is used as a measure of agenda setting success, 
as discussed in detail below. As a last measure, a web search was conducted using the 
above listed keywords to double-check for any websites, news items, or reports that 
might have gone unnoticed in conducting the prior searches. 
As a result of the data collection process, six new cases that used a security frame 
at least at one stage of global agenda setting and policy making were identified and added 
to the universe of cases to be analyzed. These cases are Avian Influenza, Conflict 
Diamonds, Climate Refugees, Illegal Wildlife Trade, Sexual Violence in Conflict, and 
Women Peace and Security. 
While Busby’s dataset constituted the pool of cases that this study used as a 
starting point, not all of the cases in the dataset were included in this study. For the cases 
to contribute to the purpose of this study it was essential that (i) frames that campaigns 
used, and (ii) the success that the campaigns reached at different stages of global agenda 
setting and policy making can be traced over time. Four of the cases listed in the original 
dataset (Civilian Protection, Marine Conservation, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
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Refugees) were left out after initial analysis as they do not fit into the criteria used by this 
research.  
The issue of Marine Conservation was left out as the initial research indicated that 
the advocacy efforts surrounding the issue was too disperse to analyze the use of a 
particular frame over another at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making.
282
 
Civilian Protection,
283
 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
284
 and Refugees
285
 campaigns were 
excluded from the analysis as these issues were already on the global agenda before the 
campaigns under investigation have picked up. As opposed to other cases in the dataset, 
these campaigns did not aim to bring the issues onto the global agenda but rather aimed 
to rekindle the global interest in these issues and revitalize the efforts to develop policies 
in addressing them.  
Operationalizing the Variables 
Once the universe of cases to be analyzed was determined, the next step was to 
decide how to define the key concepts of securitization and success to test whether any 
correlation exists between the two. To that end, I developed the data in two ways. I added 
securitization as the independent variable and then I took a detailed look at the dependent 
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variable (i.e. success) and analyzed it separately for three stages of global policy making: 
agenda setting, political commitment, and policy implementation.
286
    
Coding the Independent Variable: Securitization  
For the purpose of this study, an issue is identified as securitized when (i) the 
issue is defined as a security threat/concern; (ii) the issue’s worthiness of international 
attention is explained based on the security threat it presents; (iii) the campaign asks a 
security organization (i.e. the UNSC) to take action; and/or (iv) military response is the 
suggested course of action. Various documents such as reports, press releases, letters to 
the editors, mission statements, and conference proposals were analyzed in coding the 
securitization variable.  
For every stage of global policy making, I analyzed the cases to see if security 
frame was the dominant frame at that particular stage and if it was, then I identified when 
and by whom it was introduced.
 287
 As discussed in the previous chapter, securitization 
literature suggests that understanding a securitizing move requires us to understand at 
least three factors: who the securitizing actor is,
288
 the venue in which the securitizing 
move takes place and the audience
289
 - the actor(s) whose opinion that the securitizing 
actor aims to shape. Following this insight, once the security rhetoric was identified, the 
second step was to look at the “securitizing actor,” the actor or the actors who introduced 
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and/or championed the security frame. The possibility that there could be more than one 
set of actors who use different frames was taken into consideration and identified when 
detected. As the third step the audience and the venue of the securitizing move were 
identified. Venue refers to the place where the security frame was championed and the 
audience refers to the actors whose behavior that the advocates aim to change (See Table 
1). 
When the dominant frame adopted at a particular stage was not a security one, 
then, the dominant frame at that stage was identified. I acknowledged that (i) at any stage 
there could be a combination of frames that is dominant (such as the use of human health 
and environment frames at the political commitment stage of Anti-toxics campaigns);
290
 
and (ii) at any stage we can see shifts between different frames (such as the shift that 
HIV/AIDS campaign has experienced from health to human rights and then to 
development frames at the agenda setting stage
291
). Such instances were noted when 
observed.  
It was also acknowledged that security frame might have been introduced at a 
stage yet might have fallen short of becoming the dominant frame. These cases were also 
noted with the idea that presence of a security frame, even if it is not the dominant one, is 
important in understanding the processes through which securitizing moves take place.  
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Table 1: Sample Coding for Securitization 
 policy outcome 
campaign 
security 
frame 
dominant 
frame 
type of 
security 
rhetoric 
author/ 
securitizing 
actor 
venue 
audience/ 
target 
AIDS 
campaign 
yes 
security
292
 
"threat to 
international 
security" 
“threat to 
national 
security”293 
President  Bill 
Clinton and 
Vice- 
President Al 
Gore
294
 
UNSC
295
 states
296
 
 
Coding the Dependent Variable: Success of Global Policy Making 
Global policy making was divided into three stages for the purpose of this study. 
The first stage is titled “agenda setting stage” and refers to the placing of the issue on the 
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meeting on a health issue which marked the beginning of approaching the issue of HIV/AIDS from a 
security perspective at the global level. (“Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of AIDS on Peace and 
Security in Africa,” UN Press Release SC/6781, 10 January 2010, available at 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000110.sc6781.doc.html>, accessed 12 February 2012.)  
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 In his speech at the UNSC’s special session on HIV/AIDS, Al Gore not only detailed out the steps that 
the US has taken in addressing the issue but also declared the fight against HIV/AIDS a battle to be fought 
through collaboration among states. “We here in this room – representing the billions of people of the 
world -- we must become the promise of hope and of change. We must become the promise of life itself. 
We have the knowledge, the compassion, and the means to make a difference. We must acknowledge our 
moral duty and accept our great and grave responsibility to succeed.” (“UN Security Council Session on 
AIDS in Africa Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Vice President Al Gore,” 10 January 2000, available at 
<http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/unaid_health.html>, accessed 12 February 
2013.)  
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global agenda by convincing the allies and the target actors to the significance of the 
issue. The second stage is the “political commitment” stage. This stage refers to the level 
of global policy making where target actors go beyond acknowledging the issue’s 
importance and publicly commit to address it. The third stage is the “policy 
implementation” stage and refers to the phase where target actors follow through with the 
commitments they made and take tangible steps in addressing the problem.  
Agenda Setting Success 
The primary indicator I used for measuring success at the agenda setting stage 
was UN General Assembly Resolutions. The issues that led to UNGA resolutions were 
considered as salient on the global agenda as resolutions are “formal expressions of the 
opinion or will of United Nations organs.”297 Resolutions require either simple majority 
(for most of the issues) or qualified majority for “important issues” (such as the ones 
concerning security and peace, and membership issues). For that reason, they are 
considered to be better indicators of the saliency of an issue on the UN agenda than mere 
discussions on the issue at the General Assembly (which does not require majority of the 
states’ agreement). Moreover, since the resolutions are not binding, they make it possible 
to distinguish between issues that only found a place on the agenda from the issues that 
has led to political commitment and policy implementation.  
After conducting this analysis I realized that this indicator alone was not enough 
to understand all of the cases at hand as not all cases targeted the UN as its venue. 
Notably, the cases that are mainly economic had smaller set of states whose behavior 
they aimed to change and therefore, they pursued their campaigns in different venues 
                                                 
297 United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, “UN Resolution,” available at 
<http://research.un.org/en/docs/resolutions>, accessed 12 February 2013. 
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(such as the G8). Therefore, I expanded the indicator to include all the resolutions taken 
by the targeted venue given that the resolutions require the support of at least the majority 
of the members.  
Political Commitment Success 
As discussed in the previous chapter, successfully putting an issue on the global 
agenda does not guarantee that this success will translate into successfully convincing the 
relevant actors to commit to solve the issue. Many issues promoted by transnational 
advocacy campaigns find a place on the global agenda yet fail to initiate action on the 
part of the target actors. International treaties become binding when they are ratified and 
ratification is neither automatic nor obligatory.
298
 As Barrett articulates “writing a treaty 
that tells parties to reduce their emissions is easy. Making countries want to participate in 
such a treaty, and making participants want to comply with it, is much harder.”299 
Therefore, it is important to analyze the connection between security frames and success 
at political commitment and policy implementation stages separately from the connection 
they have at the agenda setting stage. 
For the purpose of this study, a campaign is considered to have successfully 
created political commitment when the target actors take an action to declare their 
commitment to addressing the issue. This commitment can be in various forms, including 
but not limited to: pledging of funds; attending to the related international meetings and 
conferences; endorsing a suggested meeting, resolution or treaty; agreeing to become a 
member of the related international body; or signing an international treaty. Once the 
level of success at this stage was identified, various documents such as treaties, protocols 
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 Simmons 2010. 
299
 Barrett 2003: xiv. For more on different arguments in the literature on why states commit to 
international treaties see such as Moravcsik 2000; Hathaway 2007; and Simmons 2009; 2010. 
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and international institutions’ mission statements’ were analyzed in deciding whether 
security frames were used or not using the criteria explained above.  
Measuring success at political commitment stage proved to be more difficult as 
different issues require different set of actions to be taken by the target actors. For 
instance, some cases require mainly financial commitment yet others require the 
establishment of a new institution, while others necessitates changes to be made to 
domestic laws and regulations. Therefore, to account for these nuances, I chose to 
approach “success” at this stage as a “sphere” rather than a single point to be reached 
(See Table 2).  
Table 2: Sample Coding – Success at Political Commitment Stage 
campaign 
preparing 
reports 
pledging 
of funds 
attending to 
related 
international 
meetings 
and 
conferences 
endorsing 
a 
suggested 
meeting, 
resolution 
or treaty 
agreeing to 
become a 
member of the 
related 
international 
body 
signing an 
international 
treaty 
Anti-
GMOs 
no
300
 NA
301
 yes
302
 mixed
303
 NA
304
 mixed
305
 
                                                 
300
 No specific report that was prepared by states prior to the political commitment stage can be associated 
with meetings conducted at this stage.  
301
 The primary goal of the signed Protocol is “international agreement which aims to ensure the safe 
handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology 
that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.”  
(“The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol>, accessed 18 May 2012.) 
Pledging of funds by the states in dealing with the issue was not a priority for the campaign; hence, it is 
indicated as NA (Not Applicable). 
302
 A series of meetings took place which led to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. (“History of the 
Convention,” available at <http://www.cbd.int/history/>, accessed 18 May 2012.)  
303
 While the meetings and the signed Protocol has brought a number of states and non-state actors together, 
it did not get endorsement from the main producers and traders of genetically modified organisms. (“Parties 
to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol,” 
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>, accessed 18 May 2012.)  
304
 The signed protocol does not envision the creation of a new international body.  
305
 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2000, went into effect in 2003 yet not all related 
parties have ratified the treaty such as the major producers the USA, Canada and Argentina. For a list of 
signatory countries see “Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary 
Protocol,” available at <http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>, accessed 18 May 2012. 
95 
 
In analyzing the degree of success at the political commitment stage I chose to 
take the actions identified by the advocates as the baseline and I compared it against the 
actions taken by the target actors. This made it possible to account for the unique 
characteristics of each issue without essentializing one form of international action as the 
sole indicator of political commitment to a global problem.  
In conducting this study, I acknowledged that even the most successful cases of 
global policy making will not be able to get all the target actors to completely commit to 
a cause and/or comply with the commitments they make. However, looking whether 
majority of the actors in the system committed to the problem is also not a reliable 
measure since commitment on the part of actors with lesser significance does not prove 
success. That is to say, for instance, we cannot expect all the countries to sign the 
Landmines Treaty before we call it a success yet we also cannot measure the 
International Campaign to Ban on Landmines’ (ICBL) success based on the commitment 
made by states that neither use nor stockpile landmines.  Therefore, in measuring the 
success of the campaigns, I analyzed the primary target actors’ commitment and 
compliance. The cases where we observe an overall commitment or compliance while a 
few target actors fall short of doing so is indicated as “partial success” in the dataset to 
account for different levels of success that can be reached by different campaigns.  
Policy Implementation Success 
Target actors’ public commitments to address a transnational problem do not 
necessarily translate into changes in their policies; therefore, it is essential to distinguish 
political commitment from successful policy implementation in analyzing advocacy 
campaigns’ success. As Risse and Ropp point out in their analysis of human rights norms, 
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“… it is one thing to argue that there is a global human rights polity composed of 
international regimes, organizations, and supportive advocacy coalitions. It is quite 
another to claim that these global norms have made a real difference in the daily practices 
of national governments.”306 This is primarily because, “even if a state believes that 
signing a treaty is in its best interest, the political calculations associated with the 
subsequent decision to comply with international agreements are distinct and 
different.”307 Ratification of a treaty is generally considered as an important benchmark 
of compliance but norms can also be internalized without or prior to ratification.
308
 
For the purpose of this study, a campaign is considered to be successful in leading 
to policy implementation when the target actors implement the policy that advocates 
champion through some domestic/internal decision-making processes. This could range 
from disbursement of pledged funds, ratification of treaties to initiation of domestic legal 
or policy changes (See Table 3). 
Table 3: Sample Coding – Success at Policy Implementation Stage 
Campaign 
disbursement of 
pledged funds 
initiation of 
domestic legal or 
policy changes 
Biodiversity mixed
309
 mixed
310
 
 
                                                 
306
 Risse and Ropp 1999. 
307
 Haas 2000:45. It is also important to note that there are arguments in the literature which suggest that 
states’ commitments and compliance are closely connected. The argument is that states “take into account 
the likely costs and benefits of complying with a treaty when they decide whether to commit to a treaty.” 
(Hathaway 2007, 590)  (See also Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996; Von Stein 2005, 611) Therefore, while 
these two stages are analyzed separately for the purpose of this study, it is noted that there are close 
connections between the two.  
308
 Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009. 
309
 The targets identified by the Convention on Biological Diversity have been only partially met. For 
detailed account see “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,” available at 
<http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/index.aspx>, accessed 24 June 2013. 
310
 For country based analysis of policy change see “Country Profiles,” available at 
<http://www.cbd.int/countries/>, accessed 24 June 2013. 
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Progress reports, news items, press releases, public statements etc. were taken into 
consideration in measuring success as well as securitization at the policy implementation 
stage. While accessing these documents was not difficult, measuring success at the policy 
implementation stage has proved to be the most difficult part of data collection and 
coding. The reason for this difficulty is twofold: first, the number of actors whose 
behavior that each campaign aims to change totals in the hundreds and analyzing policy 
implementation requires this study to look into changes in each of these actors’ 
behaviors. This is too large of a task to undertake given the scope of the study; therefore, 
I needed to rely on the existing literature, where available, in understanding whether any 
changes can be observed in target actors’ behavior. To make sure that the information is 
up to date, the findings of the literature were complemented with issue advocates’ 
accounts on progresses made as well as the news articles on the issue.  
The second reason why it is difficult to measure success at the policy 
implementation stage is due to the time-lag needed for such an analysis. That is to say, 
most of these campaigns require target actors to undertake significant domestic policy 
changes as well as to disburse significant amount of funds to comply with their 
commitments. There is not enough time-lag in every issue for actors to follow through 
with their commitments. Moreover, even when the target actors initiate the changes on 
paper, most of the time there is not enough time-lag to compile data to verify these 
commitments. Therefore, this study brings in an overall estimate of success at the policy 
implementation stage by looking at disbursement of pledged funds and initiation of 
domestic and legal changes.
311
  
                                                 
311
 This needs to be distinguished from the long-term commitment and behavioral change. Since there is not 
enough time-lag for each campaign to analyze the latter, this study focuses on the former.  
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Findings 
Overall Findings 
The purpose of this initial analysis of the data is to take a snapshot of the bigger 
picture to understand whether the claims made in the literature regarding the positive 
impact that using security frames makes on campaigns’ success are supported by the 
evidence. This claim has two components to it. First, it argues that the actors perceive a 
positive correlation between the use of security frames and successfully addressing a non-
priority issue.
312
 This perception in turn creates a tendency among the actors to resort to 
security frames. Second, the argument suggests that the correlation between using a 
security frame and reaching success is not just a perceived one but rather an observable 
one on the ground.
313
  Thus, the conventional wisdom is that not only security frames are 
frequently used but also there is a connection between resorting to such use and 
successfully addressing a transnational problem.  
In testing these claims, as a first step, I look at the frequency at which security 
frames are used in comparison to other frames, as discussed in detail below. Then, I look 
at each stage of global agenda setting and policy making separately in the following sub-
sections to study whether any correlation can be observed between the use of security 
frames and reaching success at these three different stages. This descriptive analysis is 
built to function as a basis for a more detailed comparative analysis conducted in the 
following chapter.  
                                                 
312
 This argument is embedded in the literature’s perception of security not as a defined arena but as a fluid 
domain created by speech acts, initiated by securitizing actors on the perception that the audience would be 
receptive to the claims of “existential threats.” (For a detailed discussion see Balzacq 2005) 
313
 Such as Hudson 2010; Hartmann 2010. 
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The initial analysis aims to test the frequency at which security frames are used. 
Even though there are differences in the frequency with which security frames are used at 
different stages of global agenda setting and policy making, it became clear that security 
frames are not used as frequently as implied by the literature (See Table 4). The 
comparative analysis reveals that five of the thirty-eight cases (13.2%) used a security 
frame as one of their dominant frames at the agenda setting stage, while thirty-three of 
the cases (86.8%) analyzed at this stage did not resort to a security frame in their attempts 
to attract allies’ and target actors’ attention to their causes.  
Table 4: Use of Security Frames at Different Stages of Global Policy Making 
 
number of cases 
agenda 
setting stage 
political 
commitment 
stage  
policy 
implementation 
stage 
security frame used 5 (13.2%) 8 (25%) 8 (28.6%) 
no meaningful use of a 
security frame 
33 (86.8%) 24 (75%) 20 (71.4%) 
total  38 (100%) 32 (100%) 28 (100%) 
 
The results for the political commitment stage also reveal that even though there 
is an increase in the frequency at which security frames are used, it is still not a 
frequently made choice. Of the thirty-two cases that successfully reached to the political 
commitment stage, eight cases (25%) have used a security frame as one of their dominant 
frames. The research has not revealed any meaningful use of security frames in the 
remaining twenty-four cases (75%).  
The campaigns’ framing choices at the policy implementation stage hints an 
increase in the frequency at which security frames are used but it is not strong enough to 
claim a systematic tendency among actors toward adopting such a frame. Of the twenty-
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eight cases that have successfully reached to the policy implementation stage, eight cases 
(28.6%) used a security frame while the remaining twenty cases (71.4%) did not resort to 
such use.   
This comparative data reveals two insights: First, the findings signals that, as 
opposed to the arguments made in the literature, no clear tendency can be observed 
among advocates to adopt a security frame in their attempts to get the target actors to 
prioritize and address an issue. Thus, the argument that global policy making is getting 
increasingly securitized needs to be approached with caution. This is not to deny the 
widening and the deepening of what security means and the evidence that shows how 
different issues can be framed as security threats.
314
 However, I believe, this finding 
nonetheless shows that adopting a security frame is not an inevitable process into which 
every issue would eventually fall. As the comparative evidence above illustrates, majority 
of the campaigns that worked on prioritizing a transnational problem on the global 
agenda and create global action have done so without using a security frame.  
Second, while the above discussed findings do not produce any evidence 
regarding a systematic inclination to adopt a security frame, it nonetheless illustrates an 
increased tendency to use a security frame as we advance in the stages of global agenda 
setting and policy making. This finding makes it necessary to assess each of these stages 
separately to reveal the potential reasons for and mechanisms of the increased inclination 
to use security frames and their impact on success.  
The following three subsections explore three main questions: (i) is there a 
correlation between the use of security frames and success; (ii) are there any nuances in 
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 Such as the rise of concepts like “food security” (Cavalcanti 2005) and “environmental security” 
(Deudney 1990; Kakonen 1994; and Litfin 1999). 
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the role that security frames played and the contribution they made to different 
campaigns; and (iii) could the campaigns have succeeded without using a security frame? 
Agenda Setting Stage 
 In the agenda setting stage, I analyze the framing preferences and success levels 
of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns. The analysis reveals a lack of evidence 
to support the claims of correlation between the use of security frames and success 
reached at this level (See Table 5). 
Table 5: Use of Security Frames and Success at Agenda Setting Stage 
 
  Success  
Partial 
success 
Failure Total 
A
g
en
d
a 
se
tt
in
g
 Security frame 
used 
4 (80%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 
No use of security 
frames 
23 (69.6%) 5 (15.2%) 5 (15.2%) 33 (100%) 
 
 
 An overall analysis illustrates that adopting a security frame does not guarantee 
success at the agenda setting stage and similarly lack of such use does not lead to 
systematic advocacy failure across cases. Of the five campaigns that used a security 
frame at the agenda setting stage four of them reached success (80%) while one campaign 
failed to do so (20%). Among the remaining thirty-three non-securitized cases, five of 
them failed at succeeding at the agenda setting stage (15.2%) while five of the campaigns 
reached partial success (15.2%) and the remaining twenty-three cases succeeded (69.6%) 
at this stage. Thus, statistically no significant difference is observed between the 
securitized cases and non-securitized cases in avoiding failure at this first stage (see 
Table 6 for the detailed list of the cases).  
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Table 6: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Agenda 
Setting Stage 
 
Agenda Setting Stage 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
Success Partial Success  Failure 
Conflict Diamonds 
War Crimes Tribunals 
Women Peace and Security 
Transparency 
  
Illegal Wildlife Trade 
N
o
n
-S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
AIDS Campaign 
Anti-Smoking/Tobacco 
Anti-Toxics 
Avian Influenza 
Biodiversity 
Child Labor 
Child Soldiers 
Climate Change 
Climate Refugees 
Cluster Bombs 
Dams 
Human Trafficking 
Humanitarian Intervention 
IDPs 
International Criminal 
Court 
Jubilee 2000 
Landmines 
Maternal Mortality 
Sexual Violence in Conflict 
Small Arms 
Sweatshops 
Torture 
Violence Against Women 
Anti-GMOs 
Anti-War Protests 
Female Genital Mutilation 
Privacy Protection 
Women’s Rep. Rights 
Anti-IFI 
Demil. Of Outer Space 
Make Poverty History 
Rainforest Preservation 
Water Conservation 
 
In the absence of clear evidence to support the claims of the conventional wisdom 
it is necessary to take a closer look at the dynamics of advocates’ framing choices and the 
strategic environments that surround them. As is briefly discussed in this chapter and 
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further developed in the following, the analysis of the securitized cases highlights two 
important insights. Most importantly, the findings reveal that advocates tend to use 
security frames in combination with other frames to expand their chances at reaching out 
to as many potential allies and target actors as possible. Thus, even when securitization 
correlates with success, by itself it does not prove that success was related to the 
securitization of the campaign. The findings also reveal that the content of the security 
language – how the “security threat” was framed – plays a role in the contribution that 
security frames make to an advocacy campaign. Thus, as opposed to the conventional 
wisdom, the use of security language does not necessarily take the form of portrayal of an 
issue as an existential threat and depending on the particular language it involves, 
securitization can lead to different policy outcomes.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, transnational advocacy networks need to 
attract a variety of actors’ attention and support to their cause in their attempts to placing 
their issue on the global agenda. Doing so requires them to use frames strategically to 
make them appeal to these actors’ interests and priorities.315 Since different actors are 
amenable to different frames, campaigns frequently use a combination of frames in their 
advocacy efforts. The findings illustrated that such combined use of frame, i.e. 
multivocalization, is apparent for securitized cases as well (See Table 7).   
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 Keck and Sikkink 1998. 
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Table 7: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Agenda Setting Stage 
 
 
Agenda Setting Stage 
Campaign security 
human 
rights 
humanit
arian 
environ
ment 
develop
ment 
animal 
rights 
level of 
success 
Conflict 
Diamonds              
Success 
War Crimes 
Tribunals             
Success 
Women Peace 
& Sec.             
Success 
Transparency              Success 
Illegal Wildlife 
Trade              
Failure 
 
** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign.  
 
The closer analysis of the framing preferences of securitized campaign reveals 
that, at the agenda setting stage, all of the securitized cases used the security frame in 
combination with other frames. At the early stages of agenda setting stage, the 
Transparency Campaign drew a link between corruption and its impact on development. 
Transparency International, the global coalition against corruption, explained the problem 
as “corruption has dire global consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery and 
breeding social, economic and political unrest… Corruption is both a cause of poverty, 
and a barrier to overcoming it. It is one of the most serious obstacles to reducing 
poverty.”316 In this context, security was portrayed as one of the consequences of 
corruption and it was suggested that “corruption threatens domestic and international 
security and the sustainability of natural resources.”317 Thus, while the security language 
was adopted it was done as a supportive frame where the immediate consequence of lack 
                                                 
316
 “About Us,” available at <www.transparency.org/about_us>, accessed 8 May 2012. 
317
 Ibid. 
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of transparency was portrayed as a developmental problem and security risks were 
portrayed only as a potential by-product of such developmental problems.  
Conflict Diamonds campaign also used a combination of human rights and 
security frames at the early stages of the agenda setting stage. As it is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5, at this early stage, a security frame was utilized to attract the attention of the 
UNSC
318
 and get their support to the issue while human rights frame was utilized to get 
the industry to react by pinpointing the industry’s responsibility in the trade of illicit 
diamonds and by threatening them with an industry-scale boycott.
319
  
 Similarly, the campaign for the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals used a 
combination of human rights, humanitarian and security frames. The security frame 
functioned as the supportive frame to draw links between existing perceptions and the 
situation at hand, and in a way “grafted” the issue to the existing norms.320 The main 
context in which the security frame was employed was the attempt to draw a link 
between the consequences of the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the memory of the 
World War II and the Holocaust.  Nelaeva, for instance talks about the role of war images 
in bringing the attention of the international community to the need to establish a 
Tribunal: “Elie Wisel, a Holocaust survivor and Nobel prize winner, addressed Lawrence 
Eagleburger (US Secretary of State) and Eagleburger in his “naming names speech” at 
the Geneva Conference (December 16, 1992), mentioned that violations of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions and London agreements by the Serb authorities, 
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 Canada’s term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC created a receptive environment for such a 
campaign to find a place on the Council’s agenda (Global Witness, Annual Report 2005.)  
319
 Smillie 2002a. 
320
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the norms are believed to have a better chance at gaining acceptance when 
they “resonate” with the existing norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Payne 
2001). 
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“… is not only producing an intolerable and deteriorating situation outside the former 
Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the new 
Europe.”321 
 Despite the strategic contribution that the security frame made to the campaign for 
the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals, the success of the campaign cannot be 
explained by the emphasis put on the security dimension of the issue. This can be traced 
by looking at the output of the campaign. The resolution adopted by the UNSC in May 
25, 1993 not only served as a basis for the establishment of the Court but also 
emphasized the humanitarian dimension of the issue. UNSC Resolution 827 stated “grave 
alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant violation of international 
humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially 
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings, massive, 
organized and systematic detention and rape of women and the continuance of the 
practice of “ethnic cleansing”, including for the acquisition and the holding of 
territory.”322 Thus, it can be argued that in this instance, security frame served as a 
catalyst that helped the campaign to advance their humanitarian and human rights 
arguments by drawing a link between a well-remembered past security threat and the 
issue at hand.  
The Illegal Wildlife Trade is one of the campaigns that adopted a security frame 
in combination with an animal rights frame, yet failed to succeed in getting the issue to 
the global agenda. The security language was adopted by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
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 Nelavea 2011, 105. 
322
 Preamble, S.C.Res.827, U.N. Doc. S/RES./827 
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and aimed to tap into the states’ perceptions about trafficking in general.323 According to 
WWF’s report “Besides driving many endangered species towards extinction, illegal 
wildlife trade strengthens criminal networks, undermines national security, and poses 
increasing risks to global health.”324 Thus, rather than aiming to convince the states that 
wildlife trade presents an “existential threat” for them, the campaign adopted such 
language to use the states’ perception about trafficking as a way to convince the states to 
take action. Yet, such efforts have proved to be insufficient to get the issue onto the 
global agenda. This illustrates that using a security frame is not a sufficient condition for 
achieving agenda setting success.    
The security frame played a more dominant role in the Women, Peace and 
Security Campaign as analyzed by a number of scholars who claimed that securitization 
of women’s rights issues contributed to the cause.325 However, a closer analysis reveals 
that categorizing this issue as just another example of securitization would overlook the 
specific dynamics that security language had, and the contribution that using a security 
language made to this campaign.  
 The type of security language used in other four campaigns analyzed at this stage 
was similar in the sense that the issue at hand is perceived to be a threat to international 
and national security, and hence in need of immediate international attention. However, 
in the Women, Peace and Security campaign, women are not framed as a threat to 
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 For an example of such use see Office of the United States Trade Representative’s “Fact Sheet: Trade, 
İllegal Wildlife Trafficking, and National Security,” available at <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/fact-sheets/2014/June/Trade-Illegal-Wildlife-Trafficking-and-National-Security>, accessed 6 
September 2014. 
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 “Illegal Wildlife Trade Threatens National Security, Says WWF Report,” available at 
<http://wwf.panda.org/?207054/Illegal-wildlife-trade-threatens-national-security-says-WWF-report>, 
accessed 6 September 2014. 
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 For a detailed analysis of the issue see Cohn 2004; Basu 2009; Tryggestad 2009; Hudson 2009; 2010; 
Willett 2010; Pratt 2013; Miller et al. 2014.  
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international security. Rather, women and their active participation in the peacemaking 
and peacebuilding processes are portrayed as contributors to international peace and 
security.
326
 This is evident in the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security’s 
description of their goal: “The NGOWG on Women, Peace and Security advocates for 
the equal and full participation of women in all efforts to create and maintain 
international peace and security... Sustainable peace depends on the full participation of 
women in all decision-making to prevent violent conflict and to protect all civilians.”327 
Thus, the contribution that adopting the security frame made to this campaign was not to 
invoke an image of “existential threat” but rather to portray the inclusion of women as an 
opportunity in tackling such threats.  
  The above analysis illustrates that security frames and the contribution they make 
to campaigns take a number of forms that cannot be captured by broad and uncritical 
approaches to securitization. However, in order to better understand the contribution that 
security frames make to campaigns, we also need to analyze whether campaigns would 
have succeeded without using security frames. As I discuss in detail in the next chapter 
by comparing HIV/AIDS versus Maternal Mortality and Landmines versus Small Arms 
campaigns, the best measure we have in engaging in such analysis is to compare the 
securitized cases with non-securitized ones. 
An analysis of campaigns with similar goals illustrates that there is no overarching 
tendency among campaigns to adopt security frames at the agenda setting stage. While 
the War Crimes Tribunals campaign resorted to a security frame, the campaign for the 
creation of the International Criminal Court has not used a similar approach. As 
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 “About Us,” available at <http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>, accessed 27 October 2014. 
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exemplified in the statements of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (the 
NGO network that played a central role in the campaign), in explaining their goal and the 
purpose of the campaign, the campaign used a human rights frame: “the global fight to 
end genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity through a commitment to the 
core values of human rights and justice.”328 Despite the lack of a security frame at the 
agenda setting stage, the campaign for the International Criminal Court also succeeded 
which illustrates that even though security language might have contributed to the War 
Crimes Tribunals campaign, adopting a security frame is not a necessary condition for the 
success of campaigns with similar goals.  
What sheds further doubt on the prominence that the conventional wisdom 
attaches to the use of security frames is the fact that some campaigns that can be 
considered as likely candidates for using a security frame did not resort to such use. In 
analyzing the framing choices of the campaigns at the agenda setting, we observe that 
some of the cases that by nature are security issues chose not to use a security frame. For 
instance, Small Arms campaign used a combination of human rights and humanitarian 
frames in their attempts to attract international attention to their cause.  The IANSA, the 
campaign organization, defines themselves as  
the global movement against gun violence, linking civil society organisations 
working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. 
IANSA supports efforts to make people safer by reducing demand for such 
weapons, improving firearm regulation and strengthening controls on arms 
transfers. Through research, advocacy and campaigning, IANSA members are 
promoting local, national, regional and global measures to strengthen human 
security...raising awareness among policymakers, the public and the media about 
the global threat to human rights and human security caused by small arms.
329
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 “Coalition for the ICC,” available at <http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/coalition-icc>, accessed 22 May 
2014. 
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 “About Us,” available at <http://www.iansa.org/aboutus>, accessed 7 September 2014. 
 
110 
 
 
Yet despite the security nature of the issue, the campaign has chosen to not use a security 
frame, i.e. de-securitize the issue, and succeeded in bringing the issue on the global 
agenda. Moreover, as is discussed in detail in the following chapter, the Small Arms 
campaign was securitized at the political commitment stage, yet securitization brought 
only a very recent and very limited success. This example also hints that using a security 
frame is not a necessary condition for the success of a campaign.  
The comparative analysis of the thirty-eight cases at the agenda setting stage 
brought forward three main insights. First, the findings showed that no clear correlation 
can be observed between the use of security frames and success reached at this level. 
Second, a closer analysis of securitized cases illustrated that securitization is a complex 
process which means that securitization might take different forms and might have 
varying implications for different issues. Third, a closer comparison of securitized and 
non-securitized cases illustrates that adopting a security language is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for success.  
Political Commitment Stage 
Analysis of the framing choices of campaigns at the political commitment stage 
reveal similar insights to those discussed at the agenda setting stage and shows that 
securitization does not necessarily correlate with success at this stage, either. Despite the 
increase in the number of cases that used a security frame in comparison to the agenda 
setting stage, no increased likelihood was observed between the decision to use a security 
frame and reaching success at the political commitment stage. Moreover, the in-depth 
analysis of securitized cases provides further evidence that shed light onto the inner 
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dynamics of adopting security frames, and various ways through which security frames 
affect campaigns.   
Table 8: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Political 
Commitment Stage 
 
 
 Success 
Partial 
success 
Failure Total 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
co
m
m
it
m
en
t 
Security frame 
used 
4 (50%) 3 (37.5%) 2 (12.5%) 8 (100%) 
No use of security 
frames 
10 (41.6%) 13 (54.2%) 1 (4.2%)  24 (100%) 
 
Only four of the eight securitized cases (50%) have reached success at the 
political commitment stage (in comparison to 80% at the agenda setting stage) (See Table 
8). HIV/AIDS campaign succeeded in placing the issue among the Millennium 
Development Goals;
330
 and the Conflict Diamonds campaign led to the creation of a 
certification mechanism, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
 331
 which brought 
the major diamond producing and trading countries together successfully.
 
Humanitarian 
Intervention campaign has successfully led to a World Summit where states declared 
their commitment to develop mechanisms in addressing “genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”332 Women, Peace and Security campaign has 
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 “Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases,” available at 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/aids.shtml>, accessed 22 December 2012. 
331
 “Kimberley Process,” available at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>, accessed 24 November 2013. 
332
 The Outcome Document of the World Summit 2005 stated that: “Each individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” (Article 138) 
“The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
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convinced the UNSC to declare the Resolution 1325 which aimed to mainstream the 
involvement of women in the peacemaking and conflict resolution processes (See Table 
9).
333
  
Three of the campaigns that used a security frame (International Criminal Court, 
Small Arms and Sexual Violence in Conflict) (37.5%) have reached only partial success. 
The campaign for the International Criminal Court has led to the creation of the court; 
however, the campaign was not able to convince all of the major actors to take part in the 
court. The Small Arms campaign has led to the Arms Trade Treaty which has recently 
entered into force in December 2014. Yet this treaty constitutes only a partial success as 
of 130 countries that signed the agreement so far only 63 has ratified.
334
 The campaign on 
the Sexual Violence in Conflict has successfully got states to sign the “Declaration of 
Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict,” but no measurable accomplishment 
has been observed after that. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international 
law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” (Article 139) 
333
 S.C.Res.1325, U.N. Doc S/RES/1325  
334
 “The Arms Trade Treaty,” available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>, accessed 12 January 
2015. 
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Table 9: Use of Security Frames and Success at Political Commitment Stage 
 
Political Commitment Stage 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
Success Partial Success Failure 
AIDS Campaign 
Conflict Diamonds 
Humanitarian 
Intervention 
Women Peace and 
Security 
 
ICC 
Sex. Violence in 
Conflict
335
 
 Small Arms
336
 
Climate Refugees 
 
N
o
n
-S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
Anti-Smoking/Tobacco 
Anti-Toxics 
Avian Influenza 
Biodiversity 
Child Labor 
Climate Change 
Human Trafficking 
Landmines 
Violence Against 
Women 
War Crimes Tribunals 
Anti-GMOs 
Anti-War Protests 
Child Soldiers 
Cluster Bombs 
Dams 
Female Genital Mutilation 
Jubilee 2000 
Maternal Mortality 
Privacy Protection 
Sweatshops 
Torture 
Transparency 
Women’s Rep. Rights 
IDPs 
 
The one remaining campaign (12.5%) failed at this stage (in comparison to 20% at 
the agenda setting stage). As further analyzed in the following chapter, the Climate 
Refugees campaign used a security frame but failed in convincing states to publicly 
commit to taking action. The issue has made it to the agenda of a number of international 
                                                 
335
 The Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict has taken place very recently in June 2014. 
Therefore, while this summit is a step toward political commitment success, it is a tentative one (“Global 
Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict,” available at < https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-
events/sexual-violence-in-conflict>, 29 November 2014.) 
336
 The coding of the Small Arms campaign at the political commitment stage as “partial success” is also 
tentative since the Arms Trade Treaty has entered into force only in December 24, 2014 (“The Arms Trade 
Treaty,” available at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>, accessed 12 January 2015.) As the limited 
success that both Sexual Violence in Conflict and Small Arms campaigns have reached are very recent, it is 
not possible to analyze these cases at the policy implementation stage. Therefore, they are left out of the 
analysis presented in the following subsection.  
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organizations but has not initiated political commitment yet.
337
 While the importance of 
the issue has been recognized by the international community, no tangible steps have 
been successfully taken so far to induce states to commit to take action.  
Not only we do not observe systematic success across securitized cases at this 
stage, we also do not observe an increase in the likelihood of failure among non-
securitized or de-securitized campaigns. Ten of the twenty-four non-securitized cases 
(41.6%) have succeeded in triggering high levels of political commitment, while thirteen 
of the cases reached partial success (54.2%) and only one campaign (4.2%) has failed in 
compelling the target actors to publicly commit to the issue.  
Except for the Conflict Diamonds campaign which used security frame as its sole 
dominant frame, the remaining campaigns have used security frames in combination with 
other frames.
338
 As they are further discussed in Chapter 4, Sexual Violence in Conflict 
and Small Arms campaigns combined humanitarian, human rights and security frames. 
At this stage, the International Criminal Court, Climate Refugees and Women, Peace and 
Security campaigns took similar approaches and combined security frame with a human 
rights frame. The Humanitarian Intervention campaign on the other hand, combined the 
security frame with a humanitarian frame. Lastly, the HIV/AIDS campaign combined 
development, human rights and security frames. The way that these campaigns adopted 
the security language into their frames shaped not only the content of the security 
                                                 
337
 Such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP). 
338
 As I present in Chapter 5, the detailed analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrates that even 
though security frame became the dominant frame at the political commitment stage, depending on the 
actor who was using the security language (NGOs, industry or the states), the same language had very 
different purposes and different implications. Thus, even in this campaign there was neither a single 
coherent use of the security frame nor the militarization of the policy instruments which is what the 
conventional wisdom would have expected to see.  
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language, but also how and to what extent security language contributed to these 
campaigns. 
Table 10: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Political Commitment Stage 
 
 
Political Commitment Stage 
Campaign security 
human 
rights 
humanit
arian 
developm
ent 
level of 
success 
AIDS        Success 
Climate Refugees     
 
  Failure 
Conflict Diamonds     
 
  Success 
Humanitarian 
Intervention 
    
 
  Success 
International Criminal 
Court 
    
 
  
Partial 
success 
Sexual Violence in 
Conflict 
    
 
  
Partial 
success 
Small Arms     
 
  
Partial 
success 
Women, Peace and 
Security  
    
 
  Success 
 
** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign.  
 
The close analysis of securitized campaigns illustrate that in most of the 
campaigns that adopted a security frame at the political commitment stage, the 
securitized language has not completely sidelined other frames. Rather, the security 
frame functioned as a secondary frame that was used to support the arguments made 
through humanitarian, human rights and environmental frames. For instance, the 
Humanitarian Intervention campaign, while remaining primarily within the humanitarian 
domain, has experienced a securitizing move. This was accomplished through the 
involvement of the UNSC in the issue. This involvement is realized through the active 
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involvement of the UNSC in supporting Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
339
 Thus, in this 
case, the overall framing of the issue has not shifted but the issue got securitized through 
the widening of the security agenda rather than the issue being redefined as an existential 
threat.  
In a similar manner, the UNSC’s involvement in the issue of ICC also indicated 
the existence of a securitizing move at the political commitment stage of this issue. As 
Busby suggests, “while the ICC is ostensibly a case in the human rights arena, the 
potential prosecution of individuals for war crimes touches upon the security sphere, 
elevating the ICC from low politics to high politics…”340 The UNSC has become actively 
involved in the issue as a result of what is known as “Singapore Compromise” which 
“allowed the Security Council to block ICC jurisdiction but not be required to authorize 
every case.”341 Thus in this case, security language also functioned as a supportive frame 
to boost already accumulating support by guaranteeing the support of an important ally 
rather than as a strategy to change the perceptions of the target actors. 
 
 
The issue of Sexual Violence in Conflict has also, so far, kept the main focus on 
the human rights and humanitarian implications of the issue. They nonetheless, have 
started to emphasize the threat that the issue presents for international security: “Sexual 
violence in conflict poses a grave threat to international peace and security. It exacerbates 
tension and violence and undermines stability.”342 The securitization of the issue is also 
                                                 
339
 For a detailed account of UNSC Resolutions referencing Responsibility to Protect see Global Centre for 
Responsibility to Protect, “UN Security Council Resolutions Referencing R2P,” 23 April 2013, available at 
<http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/335>, accessed 29 January 2014.  
340
 Busby 2010, 213. 
341
 Busby 2010, 217.  
342
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Policy Paper: Chair’s Summary – Global Summit to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict,” 13 June 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chairs-
summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-violence-in-conflict/chairs-summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-
violence-in-conflict>, accessed 6 September 2014. 
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evident in the fact that sexual violence in conflict has been brought to the UNSC 
agenda
343
 which led to the signing of “Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict.” Thus, while the process of securitization is evident at the political 
commitment stage, the success reached in creating political commitment is a partial one 
as not all related parties have taken part in the Declaration. 
Women, Peace and Security is one of the campaigns that have sustained its 
framing choices throughout all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making. 
As it was the case at the agenda setting stage, the realization of women’s rights and the 
further inclusion of women into peacemaking and conflict resolution processes are 
framed as necessary conditions for reaching international peace and security rather than 
being portrayed as a threat to security itself.
344
  
As I show in the following chapter, in contrast to other securitized cases analyzed 
at the political commitment stage, in the case of HIV/AIDS, the securitization was 
experienced in a more direct way, wherein the issue was reframed as one that would 
threaten states’ national security if remain unaddressed.  The issue was announced to be a 
“threat to international security” by the US Ambassador Richard Holbrook and Vice 
President Al Gore
345
 and brought to the UNSC’s agenda as the first ever health issue to 
find a place on the Council’s agenda. In this regard, HIV/AIDS is one of the examples 
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 “Statement by SRSG Zainab Hawa Bangura to the Security Council,” 17 April 2014, available at 
<http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/statement/statement-by-srsg-zainab-hawa-bangura-to-the-
security-council-17-april-2013/>, accessed 4 October 2014. 
344
 Resolution 1325 “stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping. It calls on member states to ensure 
women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and security, and urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspective 
in all areas of peace building.” (S.C.Res.1325, U.N. Doc S/RES/1325) 
345
 Elbe 2006. 
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where we see a clear link between the reframing of the issue as a security threat and 
succeeding in triggering political commitment.
346
 
In order to better understand the contribution that using a security frame makes to 
an advocacy campaign, it is also useful to look at cases that got de-securitized at the 
political commitment stage.  Transparency campaign used development and security 
approaches together at the agenda setting stage but it settled on a predominantly 
development frame at the political commitment stage. This is exemplified in the 
international organizations’ approaches to the issue following the campaign. One of the 
successful outcomes of the campaign was the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, which defines its goal as: “we share a belief that the prudent use of natural 
resource wealth should be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that 
contributes to sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed 
properly, can create negative economic and social impacts.”347 Thus, Transparency 
campaign illustrates that succeeding even after de-securitizing an issue is possible.  
The second campaign that moved away from a security frame was the War 
Crimes Tribunal campaign. As was discussed earlier, at the agenda setting stage, security 
language was used to support the human rights frame in getting states to accept the need 
for such a Court. Once the court was established, the need for such use was no longer 
apparent and the emphasis remained on the human rights frame from that point onward.  
This is exemplified in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s 
(ICTY) statement of its mandate “the key objective of the ICTY is to try those 
                                                 
346
 As it is discussed in the next chapter, this link becomes a problematic one at the policy implementation 
stage, where the contribution of the security language to the issue is no longer a clearly positive one.  
347
 “The EITI [Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative] Principles,” available at 
<http://eiti.org/eiti/principles>, accessed 25 October 2014. 
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individuals most responsible for appalling acts such as murder, torture, rape, 
enslavement, destruction of property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal's Statute. By 
bringing perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aims to deter future crimes and render justice to 
thousands of victims and their families.”348  
The framing choices of these two campaigns at the political commitment stage 
illustrate that once adopted, security frames do not necessarily dictate the rest of the 
global policy making. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which suggests that once 
successfully completed, securitization moves the issue outside of the realm of normal 
politics. However, as the comparative analysis illustrates, as it is the case for other 
frames, security frames can be adopted and dropped as needed. This is not to argue that 
campaigns float among different frames freely and such a shift is always feasible. Rather, 
that the examples shows that security frames function like any other frames, and when 
the conditions and priorities call for it, a move away from the security frame is possible.  
 In addition to the insights that de-securitized cases bring forward, similar to the 
agenda setting stage, the findings of the political commitment stage also illustrate that 
there was not a cross-cutting inclination among similar issues to adopt security frames. 
For instance, when the campaigns that focus on problems faced mainly by women are 
compared, we do not see an overall securitization of the issue area. In fact, among the 
seven campaigns that fit into this category: Female Genital Mutilation, Human 
Trafficking, Maternal Mortality, Sexual Violence in Conflict, Violence against Women, 
Women, Peace and Security, and Women’s Reproductive Rights, only two have adopted 
security frames at the political commitment stage. Moreover, all of the seven cases listed 
above have reached at least partial success at the political commitment stage. Thus, not 
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 “About the ICTY,” available at <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>, accessed June 2014.  
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only is there no systematic tendency to adopt a security frame, but also there is no 
observable correlation between the decision to use a security frame and level of success 
reached by these campaigns. 
 The comparative analysis of cases at the political commitment stage not only 
supported the findings of the agenda setting stage but also revealed two more important 
insights into the dynamics of securitization. First, the analysis of de-securitized cases 
illustrate that once adopted, security frames are as likely to be dropped as other frames in 
transitioning from agenda setting stage to political commitment stage and therefore, 
security frames do not function any different than other frames. Second, the evidence also 
showed that once adopted, security frames do not necessarily take over the main 
arguments and the language of the campaign. Security frames might also be used 
strategically with the limited purpose of supporting the existing frames.  
Policy Implementation Stage 
A detailed analysis of the policy implementation stage reveals that an increased 
percentage of campaigns have experienced securitization at this stage. The securitizing 
attempts have proved to be more successful in some of these cases in terms of convincing 
the audience that the issue at hand presents a security threat, while the efforts in other 
cases remained scattered and less successful in making a case for security implications of 
the issue. 
At the policy implementation stage, all of the cases analyzed in this study have 
succeeded in achieving at least partial success in making the states follow through with 
the commitments they have made to address the issue at hand. It is also observed that this 
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success is almost always a partial one, as expected, given the difficulty of creating perfect 
norm compliance.  
While the percentage of cases that used a security frame increased at the policy 
implementation stage, neither a systematic success across securitized cases nor a 
systematic failure across non-securitized cases can be observed. Of the eight cases that 
used a security frame, seven of them (87.5%) reached partial success while one campaign 
has reached high level of success (12.5%). The remaining twenty cases did not use a 
security frame and of these twenty cases one case reached high level of policy 
implementation success (5%) while the remaining eighteen cases have reached partial 
success (95%) (See Table 11).  
Table 11: Success Level of Campaigns Based on Their Use of Security Frames: Policy 
Implementation Stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Success 
Partial 
success 
Total 
P
o
li
cy
 
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
Security frame used 1 (12.5%) 7 (87.5%) 8 (100%) 
No use of security 
frames 
1 (5%) 19 (95%) 20 (100%) 
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Table 12: Framing Choices of Campaigns at the Policy Implementation Stage and 
Success Levels  
 
Policy Implementation Stage 
S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
Success Partial Success  
Conflict Diamonds 
AIDS Campaign 
Avian Influenza 
Climate Change 
Human Trafficking 
Humanitarian Intervention 
International Criminal Court 
Women Peace and Security 
N
o
n
-S
ec
u
ri
ti
ze
d
 
Landmines 
Anti-GMOs 
Anti-Smoking/Tobacco 
Anti-Toxics 
Anti-War Protests 
Biodiversity 
Child Labor  
Child Soldiers 
Cluster Bombs 
Dams 
Female Genital Mutilation 
Jubilee 2000 
Maternal Mortality 
Privacy Protection 
Sweatshops 
Torture 
Transparency 
Violence Against Women 
War Crimes Tribunals 
Women’s Reproductive Rights 
 
A closer analysis of the framing choices of securitized campaigns reveals 
interesting lessons into the dynamics of framing and global policy making. The first 
important insight is regarding how persistent the campaigns were in their use of security 
frames across different stages of global agenda setting and policy making. As discussed 
in the previous section, Transparency and War Crimes Tribunals campaigns were using 
security frames at the agenda setting stage but they moved away from such use at the 
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political commitment stage. However, consistency in framing is observed when the 
campaigns’ use of security frames at the political commitment and policy implementation 
stages are compared. That is to say, all of the cases that used a security frame at the 
political commitment stage continued doing so at the policy implementation stage (See 
Table 12 and Table 13).  
Table 13: Framing Choices of Securitized Campaigns at the Policy Implementation Stage 
 
 
Policy Implementation Stage 
Campaign security 
human 
rights 
human
itarian 
enviro
nment 
develo
pment 
Bio 
security 
level of 
success 
AIDS     
 
      
Partial 
success 
Avian 
Influenza 
    
 
      
Partial 
success 
Climate 
Change 
    
 
      
Partial 
success 
Conflict 
Diamonds 
    
 
      Success 
Human 
Trafficking 
    
 
      
Partial 
success 
Human. 
Interven. 
    
 
      
Partial 
success 
ICC     
 
      
Partial 
success 
Women 
Peace, Sec.  
    
 
      
Partial 
success 
 
** Gray shaded cell indicate that the related frame is adopted by the campaign. 
The securitization literature argues that the above discussed persistence is specific 
to security frames. They argue that once an issue gets securitized, it tends to stay 
securitized as securitizing an issue moves it out of the realm of normal politics and limits 
the actors and policy options that can be used from that point onward.
349
 However, when 
we analyze the use of frames across cases, we observe that the consistency in framing is 
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 Waever 1995; Corry 2011.  
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not particular to the security frame. The data reveals that a drastic change in framing was 
experienced only in the Avian Influenza case where there was a transition from a health 
frame at the political commitment stage to the use of a combination of security and 
biosecurity frames at the policy implementation stage. For the other cases, we observe 
that all the cases that have succeeded at the political commitment stage have held onto 
their existing frames and only add in new frames in a few instances.  
An explanation that would better account for the above observation would be that 
frames that are used at the political commitment stage define which international regime 
the issue will get situated in and which actors shoulders the responsibility in addressing 
the issue. In other words, the language used at the political commitment stage gets 
embedded into the institutions and mechanisms developed in addressing the issue. 
Therefore, given that the campaign succeeds at this stage, the framing choices shapes 
what type of policies developed and which actors would be involved at the policy 
implementation stage and these policies and institutions perpetuate the frame, in return. 
This observation lends support to the arguments in the securitization literature that once 
an issue is securitized, it tends to stay securitized. However, the findings also illustrate 
that such persistence is not unique to the security frame. This, in turn, supports the 
argument of this study that securitization is an instance of framing rather than a unique 
process.  
A close analysis of the securitized cases also illustrates that the implication of 
adopting a security frame might vary across different stages of global agenda setting and 
policy making. Thus, even when a campaign consistently uses a security frame, the 
centrality of the security frame for the issue as well as the contribution that security 
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frames make to the success of the campaign might vary. For instance, as analyzed in the 
following chapter, when we look at the HIV/AIDS case we observe that the security 
language was only complementary at the political commitment stage, supporting the 
development and human rights frames that mainly shaped the policy efforts. However, 
when we came to the policy implementation stage we observe that the security frame has 
decreased the prominence of development and human rights frames and became the core 
frame through which policy makers approach the issue.
350
  
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 5, when we assess at the Conflict Diamonds 
case we also observe that the prominence of the security language has changed over time. 
While security language was predominant at the political commitment stage, it has later 
become a source of criticism at the policy implementation stage. The advocates of the 
issue still use a security frame when dealing with conflict diamonds issue; yet, they do so 
with an increasing discontent.
351
  
Conclusion 
 The comparative analysis of thirty-eight transnational advocacy campaigns at 
three different stages of global agenda setting and policy making has revealed four sets of 
insights into security frames and their contribution to the success of transnational 
advocacy campaigns.  
 First, not only that security frames were not used as frequently as suggested by the 
literature but also no positive correlation between the use of security frames and success 
at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making was observed. Similarly, there 
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 For a detailed analysis of how securitization of HIV/AIDS limited the room for maneuver that the NGOs 
have in delivering services on the ground see Elbe 2006.   
351
 For an example of such discontent see Rappaport, “Guilt Trip,” 7 April 2000, available at 
<http://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?Search=guilt%20trip&ArticleID=3830&ArticleTitle=Gu
ilt+Trip>, accessed 2 January 2015.  
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was no systematic failure across cases that did not adopt a security frame or cases that 
moved away from a security frame. Relatedly, there was no clearly increasing tendency 
among cases to adopt security frames over time, either. Thus, the arguments in the 
literature about the positive correlation between using a security frame and success were 
not supported by the evidence at hand.  
Second, brief comparisons of successful and non-successful examples of 
securitized and non-securitized cases illustrated that security frames are neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for reaching success at any stage of global agenda 
setting and policy making. 
 Third, the comparative analysis also revealed that once securitized at the political 
commitment stage, the campaigns tend to remain securitized at the policy implementation 
stage. However, a closer analysis also revealed that not only securitized cases but also 
non-securitized cases tend to stick to their framing choices in transitioning to policy 
implementation stages. Thus, the findings illustrated that security frames function the 
same way the other frames do rather than being an exception. This finding in turn stresses 
the importance of comparative studies in order not to overestimate the role and 
importance of security frames.  
 The fourth insight that the comparative analysis provides is that campaigns tend to 
multivocalize their issues. That is to say, advocates simultaneously invoke multiple 
frames. Therefore, securitization of an issue does not necessarily mean that the security 
frame automatically sidelines other frames and lead to the removal of the issue from the 
normal realm of politics which is what the securitization literature argues would happen. 
The impact that the security frame has on the direction that a campaign takes in terms of 
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both success and the types of policies it initiates depends on how securitization interacts 
with other frames used by the campaign and the exact content of the security language 
(whether the issue is framed as a threat to international security as it is the case with 
HIV/AIDS or it is framed as a condition for avoiding conflict and insecurity as it is the 
case for Women, Peace and Security).  
 The descriptive information that the medium-n analysis produced has revealed 
insights that challenged the arguments made in the literature about the connection 
between security frames and success. However, such an analysis is not sufficient enough 
to reveal the dynamics behind adopting security frames and the nature and extent of the 
influence such frames have on campaigns. The following chapter conducts a close 
comparative analysis of nine cases to further substantiate the arguments made in this 
chapter, and to reveal the varying implications of adopting security frames and the 
reasons behind them.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a comparison of thirty-eight cases of global 
agenda setting and policy making to test two assumptions derived from the literature: (i) 
framing a transnational problem as a security threat increases the chances of getting states 
to address the problem, and as a function of that, (ii) there is a tendency among 
campaigners to “securitize” issues that are not traditionally considered to be security 
threats. The analysis presented in the previous chapter challenged both of these 
assumptions by revealing that the number of global advocacy campaigns that adopted a 
security frame is limited, and that no correlation exists between the adoption of security 
frames and the success reached at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making.  
While this type of analysis helps us question the “uniqueness” attributed to the 
security frames in the literature, understanding the mechanisms that lead to the adoption 
of these frames – as well as the consequences of such choices – requires further analysis. 
For this reason, at this second stage of the analysis, I compare nine campaigns to 
understand both the advocacy campaigns’ decisions to securitize (and de-securitize) 
issues (in particular) and campaigns’ framing choices (in general), as well as the factors 
that shape such decisions’ contribution to success.  
The cases are selected using a combination of most similar and most different 
systems designs. The logic of the most similar systems design is to compare cases that are 
similar in as many aspects as possible and differ on the dependent variable, so that the 
effect of the independent variable under investigation can be distilled from other possible 
129 
 
factors.
352
 Most different systems design, on the other hand, compares cases that vary in 
almost every aspect except for the outcome (the dependent variable).
353
 Thus, in this type 
of approach, “variation on the independent variable is prized, while the variation on the 
outcome is eschewed.” 354 
Both of these methods have their strengths and weaknesses. Most similar systems 
design is useful in supporting the tentative findings achieved through single case 
studies,
355
 yet criticized due to the difficulty in discerning the impact of one single factor 
from the others.
356
 Most different systems design is helpful in analyzing a variety of cases 
together, but it is, “prone to the “many variables-too few cases” criticism that has been 
leveled at small-N studies in general.”357 
The cases analyzed in this chapter are categorized based on the similarity in the 
nature of the problem they are addressing, and then are paired based on the differences 
they possess – either in their use of frames or in their outcomes. The decision to combine 
the most similar and most different systems designs was based on Dimitrov et al.’s 
argument that when we solely focus on “common causes of a common outcome,” we run 
the risk of “identifying as necessary conditions ones that are also ubiquitous.”358 Thus, 
focusing solely on cases that adopted a security frame and succeeded limits our capacity 
to understand the extent to which security frames contributed to this success.
359
 To 
remedy this problem, this chapter compares (i) cases that succeeded without using a 
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security frame with those that adopted a security frame and, (ii) cases that failed despite 
the use of security frames with successful ones as “[i]nvestigating … “negative cases” 
can help build more complete explanations of why some problems trigger international 
policy responses whereas others do not.”360  
Based on these considerations, nine cases were chosen from four issue areas: 
health, humanitarian, environment and arms control (See Table 14). HIV/AIDS and 
Maternal Mortality campaigns are compared to each other as (i) they are both, by nature, 
health issues and (ii) the policy outcome of both campaigns are similar (placing of both 
issues on Millennium Development Goals). These campaigns nonetheless, differ in their 
use of frames. The HIV/AIDS campaign has adopted a security frame while the Maternal 
Mortality campaign has not resorted to such a use.  
The Climate Change and Climate Refugees campaigns both focus on problems 
induced by an environmental problem, and the comparison of these two campaigns 
illustrates that adopting a security frame is not a sufficient condition for success; security 
frames were adopted by both issues yet one succeeded in agenda setting and policy 
making (climate change) while the other failed at the political commitment stage (climate 
refugees).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
360
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Table 14: Comparison of Cases on the Securitization – Success Nexus 
 
 More successful Less successful 
Securitized 
 
Climate Change 
Climate Refugees 
Small Arms 
HIV/AIDS 
Sexual Violence in Conflict 
Non-securitized 
Landmines 
Internally Displaced Persons Maternal Mortality 
Child Soldiers 
  
 Campaigns on Environmentally Induced Problems 
 Health Campaigns 
 Humanitarian Campaigns 
 Arms Control Campaigns  
 
The Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict campaigns are paired as they 
both focus on the protection of vulnerable groups in conflicts. Despite the common 
ground between these two campaigns, they vary in both their framing choices as well as 
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their success levels: the non-securitized Child Soldiers campaign succeeded while the 
securitized Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign has so far reached limited success.   
Landmines and Small Arms campaigns are compared as examples of arms control 
campaigns. The analysis illustrates that success might lay with de-securitization of a 
traditional security concern, as the Landmines campaign succeeded using a humanitarian 
frame while the Small Arms campaign reached a very limited success even though they 
adopted a security frame.  
The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) campaign is then analyzed as an example 
of non-securitized, less successful campaign to trace whether the dynamics that are 
identified as important in shaping securitized campaigns’ level of success also play a role 
in non-securitized campaigns. While the goal of this study is not to explain non-
securitized campaigns, illustrating the similarities contributes to this study’s argument 
that securitized campaigns are bound by the same dynamics as non-securitized ones.  
For each of the cases, a historical account of the campaign is presented. This 
account not only provides an assessment of success for each stage of global agenda 
setting and policy making, but also discusses the framing choices of the campaigns and 
factors pertaining to such choices. The chapter also presents an analysis that combines 
and discusses the findings gained from comparative case study analysis. The IDPs 
campaign is presented in the end to further illustrate that non-securitized campaigns are 
bound by the same dynamics as securitized ones.  
If the securitization literature were to be correct, this comparison of nine cases 
should reveal the following findings. First, there should be a tendency among advocates 
to adopt security frames when such a choice is available. Second, in cases where security 
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frames are adopted, such a choice should correspond to increasing levels of success. 
Third, the decision to adopt a security frame should be guided by advocates’ expectations 
that the frame will help them appeal to the targets of influence. 
However, contrary to these expectations, the analysis of these nine campaigns 
lends further support to the arguments made in the previous chapter, and shows that 
adopting a security frame is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving 
success at any stage of global agenda setting and policy making.  
In addition to supporting the arguments put forward in the previous chapter, this 
chapter also provides three insights into the factors that affect advocates’ framing choices 
and implications of such decisions for success. The findings illustrate that campaigns 
tend to use multiple frames in order to (i) reach out to as many potential allies as possible 
to widen their network, and (ii) create an opportunity to graft the issue onto as many 
diverse norms as possible to increase their chances of success. However, in order for 
multivocalization to contribute to advocates’ efforts, it needs to be a coordinated effort 
rather than a sign of frame contestation within the campaign.  
The findings also illustrate that the advocates’ decision to adopt a particular frame 
over the other tends to reflect (i) advocates’ fields of expertise and their previous 
experiences, as well as (ii) the opportunities and constraints that the current political 
atmosphere presents. Lastly, the findings support the arguments advanced by the TANs 
and framing literatures that, while strategic framing of issues is essential for the success 
of transnational advocacy campaigns, success will not be possible if framing (including 
securitization) does not coincide with a conducive strategic environment (such as the 
short causal link, clear physical damage, concentrated network).  
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Health Campaigns 
The campaigns on HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality share three common 
characteristics. They are both health issues at their core; both campaigns reached similar 
levels of success at the agenda setting and political commitment stages; and they both 
reached partial success in ensuring that the states follow through with their publicly made 
commitments. The main difference between HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality 
campaigns is the frames they chose to use in promoting their cause. While the HIV/AIDS 
campaign adopted a security frame starting at the political commitment stage, the 
Maternal Mortality campaign stayed away from such use.   
The similar level of success that both campaigns reached despite differences in 
their framing choices illustrates that using a security frame is not a necessary condition 
for a transnational advocacy campaign to succeed. Thus, while the close analysis of 
HIV/AIDS campaign illustrate that adopting a security language can contribute to the 
efforts to solve a global problem, the analysis of the Maternal Mortality campaign 
illustrates that the success cannot solely be attributed to the adoption of such a language.  
The comparison demonstrates that the actors’ framing choices are shaped by the 
opportunities and challenges that their strategic environment presents to them. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also presents that advocates, through multivocalization, can 
alter their strategic environment by expanding their reach and getting their concerns 
heard by a diverse set of allies, as well as by increasing their ability to graft their issue 
onto as many different norms as possible.  
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HIV/AIDS Campaign 
HIV/AIDS campaign is one of the success stories of global agenda setting and 
policy making. This success was not a natural or inevitable one since not all health issues 
trigger same level of attention. On the contrary, some health problems that are equally or 
even more threatening to global health receive less attention.
361
 As Shiffman evaluates 
“for instance, in the early 2000s HIV/AIDS received more than one-third of all major 
donor funding for health, despite representing only around 5% of the mortality and 
morbidity burden in low- and middle- income countries… Meanwhile, other 
communicable diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrheal diseases, that kill millions of 
people each year and for which cost-effective interventions exist, attract minimal donor 
resources.”362  
The success of the HIV/AIDS campaign cannot be explained by the severity or 
the scope of the problem; therefore, it is important to look at the conditions that paved the 
way to this success. The case studies conducted on the issue, while noting the long-term 
moral implications, claim that securitization of the issue contributed to this success.
363
 
However, as both the below presented historical account and the comparison with the 
Maternal Mortality campaign illustrate, the HIV/AIDS campaign realized much of its 
success without using a security frame. The later decision to securitize the issue was not 
inevitable, but rather a consequence of the strategic environment that the campaign was 
operating in, and how the advocates chose to react to it.  
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HIV/AIDS is an interesting case in terms of issue framing, as the advocates and 
policy makers have tried a wide range of frames throughout the campaign with varying 
levels of success. The issue became framed as “a public health problem, a development 
issue, a humanitarian crisis, a human rights issue and a threat to security”364 at different 
stages of global agenda setting and policy making.  Prins summarizes this shift in his 
2004 article by stating that, “HIV/AIDS has been medically visible, both in 
microbiological research and soon after with treatments, for nearly 30 years; researched 
epidemiologically for 25; recognized as an issue in domestic political economy for a 
decade and as a potential security driver and an issue in global political economy (the 
principal concerns of this article) for only about five years.”365   
When it was first discovered, HIV/AIDS was framed as a health issue yet such 
approach did not bring success to the campaign, as this frame was not able to illustrate 
the direct harm that the disease inflicted on “innocent” civilians. The belief in 1980s that 
HIV/AIDS affected mainly homosexuals and drug users stigmatized the disease and 
resulted in “medicalization” of the issue. Moreover, it resulted in a loss of valuable time 
that could have been devoted to the development of preventive research.
366
 While a 
number of NGOs and support groups had been already at work, their efforts to attract 
global attention to the issue remained largely unsuccessful.
367
 This lack of success was 
apparent in the fact that, “WHO was clearly the natural UN ‘home’ for work on AIDS 
with its mandate on maintaining global health. Cases had been reported to WHO annually 
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since 1981 but only one person in the organization was working in the area of sexually 
transmitted infections in the early 1980s.”368 
The strategic framing of the issue, however, translated into success only when the 
political context made both the potential allies and target actors receptive of the 
arguments advanced by the advocates. International attention turned toward 
developments in Africa due to the changing dynamics of world politics with the end of 
the Cold War.
369
 This in turn helped the advocates’ efforts to attract global attention to 
the issue by emphasizing the development and human rights implications for Africa. 
The actors taking advantage of the newly rising opportunities within the political 
context focused on multivocalization. The use of multiple frames at this stage was most 
fruitful in attracting a number of potential allies from different issue areas to start paying 
attention to the issue. This success became evident in the establishment of the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) with the co-sponsorship of eleven 
gatekeepers from different networks.
370
  
Despite the failed attempts to securitize the issue during 1990s,
371
 the security 
frame started to be used in transitioning to the political commitment stage, with the 
purpose of appealing to more donors and potential allies by further emphasizing the 
urgency of the issue. The security frame was introduced through the involvement of the 
UNSC into the issue. In 2000, UNSC held a special debate on “the impact of AIDS on 
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peace and Security in Africa” and declared Resolution 1308 where they defined 
HIV/AIDS as a “threat to international security.”372 In this Resolution, the issue was also 
framed as having a “growing impact on social instability and emergency situations.”373 
The involvement of the UNSC into the issue was especially crucial, as it was the first 
time in the Council’s history that a health issue was considered as a security threat.  
The involvement of the UNSC is an indication of an attempt to securitize the 
issue. However, in order to understand whether the adoption of security language has 
made any difference on the ground, it is important to look at how this new frame was 
perceived by other actors within the campaign. For instance, in reacting to the Resolution, 
the former Executive Director of UNAIDS stated that, “When we look at the history of 
the fight against AIDS, there is no doubt that resolution 1308 (2000) is a milestone in the 
response to the epidemic. By underscoring the fact that the spread of HIV/AIDS, if 
unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security, the Security Council… has 
transformed how the world views AIDS.”374 This statement illustrates that the attempts to 
securitize the issue resonated with the audience and thus it was successful. 
As a result of a decade long efforts to address the issue of HIV/AIDS, the 
campaign succeeded in influencing the states to publicly commit to addressing 
HIV/AIDS. This success is exemplified in the listing of the issue as one of the six 
Millennium Development Goals.  The Millennium Development Declaration pledged by 
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2015 to have “halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of 
malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.”375  
Becoming a part of the Millennium Development Goals was not an automatic or 
an inevitable step on the path of the HIV/AIDS campaign; rather the ongoing buzz 
around the MDG encouraged the actors to emphasize the development frame at the time. 
HIV/AIDS was not among the previously negotiated targets but yet found its way into the 
list through the emphasis put on the issue by the former-Secretary General Kofi Annan 
who emphasized the development implications of HIV/AIDS in his We the Peoples 
speech that he gave prior to the declaration of Millennium Development Goals.
376
 
The forum at which HIV/AIDS was ensured political commitment illustrates that, 
while playing a critical role in creating political commitment, the security frame has not 
completely eclipsed the issue. Rather, the security frame functioned in combination with 
a development frame. This combination is also exemplified in Annan’s We the Peoples 
speech. Annan defined HIV/AIDS as both an impediment in front of development and a 
potential source of global crisis. He stated that, “… I wish here to focus on a specific 
health crisis that threatens to reverse a generation of accomplishment in human 
development, and which is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale: the spread 
of HIV/AIDS.”377 
After securing a place on MDGs, the next important step of the political 
commitment stage was the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS which was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in the Special Session held in June 2001. This 
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Declaration also embodied a combination of security, human rights and development 
frames and has been serving as the benchmark against which the accomplishments made 
in realizing the HIV/AIDS related MDGs are measured. The Declaration defined 
HIV/AIDS as “one of the most formidable challenges to human life and dignity, as well 
as to the effective enjoyment of human rights.”378 The Declaration also argued that the 
current state of HIV/AIDS presents a “state of emergency” especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa and also “recognize[ed] that poverty, underdevelopment and illiteracy are among 
the principle contributing factors to the spread of HIV/AIDS, and noting with grave 
concern that HIV/AIDS is compounding poverty and is now reversing or impeding 
development in many countries.”379 
The security language that was initially adopted to get the support of the potential 
allies later experienced a change in its function and centrality within the campaign. This 
change was due to the involvement of new security actors in the debate, which changed 
the intra-network dynamics by bringing in a number of security organizations as well as 
security scholars into the conversation.
380
 Eventually, the link between HIV/AIDS and 
security was normalized such an extent that the Director of Central Intelligence Agency 
went as far to state that “[t]he national security dimension of the virus is plain… ‘‘[i]t can 
undermine economic growth, exacerbate social tensions, diminish military preparedness, 
create huge social welfare costs, and further weaken already beleaguered states.”381   
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While the development frame is still being used, the security frame started to be 
the main frame that shaped states’ policies in addressing the issue. For instance, Britain 
considered, “implementing compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants amid 
alleged worries that HIV-positive foreigners are traveling to the United Kingdom to seek 
treatment.”382 Some argue that the emphasis on the security dimension of the issue makes 
a positive contribution as framing HIV/AIDS as a security threat “strengthens the call for 
serious action against the menace of AIDS.”383 Others, however, adopt a more critical 
approach to the implications of securitization and suggest that, “[i]f well-intentioned 
people seek to rally support among western governments for anti-AIDS efforts in Africa, 
portraying disease as a security issue may be exactly the wrong strategy to employ.”384  
Thus, putting the normative implications of using a security frame aside, it can be 
argued that security frame has gradually claimed a central role in the global agenda 
setting and policy making surrounding the issue of HIV/AIDS, and has positively 
contributed to the efforts to address the issue – especially at the political implementation 
stage. However, the security frame has never been the only dominant frame in addressing 
the issue, and the increasing importance attached to it was both a function of the strategic 
environment as well as the dynamics within the network.   
Maternal Mortality Campaign 
Maternal mortality is a major health problem that affects the entire world yet it 
has gone unnoticed for a long time even though it claims around 800 lives every day.
385
 
Despite the problem’s long history, it was only in mid-1980s that the issue started to 
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attract international attention, initially that of health practitioners and advocates, and later 
of human rights and developments advocates; this attention led to a campaign that 
resulted in its recognition as one of the Millennium Development Goals. Despite its 
similarity with the HIV/AIDS campaign in terms of campaign success, as opposed to the 
HIV/AIDS campaign, the Maternal Mortality campaign did not use a security frame. This 
choice illustrates that using a security frame is a not necessary condition for success.  
Initially the issue was framed as a health concern and it first attracted the 
international health officials’ attention in 1985, as a result of an article published in 
Lancet. The article was titled “Maternal mortality – a neglected tragedy. Where is the M 
in MCH [Maternal and Child Health]?”386 The increased interest in the topic led to an 
international meeting in Kenya in 1987 where the Global Safe Motherhood Initiative was 
launched. The goal of the Initiative was to decrease the global maternal deaths by 50% by 
2000 – a goal that they failed to realize.387 Despite the failure of the early initiatives in 
solving the problem they succeeded in placing the issue on the global agenda. The Inter-
Agency Group for Safe Motherhood was formed and led to a series of conferences, 
sponsored by the UN, throughout 1990s.
388
  
In the earlier stages of global agenda setting, the Maternal Mortality campaign has 
combined human rights, development and health frames together with the purpose of 
reaching out to a number of potential allies, and has also inserted the issue onto a number 
of existing international institutions’ agendas. This approach can be traced to how the 
main actors in the campaign chose to define and portray the issue. For instance, 
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), one of the leading NGOs in 
                                                 
386
 Rosenfield and Maine 1985. 
387
 Shiffman 2007. 
388
 Tinker and Koblinsky 1993. 
143 
 
the field, argues that “maternal mortality is nothing short of an epidemic” and 
summarizes their perception of the issue as “CARE believes that access to quality sexual, 
reproductive and maternal health is both a fundamental human right and a critical 
development issue. Improving sexual, reproductive and maternal health is therefore 
central to our commitment to gender equality and to reducing global poverty.”389 
Maternal health is also argued to be a part of the “right to the highest attainable standard 
of health” which is recognized as a human right by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
390
 Similar to the CARE’s approach, the White 
Ribbon Alliance, which was established in 1999 as a coalition of NGOs and donors, also 
combines health and human rights frames in their advocacy efforts.
391
 While their slogan 
has a straightforward health frame: “Healthy Mothers, Health World”,392 they 
nonetheless, define safe birth as a women’s right.393  
The emphasis on the development consequences of the issue has proven to be 
especially useful in taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the strategic 
environment at the time; this emphasis also resulted in the placement of the issue on the 
list of Millennium Development Goals. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, the states 
committed to reducing maternal mortality by three quarters by the year 2015. While the 
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target is likely to be missed, significant achievements have been made since the goals 
were set.
394
 
Once the campaign succeeded in getting states to commit to address the problem 
of maternal mortality, existing networks were joined by new ones in working towards 
compelling states to follow through with their commitments, and implement the policies 
they agreed upon. Of the newly established cross-sectorial networks, Campaign on 
Accelerated Reduction of Maternal, Newborn and Child Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) 
has gained a central role in the process. Established by the African Union’s initiative, 
CARMMA brought African states and non-state actors across the globe together
 395
 and 
focused on creating coordination across African countries to reduce maternal deaths in 
Africa. 
This new effort to compel states to implement the policies they publicly 
committed to uses a combination of human rights and development frames. The 
campaign portrays women as an indispensable component of African development
396
 and 
defines access to maternal care as a right.
397
  Despite the fact that maternal mortality has 
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not been reduced to the targeted levels yet, CARMMA has reached notable success in 
mainstreaming the prevention of maternal mortality into African states’ policies. 398  
The sustained use of human rights and development frames by both existing 
advocates within the campaign as well as by the newly developed mechanisms was not an 
inevitable process. Specifically, the growing tendency to draw links between women’s 
rights issues and the security implications of them, as discussed in the previous 
chapter,
399
 could have also spread to the maternal mortality issue. Yet such a shift has not 
been experienced, which further supports the arguments of this study. This also illustrates 
that not only securitization is not a necessary condition for advocacy success, but that the 
tendency to utilize it does not exist across campaigns on similar issues.  
Campaigns on Environmentally Induced Problems 
The comparison of Climate Change and Climate Refugees campaigns furthers our 
understanding of the role of security frames, and the limits of the contribution they make 
to the success of advocacy campaigns. Both campaigns analyzed in this subsection focus 
on addressing climate change induced problems and they both eventually adopted a 
securitized definition of climate change. Despite these similarities, the Climate Change 
campaign reached to the policy implementation stage and achieved at least partial 
success, while Climate Refugees campaign has fallen short of generating political 
commitment so far. The comparison of these campaigns illustrates that adopting a 
security frame is not a sufficient condition for success. Moreover, this finding also 
challenges the uniqueness attributed to the security frames in the literature.  
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As is the case for any frame, while strategic framing of an issue is an important 
component of success, it needs to coincide with a fertile strategic environment to translate 
into goal achievement. The issue of climate change was successfully put on the global 
agenda prior to the securitization of the issue. Even though the securitization of climate 
change could be regarded as useful in keeping states focused on the issue, there is no 
clear evidence that the adoption of such language resulted in better policy 
implementation; moreover, the utilization of this language is not likely to produce such 
results, since the issue, in its current form, lacks the necessary conditions for framing to 
translate into success.   
Despite the securitization of the climate refugees issue that mimicked the 
securitization process that the climate change has undergone, the campaign on climate 
refugees fell short of getting states to publicly commit to addressing the problem. The 
findings highlighted that the obstacles that exist within the broader political context 
prevented strategic framing from translating into success. However, a change in framing, 
although it was toward securitization, did not bring success either, since the issue 
attributes did not provide a fertile ground for such efforts.  
Climate Change Campaign 
The issue of climate change has been primarily approached as an environmental 
issue throughout both the agenda setting and political commitment stages. “Melting 
glaciers, stranded polar bears and disappearing islands” served as cornerstones of the 
environmental frame that NGOs and epistemic communities used in “translat[ing] 
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complex climate change phenomena into event-based, visualisable narratives.”400 The 
problems faced in translating publicly made commitments to policy implementation 
invoked a security frame at later stages. However, such a shift has not made any 
significant contribution due to the problems associated with the nature of the issue at 
hand.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the 
UNEP and World Meteorological Organization and endorsed by the UNGA in 1988. At 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the governments agreed on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; the framework defined the main purpose of climate 
change policy as an environmental one and stated the key objective as “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”401  
Upon the realization that the measures set by the Framework Convention were not 
enough in tackling climate change, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and brought 
forward legally binding targets for the developed countries to reduce their carbon gas 
emission levels.
402
 The Protocol defined the problem of climate change primarily as an 
environmental one with wide range of consequences. “Climate change is a complex 
problem, which, although environmental in nature, has consequences for all spheres of 
existence on our planet. It either impacts on-- or is impacted by-- global issues, including 
poverty, economic development, population growth, sustainable development and 
                                                 
400
 Doyle 2007; Farbotko and Lazrus 2012. It is worth to note that while environmental frame has been the 
dominant frame at the early stages, there were also attempts to bring in a human rights perspective. For a 
discussion on attempts to frame the issue of climate change as a human rights issue, see Aminzadeh 2006. 
401
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
402
 “Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change,” available at 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php>, accessed 9 June 2014.  
148 
 
resource management.”403 To date, 192 parties have signed the Kyoto protocol marking a 
significant level of political commitment success. Thus, it can be argued that climate 
change reached both agenda setting and political commitment success, and has done so 
without resorting to a security language.  
Over time, security language started to find more and more room in the framing of 
the issue.
404
 This change was a function of the difficulty that the campaign faced in 
translating political commitment success to successful policy implementation. The main 
impediment in front of this transition was the problems faced in answering the question 
of who should be responsible for shouldering the burden of taking far-reaching action.
405
 
The Kyoto Protocol has pointed to the developed countries in answering this question, yet 
other states – especially the USA – wanted the burden to be shared more equally. Their 
dissatisfaction has led to their withdrawal from the Protocol.  
 Within this context security language was adopted not only to attract more 
attention to the issue; it also targeted to change the perceptions about the responsibilities 
that each actor should shoulder. This in return would have the potential to bring back the 
actors who were hesitant due to the unequal burden believed to fall on their shoulders 
within the existing framework. The security language was introduced by a number of 
different actors.
406
 For instance:  
In 2004 … British government’s chief scientist, Sir David King, suggested that 
‘climate change is a far greater threat to the world’s stability than international 
terrorism’… A group of eleven high-ranking, retired American admirals and 
generals released a report in April 2007 arguing that climate change will act as a 
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‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food 
insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to 
American national security interests.
407
  
 
In the USA, CNA, a defense think tank, stated in their report titled National Security and 
the Threat of Climate Change” that “global warming could help trigger widespread 
political instability in poor regions and large refugee movements to the United States and 
Europe.”408  
The security frame became a part of the official discourse in 2007 when UNSC 
held a debate on “climate, energy and security.”409 This language then, after intense 
debate, found a reflection in the UNGA Resolution 63/281 which invited all the UN 
organs “to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including 
its possible security implications.”410 
Despite the increasing attempts to draw links between climate change and security 
threats, the lack of a short causal link between the issue and its negative consequences, 
combined with lack of data, prevented such an emphasis to make a clear contribution to 
the development of successful policies. For instance, the United Nations Environment 
Programme suggested that the conflict in Darfur is partially a result of climate change 
induced environmental degradation.
411
 However, these connections were made without 
any clear scientific evidence to support them: “…securitization of climate change is 
supported for the most part by anecdotal research into developing regions where conflict 
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has been triggered by chronic scarcity caused by environmental change, over-
consumption of resources or the combination of both.”412 Even though this newly 
developed explanation has become an accepted one, it did not result in changes in the 
policies developed either in dealing with civil wars or tackling climate change.  
As a result of dissatisfaction with Kyoto Protocol, in December 2012 the “Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol” was adopted. The Amendment introduced a new set 
of commitments for the developed countries in reducing their greenhouse gas 
emissions.
413
 However, it is still unclear how much success the new set of commitments 
will bring in addressing the problem. Therefore, despite the gradual securitization of the 
issue and the seemingly positive contribution that this move has made in attracting more 
attention to the issue, there is no measurable contribution of such language to the 
international community’s ability to address this issue.  
Climate Refugees Campaign 
The issue of climate refugees, first advanced as a human rights issue, has also 
gone through a phase of securitization, albeit with very different implications. Despite the 
fact that the securitization of the climate refugees was built on the securitization of 
climate change – a newly developed but yet widely accepted frame – the adoption of such 
language has not contributed to the attempts to prioritize the climate refugees issue on the 
global agenda.  
In the initial stages of global agenda setting, the issue of climate refugees was 
framed as a human rights concern. The concept of “environmental refugees” was first 
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introduced by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1985 and defined 
as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or 
permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by 
people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their 
life.”414 It was as early as 1980s that the United Nations Environmental Programme 
estimated that 50 million people are at the risk of becoming environmental refugees.
415
 
While the estimates vary, some researchers argue that “environmental refugees will soon 
become the largest group of involuntary migrants.”416 Thus, during this early stage of the 
agenda setting, the issue was framed as a human rights issue and the emphasis remained 
on the toll that climate change would take on those who would have to migrate.  
The framing choices of the advocates were informed by their desire to graft their 
concern onto the existing norms on the protection of refugees, yet it took more than a 
decade after the first published reports for the global agenda setting to reach success due 
to the obstacles that the broader political context presented. The meeting organized by the 
government of the Maldives in 2006 brought “the representatives of governments, 
environmental and humanitarian organizations, and United Nations agencies” together 
and played a critical role in bringing the issue of protection of climate refugees into the 
center of the climate change debate.
417
 The Conference suggested the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on the status of refugees to be amended to include climate refugees.
418
 Yet 
the proposal faced resistance from industrialized countries due to the political and 
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economic burden it would create on the countries at the receiving end of potential 
migratory flows.
419
 
The failure of the campaign was partially a consequence of the obstacles that exist 
within the broader political context. While there is a relatively well-developed 
international regime that focuses on the protection of refugees, the regime and institutions 
are facing significant challenges in responding to the needs of increasing number of 
refugees, even when climate refugees are kept out of the calculation. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, which is at the center of international refugee regime, 
deals with around 10 million refugees based on its mandate of providing protection for 
those who face prosecution due to race, religion, political opinion or ethnicity.
420
 
Therefore, the additional burden that the inclusion of a new category of refugees would 
bring was an unwelcomed one for the key organizations.  
In order to remedy this problem, as the campaign evolved, the issue of 
environmental refugees got reframed and more emphasis started to be put on the security 
threats that these migratory movements are believed to create (especially for the receiving 
countries). The security frame got so prevalent that even International Organization for 
Migration integrated the security frame into its rhetoric: “Migration, climate change and 
the environment are interrelated. Just as environmental degradation and disasters can 
cause migration, movement of people can also entail significant effects on surrounding 
ecosystems. This complex nexus needs to be addressed in a holistic manner, taking into 
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account other possible mediating factors including, inter alia, human security, human and 
economic development, livelihood strategies and conflict.”421 
The introduction of the security frame into the climate refugees debate has not 
gone uncontested. The policy implications of adopting such a frame for the well-being of 
the climate refugees have been at the center of these concerns. As Hartmann points out, 
“climate refugees narrative can, through mobilising racist fears of a dangerous poor, 
protect  the interests of national security in the west, increasing rather than addressing 
fundamental issues of social inequality.”422  
Despite the securitization of the climate refugees issue and attempts to initiate 
policy development by appealing to states’ security concerns, such efforts have not been 
successful so far due to the difficulties in illustrating a short causal link between climate 
change and the refugee flows it can create.  Since certain types of environmental 
problems such as volcanic explosions have been happening throughout the history, their 
existence and the population movements they pave the way to cannot be attributed to 
climate change. However, other forms of environmental problems such as droughts, 
floods, and rising sea levels (or at least the frequency at which they happen) are 
connected to climate change. Nevertheless, given the nature of these issues it is difficult 
to provide aggregate and case-specific evidence to clearly pinpoint this link, which is 
critical in convincing policy makers to take actions accordingly. Thus, while 
securitization might have helped the efforts to prioritize the environmental consequences 
of climate change on the global agenda, it did not perform a similar function in 
prioritizing its impact on population movements.  
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Humanitarian Campaigns 
There have been a number of campaigns that have focused on tackling the 
damages that war and conflict inflict on people, especially on vulnerable populations. 
Despite the mounting efforts, as is the case for all transnational advocacy campaigns, 
some of these campaigns succeeded in garnering attention while the others failed.
423
 In 
order to understand the factors that led to success and the role of security frames in this 
process, this subsection compares two relatively successful cases of advocacy campaigns 
in this issue area: Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict.  
What guided the decision to compare these campaigns is the fact that, despite the 
similarity in their primary concerns, these campaigns vary in their use of frames. On the 
one hand, Child Soldiers campaign primarily used humanitarian and human rights frames 
throughout all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making and only very 
recently experienced attempts from the outside of the campaign to invoke a security 
language. On the other hand, the Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign was quick to 
adopt security language at the political commitment stage and attributed a more central 
role to it.  
Another factor that makes the framing choices of these campaigns interesting is 
that even though the child soldiers issue is more amenable to a security frame due to the 
potential military threat it presents, its campaign activists did not resort to a security 
frame. The Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign, however, resorted to a security frame 
even though the damage it inflicts on the bodily integrity of individuals is more apparent 
(hence the campaign was more amenable to a humanitarian frame). The campaign 
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ultimately resorted to a security frame. This distinction further illustrates the strategic 
nature of securitization and that adopting it is not an inevitable choice.  
The comparison of these two cases also provides insights into the reasons behind 
advocates’ framing decisions, as well as the factors that affect campaigns’ success. Both 
cases illustrate that advocates’ past experiences and areas of expertise as well as strategic 
environment at the time of the campaign shape advocates’ framing choices; moreover, 
they show that multivocalization is utilized strategically to widen the reach of the 
campaign. Additionally, the analysis illustrates that the degree of compliance with the 
norms on which the advocates are trying to graft the new issue affects the campaign’s 
ability to reach success.  
Child Soldiers Campaign 
The issue of child soldiers first started to gain international attention in the 1980s 
as a result of the momentum clustered around the issue of child’s rights. The minimum 
age for recruiting soldiers was set as 15 by the Additional Protocols I and II to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and this norm has gone unchallenged for a while.
424
 
However, the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed in 1989 defined a child as 
“every human being below the age of 18 years unless, the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier.” This disparity triggered reaction among activists and led to a 
call for an Optional Protocol to be signed to increase the minimum recruitment age to 18.  
The issue of child soldiers started to garner global attention in mid-1990s as a 
human rights and humanitarian issue by seizing the opportunities within the political 
context. The year 1994 was declared as the International Year of the Family, and this 
provided a space for child’s rights to be prioritized on the global agenda. On that same 
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year, Cohn and Goodwin-Gill published a ground-breaking report which allowed the 
child soldiers issue to find a place within this broader framework. In their report, Cohn 
and Goodwin-Gill explained the role of child soldiers in international law and illustrated 
the ways in which the humanitarian law has fallen short of protecting these children.
425
  
The next important step was the report prepared by Graça Machel to be presented 
to the UNGA in 1996. In this report, the issue of child soldiers was approached from 
human rights and humanitarian perspectives. The report listed child soldiering among the 
negative impacts of armed conflict on children and therefore categorized it as something 
to be prevented in order to promote and protect the rights of children.
426
 The report was 
welcomed by the General Assembly and led to a resolution on the issue which marked 
the success of the global agenda setting stage of the campaign.
427
 Following the report, 
the UN Secretary General appointed a new Special Representative for Children and 
Armed Conflict.
428
  
The sporadic efforts that preceded the UNGA Resolution were concentrated 
afterwards with the realization that while the political atmosphere was conducive for 
garnering international attention to the issue, it will be a more difficult task to get states 
to take action to address it. With this understanding, the Coalition to Stop the Use of 
Child Soldiers (CSUCS) was launched in 1998.
429
 The Coalition followed suit and 
adopted human rights and humanitarian frames from the very beginning. Stuart Maslen, 
the coordinator of the Coalition at the time, reached out to the international community in 
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an article published in 1998 by framing the issue from human rights and humanitarian 
perspectives and stated that:  
It is perhaps unsurprising that, when on active service, children fighting in armed 
forces or armed groups face similar risks to their adult counterparts: death, injury 
or dismemberment as a result of enemy military action; execution or 
imprisonment for desertion or upon capture (notwithstanding the demands of 
international humanitarian law), disease or malnutrition brought on by the rigours 
of military life. But the direct consequences for children used as soldiers reach 
deeper into the trough of atrocious misery to encompass an almost systemic 
physical, sexual and mental abuse by other, older recruits amidst a frequent 
disintegration of social and cultural norms.
430
 
 
While the campaign chose to graft the issue onto the existing human rights and 
humanitarian norms, it is important to note that such a choice was neither automatic nor 
inevitable. Another alternative could have been to frame the issue as a child labor 
problem and graft it onto the norms developed by the International Labor Organization
431
 
which prohibit the use of children in dangerous occupations,
432
 yet advocates settled on a 
human rights and humanitarian frame.
433
   
A number of factors affected the framing choices of the advocacy campaign. The 
first factor was related to the advocates’ prior experiences. As Snyder contends, “[b]y 
early 1998, humanitarian and advocacy NGOs who played an active role in the Ottawa 
Process on landmines were now looking for other issues which had stagnated within the 
UN system and which might lend themselves to a similar formula. Child soldiers and the 
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Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict seemed like an 
obvious choice.”434 Thus, the previous success of the Landmines campaign encouraged 
the advocates to adopt a similar framing strategy.  
The framing choices of the campaign were also related to the strategic 
environment as well as the existing norms onto which the issue can be layered. Both the 
existing humanitarian norms as well as the unfinished discussion on child’s rights 
provided the advocates an opportunity to “graft” the issue onto the humanitarian and 
human rights frames. As Snyder puts it “especially following the study on the impact of 
armed conflict on children by Ms Graça Machel in 1996, UN agencies such as UNHCR 
and UNICEF have sought to develop institutional memory and consistency in their 
programming.”435 These developments provided fertile ground for varying institutions to 
be receptive of the pressure exerted by the advocates. These efforts, in return, resulted in 
signing of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in January 2000.  
Even though security language has not been championed by any of the major 
actors within the campaign (except for some attempts that came from outside of the 
campaign at the policy implementation stage), there was an early involvement of the 
UNSC through Resolution 1261.
436
 While adoption of the issue by a security organization 
is an indicator of securitization, a closer analysis reveals different insights. When the 
content of the Resolution is analyzed, it becomes clear that rather than describing child 
soldiers as a threat to international security, the Resolution, noting the humanitarian 
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law,
437
 “condemn[ed] the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict.”438 In this 
instance, the Security Council’s involvement contributed to human rights and 
humanitarian frames rather than introducing a security frame.  
Despite the military and therefore security implications of child soldiering, the 
only clear attempt to frame the issue as a security threat came at the policy 
implementation stage. The attempt came from outside the campaign and did not resonate 
with the campaign to that point. The use of child soldiers by non-state actors was one of 
the main concerns both at the agenda setting and political commitment stages, yet such 
emphasis was not formulated as a security threat until the policy implementation stage. 
These outside attempts to securitize the child soldiers issue can be explained with the 
political context of the post-9/11 world. Singer summarizes the situation from a “war on 
terror” perspective and suggests that “[child soldiers] fight in places like Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, and Sudan and, with the new 
‘war on terrorism,’ increasingly face off against the United States and other Western 
armies. Indeed, at least five underage boys suspected of being Al Qaeda terrorists or 
Taliban fighters have been imprisoned at the U.S. military prison on Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.”439  
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Despite these attempts to approach the issue from a security perspective, the 
security language has not found its way into the campaign yet. This is evidenced by the 
lack of security language in the current approach of the advocates. For instance, Child 
Soldiers International describes the current state of the policy implementation stage by 
stating that “Today close to two thirds of states recognise that banning under-18s from 
military ranks is necessary to protect them from the risk of involvement in armed conflict 
and to ensure their well-being, and that their other rights as children are respected.”440 
Thus, the analysis of the Child Soldiers campaign illustrates that the campaign 
reached success at agenda setting and political commitment stages by using human rights 
and humanitarian frames. Both the political opportunity structure as well as the 
advocates’ previous experiences shaped their framing choices. There were attempts to 
reframe the issue within the “war on terror” framework, yet these efforts have neither 
resonated with the main actors in the issue nor triggered any observable positive increase 
in states’ compliance.  
Sexual Violence in Conflict Campaign 
While the use of sexual violence as a military instrument has been documented for 
a long time,
441
 the issue has started to garner international attention only after the 
atrocities experienced in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and Democratic Republic of Congo.
442
 
These atrocities led to the recognition of sexual violence in conflict as a “crime against 
humanity and war crime in international law” yet in the words of Jody Williams, who 
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assumed a leading role in the creation of the campaign, “laws are lovely on paper. They 
are irrelevant if they are not implemented and complied with.”443  
In order to create change on the ground, and not just on paper, a group of 
advocates got together and initiated a campaign with the support of like-minded states. 
The goal of the campaign is to convert the perception about sexual violence in conflict as 
an unfortunate military tactic to be punished as a crime once the conflict is over, but 
rather to develop a norm that would eliminate the use of sexual violence as a military 
instrument, all together. 
Similar to the Child Soldiers campaign, the framing choices of the advocates at 
the global agenda setting stage was partly a function of the previous experiences of the 
actors involved in the network, and partly a function of advocates’ desire to appeal to as 
many potential allies possible and to graft the issue onto the existing norms about sexual 
violence outside conflict zones. The transnational advocacy movement that started the 
campaign got together in 2011 at the Nobel Women’s Initiative. At this meeting, “130 
women activists, security experts, academics, journalists, and corporate leaders from 30 
countries gathered with Nobel Peace Laureates Jody Williams, Shirin Ebadi, and Mairead 
Maguire.”444 These women brought in their own expertise and framed the issue primarily 
from human rights and humanitarian perspectives. As it is explained in the Campaign’s 
call for action, advocates framed wartime rape as a threat to “individuals and families, 
entire communities and the fabric of society.”445  
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The efforts proved to be successful and led to the Global Summit to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict in June 2014, which marked the transition from the agenda setting 
stage to the political commitment stage. The language used at the Summit combined a 
number of frames and defined the issue as a “public health and human rights concern, as 
well as a matter of peace and security.”446 In the summary report it was stated that:  
Sexual violence in conflict is a uniquely destructive act and method of war. It is 
an outrage to all morality. Survivors who have gone through the trauma of an 
attack too often also face rejection by their families and reprisals from their 
communities. Moreover, sexual violence in conflict often flows from underlying 
inequalities. Further, a society that believes in human rights for all human beings 
and opportunities for all its citizens cannot know about the way rape is used as a 
weapon of war and then simply ignore it. But it is not only our values that are at 
stake. Sexual violence in conflict poses a grave threat to international peace and 
security. It exacerbates tension and violence and undermines stability…447  
 
Thus, at this stage, in addition to human rights and humanitarian frames, a security frame 
was also utilized.  
The purpose of introducing a security language to the issue was not to militarize 
the topic by taking it outside the realm of politics, but rather to incorporate the issue onto 
the peace-making and peace-building efforts. That the security language adopted at the 
political commitment stage, on the one hand, defines sexual violence in conflict as a 
threat to security; and on the other hand, lists the prevention of such acts as a 
precondition for achieving lasting peace. “States have responsibility for breaches of 
international law committed by their armed forces. Although it is and has been a feature 
of most conflicts, it has only recently been discussed openly in international conflict-
prevention discourse. Yet it can undermine ceasefires, and prevent lasting reconciliation 
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long after the last bullets have been fired. It affects not only women and girls, but also 
men and boys…By undermining reconciliation, deepening grievances and devastating 
communities, sexual violence feeds a cycle of conflict.”448  
Despite these efforts and the introduction of a security frame, no significant 
change has been observed on the ground so far
449
 due to the obstacles within the broader 
political context as well as the attributes of the issue at hand. When evaluated from this 
perspective, the issue of sexual violence in conflict constitutes an interesting example 
because the scope and the severity of the issue have so far worked as an impediment to 
advocates’ efforts to attract global attention to the issue rather than promoting it. That is 
to say, because of “its prominence throughout history, sexual violence in warfare is often 
dismissed as an ‘inevitable’ and unfortunate feature of conflict.”450 Thus, in this case, the 
existing norms on both “code of conduct in warfare” and “sexual violence” have worked 
against the campaign as the problems faced in compliance with these norms led to a 
“fatigue,” and made sympathetic allies and target actors question the campaign’s 
potential to create change. 
As suggested by the literature and discussed in the previous chapter, the second 
reason that limited the success of the efforts to bring the issue onto the forefront of the 
global agenda is argued to be the lack of data that can be used in illustrating the scope 
and the severity of the situation. While some estimates exist
451
 they vary significantly and 
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the “scarcity of data from population-based surveys has fuelled certain misconceptions, 
and limited policy and programmatic investments in conflict-related sexual violence.”452 
Thus, Sexual Violence in Conflict is an example of a campaign that has not 
reached success in creating political commitment and policy implementation despite 
being framed as a security threat. The lack of compliance with the norms onto which the 
issue was grafted played an important role in limiting the success. Combined with the 
above-explained impediments, the analysis further showed that, in the absence of other 
enabling factors, adopting a security frame is not a sufficient condition for success. This 
illustrates the strategic nature of securitization and that no issue falls naturally into a 
security frame, which further supports the study’s argument that securitization functions 
like any other instance of framing.  
Arms Control Campaigns 
Above presented analyses looked into the campaigns on non-traditional security 
issues to reveal whether transnational advocacy networks resorted to security frames and 
how well such choices resonated with the level of success that campaigns reached. 
However, in order to provide a fuller analysis, it is important to look into networks’ 
framing choices when advocating for issues that are traditionally categorized as security 
concerns. Such an analysis is crucial in illustrating that mechanisms identified above are 
also valid for the framing processes surrounding traditional security issues.    
 Campaigns that targeted the banning of landmines and limiting the use of small 
arms are similar in terms of the nature of the issues at hand, as well as in terms of their 
goals. Both of the campaigns are examples of transnational advocacy networks’ efforts to 
find their ways into areas that are considered to be a part of security domain – which are 
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traditionally outside of the TANs’ reach.  Landmines have been mostly considered just 
another type of conventional weapon with “no particular ill repute”453 and thus, in 
content, very similar to small arms. Yet, despite these similarities the Landmines 
campaign reached significant level of success while the Small Arms campaign has so far 
reached a very limited one.   
Comparing these cases presents additional insights into understanding the role and 
importance of framing, as it illustrates how successful de-securitization might be crucial 
for achieving success while remaining within a security frame could lead to failure. The 
ICBL has effectively de-securitized the issue, i.e. moved the issue away from a national 
security frame into a humanitarian one.  IANSA has made a similar attempt at the agenda 
setting stage but got pulled back into the security frame at the policy commitment stage. 
As a result, the successfully de-securitized ICBL has become one of the most successful 
examples of global agenda setting and policy making while the re-securitized IANSA has 
failed to create any notable change on the ground.  
The comparative analysis below illustrates four insights into advocates’ decisions 
to use security frames. First, it demonstrates that, as it is the case for other issue areas, the 
fact that an issue is traditionally considered within a security frame does not necessarily 
dictates the framing choices of a transnational advocacy campaign. Second, de-
securitizing traditional security issues could contribute to the success of a campaign by 
providing a space wherein advocates can be credibly heard. Third, the comparison also 
illustrates that framing choices can be tailored not only to attract the attention of targets 
of influence but also to extend the reach of the network by appealing to potential allies.  
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Lastly, the relative success of the ICBL reveals that in order for a campaign to 
succeed, strategic framing needs to coexist with other enabling factors such as network 
dynamics. For that reason, lack of fertile network dynamics as well as the existence of 
counter norms and counter-campaigns prevented the Small Arms campaign from 
reaching a similar level of success.  
International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
The ICBL was established in 1992 by the Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation and Medico International; later joined by four other human rights 
organizations, they formed the Campaign’s Steering Committee.454 The campaign 
primarily used a humanitarian frame throughout all stages of global agenda setting and 
policy making and argued that, “antipersonnel mines are indiscriminate and inhumane 
weapons and therefore violate the basic elements of international humanitarian law”455 
and hurt civilians.  
The advocacy efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines turned out 
to be one of the most successful examples of global agenda setting and led to the signing 
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction in 1997 by 122 countries. The agreement is 
considered to be “a stunning example of a new form of diplomacy” where NGOs, in 
cooperation with states, have created a new norm.
456
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Despite the fact that the campaign was primarily dealing with an arms control 
issue, it did not use a security frame in its efforts to attract transnational attention and 
initiate global policies addressing the issue. To the contrary, the campaign deliberately 
stayed away from using a security frame (effectively by de-securitizing it) as it might 
have weakened the campaign rather than strengthening it. As the following statement 
illustrates this was a deliberate choice on the part of the campaign:  
The ICBL … maintained its focus on civilian harms to distinguish APMs from 
other weapon systems or war itself. Opposition to landmines was not to be 
equated with opposition to warfare in general. The ICBL continually emphasized 
the indiscriminate nature of APMs, while acknowledging that most other weapons 
had clear military benefits. By tapping into universal norms about the need to 
protect civilians and especially children, the ICBL emphasized how the harms of 
landmines ought to overwhelm any consideration of their military utility.
457
 
 
The strong and unified emphasis placed on the humanitarian frame can be 
considered as one of the most important factors in the success that ICBL has reached at 
the agenda setting stage; however, this was possible due to the network dynamics.
458
 
Rather than acting as a coalition of NGOs with varying voices and framing priorities, the 
Campaign acted with a “single, homogenous voice with a unitary position.”459 The 
coordinator of the campaign at the time, Jody Williams was in charge of voicing the 
position of the Campaign and she insisted on framing the issue as a humanitarian one by 
emphasizing that  landmines are “a humanitarian, not an arms control issue.”460 
The humanitarian frame contributed to the Campaign’s efforts to get the states to 
publicly commit to banning landmines in primarily three ways. First, the humanitarian 
frame helped the campaign by illustrating the severity of the issue and marking the states 
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as the source of the problem. As Keck and Sikkink put forward, a campaign is more 
likely to succeed if it is able to identify a perpetrator and a short causal link between the 
actions of that perpetrator and the damage it creates for “vulnerable or innocent 
individuals.”461 This approach has been evident since the very first report published by 
Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights in 1991 – which preceded the ICBL – 
“[landmines] are blind weapons that cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier 
or that of an old woman gathering firewood. They recognize no cease-fire, and long after 
the fighting has stopped, they can maim or kill the children and grandchildren of the 
soldiers who laid them.”462 With this type of a humanitarian frame, the campaign focused 
on emphasizing the damage that landmines inflict on innocent civilians. 
Images and data were used effectively to widen influence of the frame 
championed by the campaign, and helped the campaign to reach out to a number of 
potential allies. The primary statistics used by the advocates was that “landmines kill or 
maim more than twenty-six thousand people per year of whom an estimated 80 percent 
are civilian.”463 Data was used to illustrate that the problem is here to stay unless 
appropriate steps were to be taken as there “may be 200 million landmines scattered in at 
least sixty-four countries”464 and the severity of the situation can be “stabilized” only if 
the world’s mine-clearing capacity has been increased by five-fold.465 Despite the later 
criticisms about the validity of these statistics,
466
 the statistics were picked up and 
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resulted in the endorsement of the humanitarian frame by major media outlets.
467
  As a 
result, the Campaign was able not only to convince the international community to the 
“indiscriminate cost of landmines” but also to pinpoint states as the perpetrators to be 
held responsible for the damage caused.
468
 
The use of the humanitarian frame also allowed the advocacy network to get 
support from less-likely allies: states. In other words, by de-securitizing the issue, the 
campaign prevented states from ignoring the issue by hiding behind their security 
priorities. As Hubert argues, “once the issue was cast in humanitarian terms, it became 
difficult for states to resist the logic of a ban.”469 This shift in states’ approach cannot be 
attributed to the diminishing utility of landmines as exemplified by the stance that 
relatively volatile states took on the issue.
470
 This shift rather could be explained by the 
change in the cost-benefit calculations of the states as a result of the successful de-
securitization of the issue by the campaign. As Price notes, “many states have decided not 
that mines are not at all useful, but that their military utility is outweighed by their 
humanitarian costs, thus introducing a moral calculus into the definition of national 
interest.”471  
Framing the issue as a humanitarian problem also enabled the advocates to draw 
cognitive connections between their goal and the existing norms. As Finnemore and 
Sikkink suggest, an attempt to create a new norm is evaluated by the actors based on how 
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well they correspond to the existing norms.
472
 Thus, the issues that can be “grafted” onto 
the existing norms have a better chance at succeeding in getting attention and creating 
change.
473
 On the one hand, the campaign grafted the issue onto the existing norms 
against the use of chemical and biological weapons. They framed the landmines as 
“weapons of mass destruction in slow motion” which means that “they should be 
perceived as being just indiscriminate and inhumane as chemical weapons.”474 On the 
other hand, the issue was grafted onto the existing humanitarian law which forbids the 
use of a particular type of an attack if it “may cause more harm to noncombatants than 
necessary to fulfill the military objective.”475As a result of these efforts, the issue has 
become a part of discussion on protecting civilians rather than being considered as just 
another tool at militaries’ disposal.  
Today, the campaign is in its policy implementation stage and so far has reached a 
considerable level of success as a result of the signing and ratification of the treaty by 161 
countries. However, implementation is not perfect and ICBL believes that there is still 
room for improvement. Toward this end, the Coalition launched a campaign called 
“Finish the Job” where they aim to universalize the norm compliance. At this stage, the 
campaign still frames the issue as a threat to civilian protection and hence shows 
consistency in their framing choices. The consistent emphasis on the protection of 
civilians can be observed in their call for action: “Getting more states to join the Mine 
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Ban Treaty is a key way to strengthen the norm of a total ban on antipersonnel mines and 
contribute to saving more lives from the scourge of mines.” 476  
Thus, the above presented analysis illustrates that an arms control issue can be de-
securitized, and such a framing choice might contribute to the success of a campaign. 
This stands in opposition to what one would have seen if the securitization literature were 
to be correct about the prominence of security frames.  
Small Arms Campaign 
The Small Arms campaign started with the efforts of scholars and arms control 
policy advocates in the first half of 1990s.
477
 The early publications not only raised 
awareness about the issue but also brought various non-governmental actors that have 
been working on the issue, in one way or another, together.
478
 In late 1997, twenty-three 
such NGOs got together in Washington and founded the Preparatory Committee for a 
Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons. After series of meetings the 
International Action Network on Small Arms was officially formed in 1999 by the 
involvement of more than 100 NGOs.
479
  
Human rights and humanitarian frames were adopted early on by the Campaign. 
The founding document of IANSA stated the Network’s objective as, “contribut[ing] to a 
more just and violence-free world, sustainable peace, development, human security and 
respect for human rights” through fighting with the “proliferation and misuse of small 
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arms and light weapons.”480 As exemplified by the approach stated in the founding 
documents, the Network framed the problem of small arms as a threat to the “human right 
to live in a secure environment characterized by peace, dignity and humanity”481 and 
thus, tried to de-securitize the issue.  
The humanitarian and human rights language that the campaign adopted at the 
agenda setting stage also became embedded in the symbolic politics that the campaign 
has resorted to in triggering international attention. For instance, “network members often 
raise[d] the fact that more than 40 Red Cross personnel were killed in the 1990s in 
Chechnya and Rwanda alone. This is astonishing when you compare that number with 
the 15 Red Cross volunteers who died in the line of duty between 1945 and 1990.”482 
The efforts of the campaign also coincided with number of resolutions by the UN, 
and which eventually led to the creation of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Small 
Arms. As a result, the Campaign has succeeded in getting the issue on the UN’s agenda 
and led to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
All Its Aspects which was followed by a non-binding Programme of Action. The Arms 
Trade Treaty has recently gone into effect, yet the level of success this treaty brings is 
rather limited as only sixty-four out of hundred and thirty signatories have ratified the 
treaty so far.  
As the campaign moved from the agenda setting to political commitment stage, a 
shift in the framing of the issue was also experienced. While the security frame was not 
utilized at the agenda setting stage, it rose in prominence at the political commitment 
stage. This shift in the framing of the issue is exemplified in the United Nations Office 
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for Disarmament Affairs’ approach to the issue: “Illicit small arms have a negative 
impact on security, contribute to the displacement of civilians, facilitate the violation of 
human rights and hamper social and economic development.”483 However, despite what 
the securitization literature would have expected to observe, such change did not bring 
significant political commitment success.   
It is important to note that the limited success of the campaign at the political 
commitment stage cannot be attributed solely to the attempts to securitize the issue. A 
number of structural and non-structural factors played a role in the relative failure of the 
campaign. First, whereas the density and the diversity of the campaign network 
contributed to the success of the Landmines campaign, decentralized structure of the 
Small Arms campaign limited its strength.
484
 Second, the existence of pro-gun groups 
was crucial. These counter-campaigning efforts not only were able to graft their 
arguments on the norms on “right to bear arm” but also had better access to key 
conference delegations during the negotiations.
485
  
Comparative Analysis 
The analysis I present in this chapter provides insights into both the role and 
impact of security frames in particular and advocates’ framing choices and the factors 
shaping these decisions, in general. The first set of insights support the arguments 
developed in the previous chapter: The successful examples of non-securitized cases 
(Maternal Mortality, Landmines and Child Soldiers) illustrated that using security frames 
is not a necessary condition for success of a campaign while the failed examples of 
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securitized cases (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence in Conflict) illustrated that 
using security frames is not a sufficient condition for success, either.  
 As the discussion on de-securitization of the Landmines campaign illustrated, 
contrary to the arguments in the securitization literature, reframing a traditional security 
concern as a humanitarian problem can help advocates’ efforts to prioritize the issue on 
states’ political agendas. This is because de-securitizing the issue opens up a space for 
advocates to have their voices heard, which would not have been possible if the issue 
were to remain as a security concern.  
The failed examples of securitized cases (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence 
in Conflict) challenged the uniqueness attributed to the security frames by the literature 
and showed that security frames function like other discursive frames. Therefore, the 
adoption of security frames is a result of a strategic calculation on the part of the 
advocates rather than an inevitable process. Thus, like any other frame, security frames 
contribute to the success of a campaign given that other relevant conditions described by 
global agenda setting and framing literatures (such as suitable political atmosphere, 
availability of data, short causal link, physical damage inflicted on innocent victims) 
exist. As we see in the example of the Climate Refugees campaign, when other 
conditions are missing, security frame cannot trigger success on its own.  
In addition to supporting the arguments made in the previous chapter about the 
limits of the role and the importance of security frames, this chapter presented three 
lessons concerning framing processes in general. The findings provided insights into (i) 
the conditions that are needed for strategic framing to translate into campaign success; 
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(ii) motivations behind advocates’ framing choices, and (iii) conditions shaping such 
choices.  
Conditions for Success 
While not disregarding the role and importance of framing in the success of 
transnational advocacy campaigns, the comparative analysis illustrated that in order for 
strategic framing of an issue to lead to success, it needs to coexist with a number of 
factors. The findings showed that despite the uniqueness attributed to security frames, the 
same is true for securitized campaigns as illustrated by the less successful examples of 
securitized campaigns (Climate Refugees and Sexual Violence in Conflict).   
The findings of the study lend support to the arguments in the literature that 
emphasize the role of the strategic environment in explaining the success of an advocacy 
campaign. As the literature points out, target actors’ as well as potential allies’ 
receptiveness of a campaign’s calls are “context dependent.”486 While advocates 
strategically frame issues to capitalize on both structural and non-structural opportunities 
at hand, lack of such conditions limit the possible positive outcomes of such efforts. 
One of the frequently cited determinants of success is how well the proposed 
norm resonates with the existing ones.
487
 In certain cases, strategic framing of issues help 
campaigns successfully draws a link between their claims and the existing norms. This 
can be observed in the case of the Landmines campaign, and the successful link they 
drew between their call to ban landmines and existing norms on weapons of mass 
destruction and protection of civilians in warfare. However, strategic framing does not 
always accomplish this goal. This could be due to the existence of counter norms (as in 
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the case of “right to bear arms” norm that the Small Arms campaign had to work against) 
or due to the lack of adherence to the existing norms (as in the case of constant violation 
of protection of civilians norms that worked against the efforts of the Sexual Violence in 
Conflict campaign). 
 In this sense, the strategic environment within which the advocacy efforts take 
place plays an important role. While the political context is beyond the control of the 
campaign, it shapes both the potential allies’ and target actors’ priorities and their 
receptiveness to the campaigns’ advocacy efforts.488 For instance, the momentum around 
the child’s rights issues in 1980s provided a fertile ground for the campaign on Child 
Soldiers to get started. Similarly, the changing political dynamics with the end of the 
Cold War has led to an increased awareness about the problems in Africa and this in turn 
provided an opportunity for advocates’ to successfully pitch the issue of HIV/AIDS as a 
development problem.  
 Yet, the advocates’ hands are not tied in the face of less than optimal strategic 
environments. Both the arguments in the literature and the evidence that this study 
brought forward illustrated that not only structural but also non-structural factors play a 
critical role in determining the level of success that a transnational advocacy campaign 
reach. These factors “include strategy and agency, which have to do with the active 
choices and efforts of movements as well as of the opponents and other players in the 
conflict, and cultural factors that deal with the moral visions, cognitive understandings, 
and emotions that exist prior to a movement but which are also transformed by it.”489    
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 One set of such characteristics is regarding the advocacy networks’ own 
characteristics, i.e. intra-network dynamics.
490
 These characteristics include “the diversity 
of a TAN, the number and diversity of its members and its ability to exchange 
information.”491 For instance, the ICBL’s ability to bring in diverse set of actors together 
and create a dense (yet diverse) network was important in the success of the Landmines 
campaign, yet failure to create such dynamic within the network worked to the 
disadvantage of the IANSA.
492
  
Similarly, gatekeeper preferences were based on their perceptions of the issue; 
their calculations about the contribution they can make to the issue; as well as the 
benefits they could potentially draw from becoming a part of the campaign
493
 play a role 
in determining a campaign’s level of success. For instance, the overwhelmed agenda of 
gatekeepers within the international refugees regime prevented the gatekeepers from 
prioritizing the climate refugees issue and lending support to the campaign. 
 Non-structural conditions also include case specific characteristics, i.e. issue 
attributes. These attributes include the nature of the harm caused by the problem at hand 
(whether it is physical and therefore easily identifiable)
494
 as well as the perceived 
existence of harm inflicted on “innocent” civilians;495 existence of a short causal link 
between the perpetuator and the victim;
496
 and whether the issue is culturally sensitive.
497
 
While these issue attributes can be brought to light through strategic framing by the 
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advocates, not all issues are equally amenable to such efforts. For instance, the physical 
damage caused by landmines worked to the advantage of the Landmines Campaign, 
whereas the fact that the causal link between climate change and migration is a long and 
an indirect one. For that reason, despite the efforts by the advocates, it was difficult for 
advocates to convince both gatekeepers and target actors to the urgency of the problem.  
Frame multivocalization as networking 
 The above presented analysis illustrated that campaigns tend to combine multiple 
frames at the same time for two purposes. They engage in multivocalization in order to 
reach out to as many potential allies as possible and to widen their network. Using 
different frames allows campaigns to circulate their arguments within different issue 
networks and attract potential allies with varying interests. For instance, the initial 
adoption of a security frame by the HIV/AIDS campaign did not aim to emphasize the 
security implications of the issue, but rather attempted to get the UNSC’s as well as 
donors’ support in prioritizing the issue as a development and human rights issue. 
Similarly, combining human rights and health frames helped the Maternal Mortality 
campaign to bring in a wide array of NGOs together in attempts to prioritize the issue. 
The combined use of humanitarian and human rights frames by the Child Soldiers 
campaign also allowed advocates to reach out to both the UNHCR, which operates within 
the humanitarian network, and the UNICEF, which operates within the human rights 
network, at the same time and guarantee their support.  
 The findings also illustrated that adoption of multiple frames could be aimed at 
increasing the campaigns’ chances of grafting their issue onto as many norms as possible. 
For instance, the Child Soldiers campaign has framed the issue both as a human rights 
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and humanitarian issue in order to tap the issue onto both norms on child’s rights and 
humanitarian norms developed with Geneva Conventions. Similarly, the use of 
development and human rights frame together was crucial in bringing success to the 
HIV/AIDS campaign as it put responsibility on the shoulders of actors within different 
regimes after the failure of the initial campaign based on a health frame that only 
managed to stimulate action on the part of WHO. The contribution that multivocalization 
make to the HIV/AIDS campaign found its reflection in the structure of the UNAIDS 
which was sponsored by a number of organizations from different issue networks. 
 These findings lend support to the arguments developed in the recent literature 
regarding the role of intra-network dynamics in shaping decisions and actions of 
advocacy networks.
498
 Thus, bringing in crucial allies and forming a strong coalition is 
considered to be as important as the expectations about the target actors’ behaviors in 
explaining advocacy networks’ decisions. As a part of this broader literature, it is argued 
that “constructing” an issue for target actors is not enough in successfully addressing it, 
advocacy networks also need to get support from “gatekeepers” – central organizations 
within the networks.
499
 Therefore, appealing to these gatekeepers require campaigns to 
strategically choose their frame accordingly as advocates’ ability to match their issue to 
the potential allies’ mandate as well as their calculations regarding the consequences of 
taking part in the campaign is crucial.
500
 This is crucial because the scope and severity of 
the issue at hand fall short of explaining why advocates pick certain issues while 
sidelining the others. Multivocalization can be an important tool in appealing to diverse 
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set of gatekeepers and international regimes built on different norms. However, it is 
important to distinguish multivocalization from frame contestation” within the network501 
or disagreement over tactics
502
 as it was seen in the example of the Small Arms 
Campaign such dynamics are counterproductive.
503
 
 The existing studies on securitized cases of transnational advocacy campaigns 
attributed such framing choices to advocates’ desire to appeal to states’ primary concerns. 
While the uniqueness attributed to security frames in this approach helped these studies 
provide an explanation for the success of these particular campaigns, it fell short of 
explaining campaigns that succeeded through de-securitization of the issue at hand. In 
other words, while these studies were able to shed, albeit limited, light on the reasons for 
“securitization” of human rights, humanitarian and health issues, they failed to account 
for other framing processes such as “humanitarization” of security issues. As the 
discussion on de-securitization of the Landmines campaign illustrated, contrary to the 
arguments in the securitization literature, reframing a traditional security concern as a 
humanitarian problem can help advocates’ efforts to prioritize the issue on states’ 
political agendas. As discussed above, de-securitization of the landmines issue 
contributed to the campaign by opening up a space for advocates to have their voices 
heard which would not have been possible if the issue were to remain as a security 
concern.  
Dynamics of Framing Choices 
 The literature on transnational advocacy networks suggests that “a mix of 
normative and material interests influence how activists choose their normative reference 
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points.”504 The analysis presented above supports this argument and highlights two 
structural and non-structural such factors in explaining the dynamics that shape 
advocates’ framing choices. These factors are the expertise and the experiences of the 
advocates and the political context in which they operate. 
First, the advocates’ personal experiences and fields of expertise inform their 
framing decisions. This finding corresponds to the arguments in the literature about 
“transnational social movement spillovers.”505 This argument suggests that “the ideas, 
tactics, style, participants, and organizations of one movement often spill over its 
boundaries to affect other social movements.”506 This is primarily because humans are 
“cognitive misers” who resort to shortcuts in making decisions by relying on their former 
experiences.
507
 Advocates’ fields of expertise lead to selective perception, and the 
memory of previous successful and failed campaigns provide cognitive maps for the 
advocates and inform their framing choices.  
The analysis of the Child Soldiers campaign presented clear evidence for this 
argument. As discussed above, the main organizations that played a central role in the 
Landmines campaign later shifted their focus to the child soldiers issue and employed not 
only the same advocacy tactics, but also the same discursive frames with the goal of 
replicating the footsteps of the previous success. Similarly, some of the actors that took 
part in the Landmines campaign later played a central role at the early stages of the 
Campaign to End Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones. These actors not only brought in 
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their own expertise but also their experiences with former campaigns which in return 
informed their framing choices.  
 The strategic environment also affects advocates’ framing choices. Political 
context is “the broader institutional context that provides opportunities for or imposes 
constraints on NGOs engaged in framing processes.”508 Broader political contexts inform 
advocates framing choices since these are actors “are not atomistic but social actors, 
whose actions, perceptions, interests, identities and ideas are constituted by the 
institutional context.”509 This impact becomes especially evident when significant 
changes occur in the broader political context. As it was discussed in the case of Child 
Soldiers and as it will be further elaborated in the next chapter in analyzing Conflict 
Diamonds campaign, September 11 attacks and the “War on Terror” dynamics that 
followed influenced the advocates’ framing choices. 
At the same time, the shift in the conjecture could also be used strategically to 
graft the issue onto newly rising awareness on the part of both potential allies and targets 
of influence. For instance, the attempts to put Millennium Development Goals together 
have encouraged the actors to emphasize the development consequences of both 
HIV/AIDS and maternal mortality by respective campaigns. Thus, while the strategic 
environment informs the strategic choices available to advocates, through their actions, 
advocates can cultivate the strategic environment to their benefit.  
Internally Displaced Persons  
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have 
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
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particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and 
who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”510 As Ban Ki-moon 
himself acknowledges, “displacement remains arguably the most significant humanitarian 
challenge that we face.”511 Yet, while there is a well-developed international regime 
addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of the refugees
512
 no such mechanism has been 
developed for IDPs, despite the scope and the severity of the problem and the advocates’ 
efforts to gain attention.
513
  
Although it is not the purpose of this dissertation to explain the variation in the 
success of non-securitized cases, the case of the IDPs campaign further illustrates the 
points identified above. When assessing the very limited success that the campaign for 
IDPs has achieved, it becomes clear that a change in the strategic environment 
contributed to the advocates’ efforts to place the issue on the global agenda. Yet, the 
problems associated with the nature and the scope of the issue limited the advocates’ 
ability to turn this success into a significant level of political commitment. The 
complexity of the issue also limited the advocates’ ability to strategically engage in 
multivocalization, i.e. to strategically utilize human rights and humanitarian frames 
together in order to strengthen their efforts. 
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The 1990s witnessed both an increase in the number and scope of humanitarian 
crises
514
 and also a “shift in how states understand sovereignty and the state’s relationship 
with its own citizens.”515 Similar to the opportunity that the emphasis put on children’s 
rights presented for the Child Soldiers Campaign, the increasing number of IDPs as well 
as the increasing awareness of such instances constituted a breaking point for the 
strategic environment in which advocates operate; this change allowed them to utilize this 
perception of crisis as an opportunity to successful push the issue onto the global agenda.  
Friends World Committee for Consultation, the World Council of Churches, and 
the Refugee Policy Group made use of this fertile political environment and approached 
the UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), using a UN 
sponsored conference as an opportunity to draft a resolution to ask the Secretary-General 
to prepare a report to analyze the scope of the problem.
516
 As a response to these efforts, 
the UN Secretary-General appointed Francis Deng as the Representative of the Secretary-
General for Internally Displaced Persons. Yet, despite this long overdue success in 
putting the issue onto the global agenda, the success remained limited to the “recognition 
of the problem”517 and did not pave the way to the development of an effective 
international mechanism in addressing the issue.  
 The opportunity that the strategic environment presented for the advocates altered 
when it came to the political commitment stage. That is because as is acknowledged by 
the literature
518
 and discussed in the previous chapters, getting states to recognize the 
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problem is one thing, but garnering the political will to address it is another; as Ferris 
contends, “The international humanitarian community struggled to find appropriate ways 
of responding to a growing number of internally displaced individuals in the absence of 
clear institutional mechanisms.”519 However, the lack of support from the states to 
establish a new UN agency has curtailed the efforts to develop institutional mechanisms 
for relief. As a result of this reluctance, a system of coordination was established wherein 
Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) was given the task of coordinating inter-agency 
efforts and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) was given the responsibility to support ERC in these efforts.
 520
 The most 
productive output of such effort at the global scale is the non-binding Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement. The Guiding Principles encourage the NGOs, UN agencies and 
states to promote the principles and encourage states to apply them. Yet, the application 
of the principle is voluntary
 521
 and the implementation has remained “largely ad hoc and 
driven more by personalities and convictions of individuals on ground than by an 
institutional, system-wide agenda.”522 
This limited success triggered an attempt to reform the system in 2004, called the 
“humanitarian reform,” wherein a “cluster approach” that aimed to better identify the 
responsibilities of different organizations to “ensure a more predictable, consistent, and 
accountable response across crises.”523 These reform attempts have placed the issue into 
the humanitarian regime but in doing so it left the environmentally or development 
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induced displacement out of the equation, as they are considered to fall into the human 
rights regime. Thus, an attempt to strengthen the framing of the issue as a humanitarian 
concern proved to be counterproductive for the efforts to address the needs of particular 
types of IDPs. As is discussed below, the reform also fell short of leading to the 
development of a proper mechanism in addressing conflict induced displacement.  
The fact that IDPs remain within the borders of their own country is sometimes 
considered to be the reason behind the limited success that the advocates have so far 
reached in getting states to take responsibility in addressing the population’s needs. Yet, 
such reasoning is not enough to explain the very limited success that the campaign has 
reached so far. As the examples analyzed in the previous chapter illustrate, transnational 
advocacy campaigns can contribute to shaping states’ responsibilities toward their own 
citizens, as well as to the international human rights regime, as observed in the successful 
cases of Child Labor, Child Soldiers and Women’s Reproductive Rights campaigns.  
The fact that the issue has implications for both human rights and humanitarian 
regimes can also not explain the limited success of the campaign. As seen in the War 
Crimes Tribunals example, a campaign can successfully engage in human rights and 
humanitarian frames simultaneously, and successfully use the combination to attract as 
many potential allies as possible (and to put as much pressure on the target actors as 
possible).  
Rather the IDPs case suggests that the complexity of the issue presents the 
greatest challenge to the advocacy efforts. The fact that a wide array of causes can lead to 
displacement limits the campaign’s ability to adopt a focused framing strategy that would 
get their message across. The reasons for displacement range from “conflict, generalised 
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violence, human rights violations and natural hazard-induced disasters”524 as well as 
development projects.
525
 The international community’s approach and sensitivity to the 
issue varies depending on the source of the displacement: “The media is generally good 
at reporting displacement due to conflict, but natural disasters displaced three times as 
many people as war in 2013… The natural disasters that displace people can be huge, 
such as the tsunami that hit Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and other countries in 2004, and 
typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines in 2013. However, many are smaller and more 
localised, never reaching the newspapers. As a result, the damage caused to lives goes 
unrecorded.”526 This complexity limits the coordination among those who focus on 
environmentally induced IDPs and those who focus on conflict induced IDPs, as the 
former is more amenable to the human rights regime and the latter falls into the 
humanitarian regime.  
The issue of conflict induced internal displacement is at the cross-roads of many 
humanitarian problems, which means that the issue is touched upon through various 
instruments developed for other humanitarian concerns. Such complexity not only led to 
a false sense that the issue has “already been taken care of”527 but it also created a fertile 
ground for the states to defend their reluctance in establishing a new organization 
dedicated solely to this issue.  In other words, the perception that the “existing 
international humanitarian and human rights law and analogous refugee law did provide 
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substantial coverage for the internally displaced”528 contributed to reluctance of the states 
in creating a new institutional mechanism to address the vulnerabilities specific to IDPs. 
Yet this perception does not reflect the reality on the ground: as Cohen notes, “For 
example, although there is a general norm prohibiting cruel and inhuman treatment, there 
is no explicit prohibition against the forcible return of IDPs to places of danger. Or a 
general norm may cover essential medical care, but the special needs of internally 
displaced women in the areas of reproductive and psychological health care needed to be 
spelled out. Moreover, the law was silent when it came to restitution of property lost as a 
consequence of displacement during conflict or on the need of IDPs for personal 
identification and documentation.”529   
The so-called humanitarian reform was not successful in addressing this problem. 
As Ferris discusses, the reform rather led to the mainstreaming of the IDPs into 
humanitarian concerns where “[i]ncreasingly, international humanitarians talk about the 
protection of civilians, vulnerable groups, and affected populations rather than about 
internally displaced persons. Instead of developing programs to meet the particular needs 
of those uprooted from their communities, many are “mainstreaming” them into general 
protection and assistance programs.”530 As we observed in the case of the Sexual 
Violence in Conflict campaign, the fatigue that the international community has due to 
the inability of the existing norms to properly address similar problems had a negative 
impact on the advocates’ efforts to trigger political commitment.  
                                                 
528
 Orchard 2010, 293. 
529
 Cohen 1998.  
530
 “Guest blogger Elizabeth Ferris describes “the dangers of mainstreaming IDPs into oblivion,” available 
at < http://www.internal-displacement.org/blog/2015/guest-blogger-elizabeth-ferris-describes-the-dangers-
of-mainstreaming-idps-into-oblivion>, accessed 3 March 2015.  
189 
 
While the framing of the issue in humanitarian terms has not brought the desired 
results, framing the issue as a human rights problem, as done especially by those who 
focus on environmentally induced displacement,
531
 also has its own strategic 
shortcomings.
532
 The efforts to prioritize the issue of climate change induced 
displacement, very similar to the securitized Climate Refugees Campaign, suffer from the 
difficulty of illustrating a short causal link between the cause (climate change) and the 
harm (displacement).
533
 Those who focus on advocating for the needs of persons 
displaced by natural disasters suffer from illustrating that the issue is amenable to human 
action;
534
a problem that the Sexual Violence in Conflict campaign also suffered in their 
fight against the perception that sexual violence is an inevitable part of conflict.   
The strategic environment becomes even more problematic for the advocates due 
to the legal status of the IDPs. IDPs are still, technically, entitled to same rights as other 
citizens of the same country. Yet, “in reality, the fact of displacement can increase their 
vulnerability to human rights violations, including rape, exploitation and forced 
recruitment, and also their needs, including for shelter, replacement documentation and 
restitution of property.”535 Moreover, IDPs’ vulnerability increases as they “may also 
face administrative, institutional and procedural obstacles to achieving their rights. IDPs 
who have lost their documentation, for example, may not be able to take part in elections, 
they may be turned away from hospitals and/or schools.” Despite these realities, the 
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difficulty in illustrating the direct impact that displacement has on individuals’ capacity 
to enjoy their rights limits the usefulness of the human rights frame in successfully 
leading to political commitment.  
The historical accounts of the successful examples of advocacy campaigns 
demonstrated the advocates’ ability to shape global politics through strategically framing 
their issues. The stories also illustrated that the success of such efforts depends on the 
strategic environment within which campaign has to operate. In cases where the 
advocates are able to use the strategic environment to their advantage, as in the cases of 
Landmines, Child Soldiers, HIV/AIDS and Maternal Mortality, campaigns succeed. Yet, 
in cases where the campaign cannot overcome the limitations that the strategic 
environment present to them, such as the counterproductive network dynamics in the case 
of the Small Arms campaign and the nature of the issue in the case of the IDPs, the 
campaigns are bound to fail. As this comparative analysis illustrates, this variance is true 
for securitized campaigns, as well.  
Rather than underestimating the agency that the advocates have in shaping global 
agenda setting and policy making, these results highlight the importance of analyzing the 
bigger picture in understanding the motivations behind advocates’ framing choices, and 
the conditions that are needed for such choices to translate into advocacy success. The in-
depth analysis of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign I present in the following chapter 
takes a closer look at the interaction between the campaigns’ strategic environments and 
their framing preferences in the context of a securitized campaign. With this analysis I 
aim to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of securitization, and further 
illustrate the lessons that treating securitization as an instance of framing offers.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IS THAT BLOOD ON YOUR DIAMOND?: POLITICS OF FRAMING 
CONFLICT DIAMONDS 
 
Introduction 
In 1999, model Naomi Campbell made headlines for wearing a 190.27 carat 
diamond necklace promoting Graff Diamonds’ Millennium Collection.536 On August 5, 
2010 she was featured in newspapers once again with diamonds, but this time the 
headlines were about her testimony at the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague; where, 
Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, was on trial for receiving “diamonds 
from Sierra Leone rebels in exchange for weapons during that country’s 1992-2002 civil 
war.”537 While stating that she had no former information on Liberia or Charles Taylor, 
she admitted receiving “dirty looking diamonds” after meeting him at a dinner party 
organized by Nelson Mandela.
538
  
Why did the problem of trade in illicit diamonds turn into “conflict diamonds” 
and become reframed as a security threat? Until the end of 1990s, diamonds were framed 
as symbols of eternal love and devotion, and enjoyed a carefully crafted image of being 
“a girl’s best friend”. Within a few years’ time diamonds got reframed as a security threat 
and their image was replaced by one that portrays diamonds as “a rebel’s best friend.”539 
A multi-stakeholder campaign that targeted both the industry and the states was the main 
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force behind the rapid change both in the perception of the consumers and in the structure 
and functioning of diamond extraction and trade. Yet this success neither came overnight 
nor without controversy. The most controversial aspect of the campaign was to reach a 
consensus on which diamonds to categorize as “dirty.” Limiting the definition of “dirty 
diamonds” to those that finance rebel groups against legitimate governments (and 
therefore tying the problem to the security of states) was not an inevitable result but a 
consequence of a complex set of dynamics within the campaign.  
In the beginning of the campaign the advocates simultaneously used a human 
rights frame that they tailored to attract the attention of the industry and a security frame 
to appeal to the Security Council as an ally. Eventually the human rights frame was 
sidelined when the security frame was taken over by the industry who wanted to strip 
itself of any direct responsibility, and the states who wanted to keep their own practices 
outside the scope of the campaign. Thus, contrary to what the conventional wisdom 
would suggest, (i) both the author and the target of the security frame were states and 
non-state actors, and (ii) the appeal that security frames had for the target actors and the 
allies was related to these actors’ non-security concerns. Analyzing the processes behind 
these framing choices provides an opportunity to get a better understanding of not only 
the dynamics of securitization but also the mechanisms surrounding the framing 
processes. With this purpose, this chapter provides an illustrative historical analysis of 
Conflict Diamonds campaign to test the extent to which the mechanisms identified in the 
previous chapters find a reflection in this securitized campaign.  
The reason for choosing conflict diamonds as the focus of this illustrative case 
study is three-fold. First, one of the main goals of conducting this case study is to shed 
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light onto the dynamics of adopting a particular frame over another as well as to reveal 
the varying consequences of such decisions. A security frame was used by the Conflict 
Diamonds campaign throughout all stages of global agenda setting and policy making. 
Such sustained use presents an opportunity to trace different motivations that the 
advocates had in making their framing choices at different stages and the varying impact 
that such choices had on the campaign.  
Second, the Conflict Diamonds campaign has been a multi-stakeholder effort. Not 
only NGOs but also the diamond industry, states and international organizations have 
gotten involved in the issue both as allies and as targets of influence; as a result the 
authorship of the security frame has changed hands throughout the campaign. Therefore, 
the conflict diamonds campaign provides an opportunity to test the impact of changing 
network dynamics in analyzing the varying motivations behind different actors’ framing 
choices, as well as consequences of such changes.  
Third, the Conflict Diamonds case is an issue that has been widely analyzed and 
hence, it is an issue where a lot of historical data is available.
540
 However, despite the 
number of studies written on the Conflict Diamonds issue, almost none of these studies 
analyzed the issue from a securitization perspective.  In the existing studies, the link 
between diamonds and the presence of conflicts in diamond-extracting countries is 
perceived as enough of a reason for the issue to be framed as a security concern. 
However, as discussed above, the framing of an issue by a campaign in a particular way 
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is neither an automatic nor an inevitable process.
541
 Therefore, a close analysis of the 
Conflict Diamonds case provides an opportunity to enhance our case-specific knowledge 
by elaborating on an understudied aspect of the issue, in particular, as well as our 
understanding of dynamics of framing, in general.  
The illustrative case study is conducted with the understanding that the 
generalizability of the insights gained would be limited without conducting a more 
detailed comparative case study. Nevertheless, this study provides insights into the 
reasons for and the consequences of adopting security frames, in particular and 
mechanisms surrounding advocates’ framing choices, in general.  
The findings illustrate that the reasons behind adopting a security frame are more 
complex than acknowledged by the literature. The literature argues that states are more 
likely to respond to issues if they were to perceive them as threats to national security.
542
 
Thus, adopting a security frame is assumed to be tailoring the appeal toward states.
543
 Yet 
the analysis of the conflict diamonds case illustrates that the initial adoption of the 
security language as the main frame did not target the states, but rather non-state actors, 
i.e. the industry. This was a function of the fact that the industry was not willing to 
shoulder the potential financial burden of a large-scale boycott that the human rights 
implications embedded in “blood diamonds” frame might create. For that reason, while it 
was the human rights implications of the issue that forced the industry to react, the 
industry strategically worked to securitize the problem in order to neutralize the issue. 
The industry’s strategy to promote a security frame also resonated with states as they 
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were not willing to put their human rights practices under spotlight, either. Thus, the 
findings illustrate that different actors’ receptiveness to a security frame does not have to 
be a function of what that frame prioritizes on the agenda (security threats). It could also 
be a function of what that frame keeps out of the agenda (human rights violations). 
The findings also support the arguments made in the previous chapters about 
multivocalization. The analysis of framing choices at the agenda setting stage reveals that 
the campaign utilized human rights and security frames simultaneously. The former was 
used to reach out to other NGOs to strengthen the coalition, to appeal to the broader 
public, and to attract the attention of the main targets of influence of this stage, i.e. the 
industry. The latter was, on the other hand, used to reach out to the UNSC as a potential 
ally. Thus, not only did the campaign utilize multiple frames at once, but they did so to 
strengthen their coalition as well as to attract target actors’ attention.  
Tracing the changing trends in using the concepts of “blood diamonds” and 
“conflict diamonds” over time reveals that the campaign’s tendency to use one concept 
over the other was primarily shaped (i) by the network dynamics, i.e. actors’ relative 
power within the network at that particular stage of the campaign, and (ii) by the broader 
political context. In early stages of the campaign, NGOs had the upper-hand within the 
campaign and they utilized human rights and security frames almost interchangeably to 
reach out to as many potential allies and targets of influence as possible. Their motivation 
was to create a sense of urgency in addressing the human rights consequences of the 
problem at hand.  The political context also played an enabling role as the ongoing civil 
wars in Africa (and the sanctions developed in addressing them) created a background on 
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which the arguments could be built; additionally, the Canadian presence in the UNSC at 
the time provided a receptive ear for the campaign to reach out to UNSC as an ally.  
The early success of the core NGOs in attracting global attention to the issue on 
the one hand, brought both governmental and private actors on board, but it on the other 
hand, gradually decreased the relative power and influence that these NGOs had in 
framing the issue in the later stages of the campaign. When it came to the political 
commitment stage, the diamond industry and states started to have more power in 
framing the debate. Both of these actors opted for the concept of “conflict diamonds” for 
varying reasons: industry preferred such a use in order to prevent a large-scale boycott of 
the diamond sector while states preferred this concept in order to make sure that the 
policies developed will only target rebels’ handling of diamonds and not theirs. This 
limited definition was crucial for them as the states were not willing to sign onto an 
agreement that would put their human rights practices into question. The September 11 
terrorist attacks that took place during the negotiations also contributed to the 
securitization of the issue, by emphasizing the link between terrorism and illicit diamond 
trade. At this stage, the NGOs followed suit and settled on a security frame to guarantee 
targets actors’ commitment, but they occasionally used the concept of “blood diamonds” 
as a “stick” to ensure the continued cooperation of the states and the industry.  
The relative power of the states and the industry within the network continued at 
the policy implementation stage, as did their insistence on the strict use of “conflict 
diamonds” concept (which at this point became embedded in the institutional structure of 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme). Despite the almost solidified use of 
“conflict diamonds,” changes within the political context encouraged NGOs to use the 
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concept of “blood diamonds” more frequently. First, the fact that most of the diamond-
fueled civil wars in Africa came to an end made states’ wrongdoings in handling diamond 
extraction and trade more visible. Second, this realization was coupled with growing 
dissatisfaction with KPCS’s inability to react to violations of the rules by member states. 
This in turn encouraged NGOs to resort back to the “blood diamonds” concept to change 
the conversation to one where more emphasis is put on human rights consequences of the 
issue.  
The findings also lend support to some of the existing arguments in the literature 
about the implications of adopting a security frame, while challenging contrary findings. 
As extant literature suggests, while adopting a security frame might be useful in the 
success of an advocacy campaign in the short-run, it tends to result in the sidelining of 
human rights concerns in the long-run.
544
 This effect is evidenced by the rising criticisms 
about the KP as well as the advocates’ attempts to de-securitize the issue. Nevertheless, 
the evidence suggests that the continued use of the security frame is neither a function of 
the unique place that security concerns occupy on states’ agendas, nor the removal of the 
issue from the realm of normal politics that is argued to come with securitization. The 
network dynamics partially explain why a strict definition of conflict diamonds is still 
network’s preferred frame on which to operate, despite increasing criticisms. The role of 
institutionalization of the security frame at the political commitment stage is also proved 
to be essential in understanding such continued use. Thus, the persistence in using a 
security frame does not have to be based on advocates’ perceptions about the benefits that 
this particular frame provides or the unique role that such frame has in the eyes of the 
states; it could also be a function of institutional constraints. 
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Multiple sources were utilized in analyzing the reasons behind advocates’ framing 
choices as well as how and why the content of the frame and its implications have 
changed over time. The historical account of the campaign was traced using both primary 
and secondary sources. As a first step, secondary sources - academic publications, 
working papers, conference papers and newspaper articles - were surveyed by applying 
the database research methods described in Chapter 3.
545
 This information was used in 
identifying the main actors within the campaign and compiling a map of actors whose 
framing preferences need to be analyzed for the purpose of this study.  
Once the historical account and the core campaign network were identified, 
primary sources were utilized in getting insights into advocates’ framing choices 
throughout the campaign. Most of the key issue entrepreneurs have been engaging in 
prolific reporting since the early stages of the campaign. Additionally, the industry 
(through their own publications and advertisement campaigns) and the states (through 
politicians’ and diplomats’ speeches, press releases, government documents) have been 
vocal about their stance on the diamond trade. A survey of these documents was crucial 
not only in compiling a historical account of the issue but also in tracing the framing 
choices of different actors and how these preferences have evolved over time.  
The research was then supplemented with six interviews conducted with 
individuals who participated in the campaign at various stages and on behalf of different 
actors.
546
 The interviews were conducted with the understanding that the insights gained 
through them can only be limited to the perceptions and recollections of the actors 
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interviewed. Nevertheless, these interviews were crucial in gaining better insights into the 
motivations behind advocates’ framing choices.  
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section provides an historical 
account of the Conflict Diamonds campaign, identifies the main actors involved, and 
highlights the main events that took place throughout the campaign. The following three 
sections traces how the framing of the issue has evolved over time by taking a particular 
look at how the concepts of “blood diamonds” and “conflict diamonds” were used 
differently at three stages global agenda setting and policy making. Both the actors’ 
motivations in making their framing preferences as well as the factors that shaped and 
constrained these choices are discussed. The fifth section summarizes and discusses the 
findings of this chapter.  
The History of Conflict Diamonds Campaign and the Kimberley Process (KP) 
History of Diamonds 
The “resource curse” theory, which suggests that the abundance of a natural 
resource could hinder political stability and economic development, is frequently used in 
explaining civil wars, especially in Africa.
547
 In that respect, diamonds are theorized to 
play a role in civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
“in fueling the conflict as various parties funded their war efforts through mining 
activities.”548 What made the situation worse was the fact that the diamond industry has 
been traditionally in the hands of a “closely-knit family enterprises” that “operated 
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largely on a cash basis, without formal contracts or auditable paper trails” which made 
the efforts to regulate the industry futile.
549
 
However, diamonds do not necessarily or inevitably lead to conflict. Despite the 
contribution that diamonds are believed to make in fueling civil wars, they are not the 
main reasons behind the civil wars. Instead, “poor governance and the creation of a 
socially excluded underclass” can be listed as the underlying conditions for Africa’s civil 
wars.
550
 Moreover, diamonds do not always fuel conflicts, either. For instance, in Sierra 
Leone, “for a long period of time, until the beginning of the civil war in 1991, diamonds 
played an important role in the country’s national development agenda and were a 
significant feature of the local economies and societies where they were mined.”551 
Similarly, in Botswana, sixty percent of the government’s total tax revenue comes from 
the diamond mines and “diamonds have resulted in Botswana having higher economic 
growth rates than any other African country in the over the past thirty years.” [emphasis 
in the original].
552
 
Rebels’ adoption of diamond trade as a revenue generator in a number of African 
countries changed the implications of diamonds for both diamond extracting and trading 
countries. The trade in “conflict diamonds” was first benefited by the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
553
 The civil war in Angola that started in 
1992 claimed the lives of more than 500,000 people and UNITA fueled its efforts to 
overthrow the government by controlling the major diamond mining areas of Angola 
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through which they managed to generate about $3.7 billion in the course of seven 
years.
554
 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone was quick to follow and 
they adopted a similar strategy with notable help from the “Liberia’s warlord president, 
Charles Taylor.” The practice then spread to Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, 
Liberia and Côte d’lvoire.555 
The diamond trade’s fall into the hands of rebels in a number of countries 
throughout the 1990s led to dire humanitarian consequences. As Partnership Africa 
Canada (PAC) – one of the leading NGOs in the conflict diamonds issue – pointed out 
“[a]s much as 15% of the world’s $10 billion annual rough diamond production fell into 
the category of conflict diamonds in the late 1990s. Hundreds of thousands of people died 
as a direct result of these wars, and many more died of indirect causes. Millions of people 
were displaced for half a generation, health and educational infrastructures were 
destroyed, development was reversed.”556 
 Despite the ongoing civil wars in Africa and the fuzzy nature of the diamonds 
industry, neither diamonds nor the connection they had with the conflicts in Africa found 
a place on the international community’s agenda for a long time. As Christian Dietrich 
puts it clearly in his paper written as a part of the Diamonds and Human Security Project: 
“The governments of industrialized countries paid no attention to readily available and 
startling information: that the volume of diamonds reaching international markets from 
countries such as Angola, the DRC and the CAR was significantly higher than what these 
countries officially exported; that hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of diamonds 
were appearing on international markets every year, and nobody could say where on earth 
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they came from. Angola officially exported US$740 million in diamonds in 2000, the 
DRC US$240 million and the CAR [Central African Republic] US$60 million, but their 
combined output was closer to US$2 billion.”557 
History of the Campaign  
It was only at the end of the 1990s that the issue started to get international 
attention as a result of numerous efforts by a handful of actors (See Figure 1). While it 
was the UNSC that first discussed the idea of regulating diamond trade as a way of 
tackling civil wars, it was a group of NGOs that framed the issue and brought the idea of 
regulating the entire diamond industry onto the global agenda. The UNSC was quick to 
lend support as an ally and the industry, the primary target in the early stages of the 
campaign, quickly, albeit unwillingly, reacted to the campaign. 
In 1998, in the face of civil war in Angola, the UNSC put in force an international 
embargo on Angolan diamonds that were not certified by the Angolan government.
558
 
However, UNSC was not primarily interested in the connection between diamonds and 
conflicts in general or developing a norm in tackling them. The UNSC was instead 
focused on engaging in “smart sanctions” to cut off the financial sources of UNITA and 
diamonds happened to be one of the main financial sources.
559
 Regardless of its 
intentions, and while this was an important first step in questioning the role of diamonds 
in conflicts, “the issue sparked little public interest, and the embargo created little more 
than a ripple in the diamond industry.”560 
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Figure 1: Chronological Account of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign 
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Around the same time the issue entrepreneurs, a number of human rights, 
development and environmental NGOs, started to engage in simultaneous (yet to be 
coordinated at the time) efforts to bring the issue to global attention (See Figure 1). One 
of the very first and crucial steps taken in the placing of the conflict diamonds issue on 
the global agenda was a report titled A Rough Trade prepared by Global Witness. Global 
Witness was a London-based environmental and human rights NGO that works on 
highlighting the “link between natural resources, conflict and corruption and … 
systematically document[s] and expose[s] how this sustains poverty, fuels instability and 
destroys the environment.”561  
The report was primarily focused on Angola, and how the revenues made by 
smuggling of diamonds were being used by the rebels. The report targeted the diamond 
industry and specifically De Beers as it was the firm that was marketing about 80% of 
world’s rough diamonds at the time.562 The report also highlighted the ineffectiveness of 
the UN sanctions on Angola and suggested that “the UN embargo was being 
systematically sidestepped by the industry and by an almost complete lack of compliance 
on the part of countries as widely diverse as Belgium and Zambia.”563 While the A Rough 
Trade Report did not use the term “conflict diamonds” it repeatedly emphasized the 
causal connection between diamond and civil war.  
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Table 15: The Actors Involved in the Campaign and Their Roles 
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The most important contribution of the Global Witness’s report to the campaign 
was to attract the UNSC’s attention to the issue by providing detailed information on the 
situation in Angola. Shortly after the release of the report, in January 1999 Global 
Witness was invited to the UNSC to give an informal briefing on their report.
564
 
Following the briefing, Robert Fowler, Canadian Ambassador to the UN who was 
recently appointed as the Chair of the Angolan Sanctions Committee, put together an 
expert panel to “assess the effectiveness of the Angola sanctions and the link between 
diamonds and conflict.”565 
While the UNSC Expert Panel was working on investigating the functioning of 
the diamond industry, Global Witness, shifted gear and joined forces with Medico 
International (a human rights NGO), the Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa 
(NIZA) (a human rights and development NGO) and Nederlandse Organisatie Voor 
Internationale Bijstand – Dutch Organization for International Aid (NOVIB) (a human 
rights and development NGO) and launched a public awareness campaign in October 
1999 which was called “Fatal Transactions.” The campaign approached the issue from 
human rights perspective and threatened to “convince consumers that diamonds were the 
"physical embodiment of human rights abuses.”566 The consumer campaign’s primary 
goal was to reframe “De Beers’ carefully constructed marketing frame of love and 
eternity” with a frame of “war, destruction, and gruesome images of children with 
chopped-off limbs.”567 However, the campaign did not aim to stop diamond consumption 
                                                 
564
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but rather to raise awareness among consumers about the need to know the origins of the 
diamonds they purchase.
568
 The industry was quick to respond to the consumer campaign 
and shortly after De Beers announced that they would no longer be purchasing Angolan 
diamonds – including the ones sanctioned by the government.569 
Around the same time a second influential report, Heart of the Matter, was being 
prepared by PAC which was then released in 2000. The PAC’s report was focused on the 
role of diamond trade in fueling Sierra Leone’s civil war. The report approached the issue 
from a human rights perspective and highlighted the brutal methods used by the RUF 
such as mutilation of hands, feet and breasts.
570
 The main contribution the PAC’s report 
made was to challenge the general perception in the literature and among the policy 
makers that saw Sierra Leone as yet another failed state dragged into civil war. The report 
stated that:  
The point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but to engage in 
profitable crime under the cover of warfare… Over the years, the informal 
diamond mining sector, long dominated by what might be called ‘disorganized 
crime’, became increasingly influenced by organized crime and by the 
transcontinental smuggling not just of diamonds, but of guns and drugs, and by 
vast sums of money in search of a laundry. Violence became central to the 
advancement of those with vested interests [emphasis in the original].
571
  
 
While the industry was quick to reply to the consumer campaign they were not equally 
responsive to the reports. The initial reaction to both of these reports by the industry was 
not a welcoming one. In fact, Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton suggest that “[i]nitial 
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reactions to The Heart of the Matter from the industry and some governments were 
extremely hostile, and there was no rush to accept any of the recommendations.”572  
Although the reports and the public awareness campaigns have contributed to the 
efforts to put the issue on the global agenda, the incidents happened around the same time 
also provided an opportunity for the advocates to garner further support from both allies 
and targets of influence. For instance, around the same time period, the peace settlement 
in Sierra Leone collapsed and 500 UN peacekeepers got kidnapped by the RUF and this 
gave an additional incentive to the governments and the UNSC to pay more attention to 
the issue.
573
  
These events encouraged not only the industry but also a number of states to take 
action. In May of 2000, diamond extracting and trading countries along with NGOs and 
the representatives of the industry came together in Kimberley, South Africa to create a 
mechanism to “clean” the industry from “conflict/blood diamonds.” The meeting was 
initiated by South Africa, Namibia and Botswana (three major diamond extracting 
countries) who invited Britain, the United States and Belgium (three major trading 
countries) to join.  
These developments put more pressure on the industry to take further action. With 
the rising awareness on the part of the diamond industry, especially on the part of De 
Beers, that “the campaign was here to stay”, The World Diamond Council (WDC), an 
“industry NGO”, was established in 2000. The primary purpose behind the establishment 
of WDC was to represent the industry on the issues related to conflict diamonds and 
prevent an overall boycott from happening. WDC held its first meeting in Tel Aviv in 
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September 2000 with the participation of other NGOs
574
 and WDC represented the 
industry in the Kimberley Process negotiations from that point onward.  
The launch of the Kimberley Process negotiations did not bring an end to the 
campaigning efforts but rather brought in more allies and strengthened the coalition. In 
October 2000, a new public awareness campaign was staged by Amnesty International 
USA. The first action of the campaign was to hold a protest in New York in front of 
Cartier’s. The protest was staged to support a bill drafted by the Congressman Tony Hall 
(the Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act, CARAT) that 
proposed to require diamonds entering the USA to have a certificates of origin.
575
 Even 
though the bill did not pass, the protest succeeded in attracting a number of human rights 
NGOs’ attention to the issue.  
In the light of the success of the previous efforts 200 NGOs got together in the 
USA to lend support to ongoing Kimberley Process negotiations and launched a 
campaign called “Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds.” The campaign was led by 
a number of human rights NGOs such as Physicians for Human Rights, Amnesty 
International USA, World Vision and Oxfam. Their first action was to organize a protest 
at Tiffany’s on Valentine’s Day in 2001.576 This campaign was useful in keeping the 
issue on the public’s agenda and making sure that the industry and the states followed 
through with the negotiations.  
UNSC showed its support to the ongoing KP negotiations by listing diamonds as 
one of the five key minerals (along with coltan, copper, cobalt and gold) that fueled the 
                                                 
574
 Bieri 2009, 15; Smillie 2010. 
575
 Bone 2004.  
576
 Grant and Taylor 2004; Bieri 2010.  
210 
 
war in Democratic Republic of Congo.
577
 UN General Assembly joined through a 
Resolution and mandated the Kimberley Process to develop “international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds.”578  
As the Kimberley Process negotiations were proceeding one round after another, 
NGOs focused on keeping the pressure on both the industry and governments on the one 
hand, and keeping public interest alive, on the other. To that end, NGOs focused on fact 
finding and reporting efforts in addition to public awareness campaigns. As a part of 
these efforts, for instance PAC started to publish its periodic newsletter titled Other 
Facets “on the international effort to end diamond-related conflict, human rights abuses 
and corruption around the world.”579 Similarly, Fatal Transactions released its study on 
the diamond trade in the European Union (EU), titled Conflict Diamonds: Crossing 
European Borders? in August 2001. One month later, 180 NGOs got together and signed 
a petition to urge “greater speed and accountability in the Kimberley Process.”580 
 After three years of negotiations, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS) was established in 2003 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the 
UNSC. Although it became a major source of controversy later on, KP defined the 
conflict diamonds as “rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against 
legitimate governments.”581 Based on this definition, KPCS requires the trading countries 
to certify the origin of rough diamonds and implement strict control over the supply chain 
to prevent conflict diamonds from getting into the system. Participating states also
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Figure 2: Structure of the Kimberley Process 
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committed to trade diamonds only with those who also take part in the KP.
582
 The KP 
currently has fifty-four participants representing eighty-one countries
583
 (See Figure 2).  
While it is the member states’ responsibility to implement KP measures, the 
system is established in such a way that NGOs and industry representatives hold official 
observer status, and take part in both day-to-day working and decision making processes 
of the KP. The PAC is the only issue entrepreneur that is currently represented in the KP 
Civil Society Coalition since Global Witness quit the KP in 2011 and Fatal Transactions 
shifted their focus to other extractive industries in 2012.
584
 The PAC performs this 
function in collaboration with a number of development and environmental NGOs who 
joined the issue in later stages. Industry, on the other hand is represented by the World 
Diamond Council. African Diamonds Producers Association (ADPA) and Diamond 
Development Initiative International (DDII) also hold observer status. ADPA aims to 
ensure better representation of African producers in the process
585
 whereas DDII focuses 
on bettering the developmental implications of diamond trade.
586
  
Studies estimated that the share of conflict diamonds in the world diamond trade 
rose as high as 15% when it peaked in 1990s.
587
 While it is hard to provide accurate 
estimates for the current situation, the share of conflict diamonds is believed to be around 
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1% in today’s diamond industry.588 While there are a number of concerns regarding the 
long-term effectiveness of the KP, as well as regarding its ability to impose sanctions 
when necessary,
589
 it can be argued that KP is one of the fairly successful examples of 
international efforts to address a transnational problem.  
To Securitize or Not to Securitize: Building Networks and Engaging Targets at the 
Agenda Setting Stage  
 
 During the agenda setting stage of the campaign, which took place between the 
publication of the very first reports on the potential connection between diamonds and 
deadly conflicts in Africa and the first meeting of the Kimberley Process, was mainly 
dominated by a core group of NGOs and therefore, shaped by their framing preferences. 
As the campaign evolved, the states and the industry have gained a more central role in 
the process. Such change in the network dynamic resulted in a transition from a 
simultaneous use of human rights and security frames to a strict use of a security frame. 
The analysis conducted on written sources as well as the interviews held with actors 
involved in the campaign reveals four main insights into actors’ framing preferences at 
this stage of the advocacy campaign. 
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During this stage, NGOs engaged in multivocalization by utilizing a number of 
frames at the same time not only to attract the attention of targets of influence but also to 
reach out to allies to strengthen their coalition. While human rights frame was mainly 
used to attract other NGOs, the industry’s and the public attention to the issue, security 
frame was used initially to get the support of the UNSC. The security frame was then 
taken over by the industry who wanted to avoid the human rights frame. Thus, during this 
stage, security frame was adopted by NGOs as a strategic tool to attract attention to 
human rights problems associated with the trade of illicit diamonds rather than to 
highlight the security implications that the issue has for the states. 
The findings also illustrate that the motivations behind adopting security frames 
are more complex than acknowledged by the existing literature. The extant scholarship 
explains the motivation behind adopting security frames with one of two dynamics. 
Security frames are either utilized by non-state actors to incentivize states to prioritize an 
issue on their agenda
590
 or they are utilized by states themselves to take an issue outside 
of the realm of politics.
591
 However, the Conflict Diamonds case illustrates that a security 
frame can also be utilized in prioritizing an issue on a non-security related private actor’s 
agenda. The analysis of the agenda setting stage illustrate that the security frame was 
adopted and then enforced by the industry that was afraid of the implications that a 
human rights frame could have for the industry.  
The analysis of the agenda setting stage also illustrates that as the composition of 
the campaign network changed, the power dynamics within the network evolved so did 
the actors’ capacity to frame the issue. This was exemplified in the shift away from a 
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human rights frame toward a strict use of the security frame, as the power of the states 
and industry gradually increased at the expense of NGOs within the campaign.   
 The evidence also shows that the political context within which the campaign was 
launched is also important in shaping the framing choices. At the agenda setting stage, 
the ongoing civil wars in Africa as well Canada’s willingness to bring the issue onto the 
UNSC agenda provided a fertile ground for security language to be utilized in 
communicating the issue to the broader audience.  
Cultivating Allies – Framing the Issue for the UNSC 
At the agenda setting stage, the most important ally that the Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign managed to cultivate was the UNSC. The UNSC supported the issue by not 
only attracting states’ attention to it but also by helping NGOs pressure the diamond 
industry. Ensuring UNSC’s support was a result of three dynamics: (i) existing concerns 
that UNSC had about ongoing civil wars in Africa, (ii) Canada’s desire to prioritize 
humanitarian concerns on the UNSC agenda, and (iii) the NGOs’ success in framing the 
issue in a way that appealed to the concerns and the priorities of the Security Council.  
The UNSC’s concern about the civil war in Angola preceded the campaign as 
evidenced by the sanctions imposed on Angola in 1998.
592
 Requiring diamonds imported 
from Angola to be certified by the government of Angola was part of the sanctions 
imposed by the UNSC. However, at that point, the UNSC did not identify diamonds as 
the main source of the problem or proposed an industry-wide certification mechanism. 
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The sanctions instead approached certification of Angolan diamonds as a component of 
the multifaceted attempts to limit the financial sources of UNITA.
593
 
The ad hoc nature of the UNSC’s approach to the connection between diamonds 
and conflict was evident in the wording of the sanctions as well. Diamonds were 
mentioned only once in the Resolutions and they were not framed as an “issue” to be 
systematically addressed. It was stated in the resolution that “[UNSC] decides also that 
all States shall take the necessary measures… to prohibit the direct or indirect import 
from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the 
Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN [Government of Unity and National 
Reconciliation].”594 Nevertheless, the concern that the UNSC had about the civil wars in 
Africa created a fertile ground for the campaign to get their arguments resonate with the 
Council within a short period of time.  
While the UNSC was concerned about the potential connection between the 
diamonds and conflicts, they were not the ones who initiated the campaign or coined the 
term conflict diamonds. Their involvement in the campaign was realized as a result of 
two developments. The first important development was the beginning of Canada’s term 
as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. With the beginning of Canada’s term, Robert 
Fowler, Canadian Ambassador to the UN became the chair of the Angolan Sanctions 
Committee which created a receptive ear for the issue of conflict diamonds to be heard by 
the UN.
595
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 Canada’s receptive ear within the UNSC provided a significant point of access for 
the issue entrepreneurs. Shortly after the release of the A Rough Trade report, which did 
not use the term “conflict diamonds” itself, Global Witness was invited to the UNSC to 
give an unofficial briefing on their findings.
596
 This briefing not only presented Global 
Witness an opportunity to promote their cause but also paved the way to the creation of 
an Expert Panel by Fowler to investigate the connection between diamonds and civil wars 
in Africa.
597
 After that point onward the UNSC became an ally and showed its support to 
the efforts to create an international mechanism in regulating the diamonds industry.  
 Getting the UNSC as an ally played a significant role not only in shaping the 
framing preferences of the advocates but also in determining the campaign’s success. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, a campaign’s success is highly dependent on the influential 
actors’ (gatekeepers) willingness to adopt and promote the issue.598 The support that these 
allies show is crucial in “signal[ing] the worthiness of certain issues”599 to both other 
potential allies as well as to the targets of influence.  
 Not just “NGO superpowers,”600 but also international organizations perform the 
function of “collective legitimization” where they are perceived as “the dispenser of 
politically significant approval of the claims, policies, and actions of states.”601 The 
UNSC plays especially a significant role due the structural power it has within the UN 
System. UNSC uses this gatekeeping role mostly in issues that pertains to international 
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security such as the role it plays in legitimizing the use of force.602 Yet, as True-Frost 
analyzes, the UNSC has also been illustrating an increasing willingness to be as a 
consumer of human rights and humanitarian norms.603 This willingness opened up a room 
for the advocacy campaigns to get their voices heard through UNSC.  
The receptive environment that the UNSC’s approach and the Canada’s initiative 
created did not automatically lead to the securitization of the issue. Issue entrepreneurs 
strategically highlighted the connection between ongoing conflicts in Africa and 
diamonds in order to engage UNSC’s sensitivities and their current interest in African 
civil wars. One strategy was to highlight the ineffectiveness of the existing sanctions 
imposed by the Security Council to convince them that there is a need for a more 
systematic approach. For instance, A Rough Trade argued that “the impact of the 
embargo has been minimal and resulted in changes of export logistics rather than major 
alterations in volume. Diamond traders and analysts confirm that the embargo has not had 
a major impact on trade. The traders have simply altered the routes and obtained 
deceptive paperwork from obliging countries.”604 In the reports that followed Global 
Witness repeatedly emphasized the role of diamonds in supporting UNITA’s war efforts 
as well as the inadequacy of the existing sanctions in solving the problem. For instance, 
in a press release published in December 1998, it was similarly stated that “the UN has 
failed to ensure that member states are rigorously implementing the embargo on 
unofficial diamond exports from Angola.”605 
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Once the issue entrepreneurs managed to get the UNSC to start listening to them, 
they strengthened their security approach by starting to use the term “conflict diamonds” 
in their statements when referring to the problem. Their goal was to convince the UNSC 
that their efforts in ending conflicts would be futile unless the issue of diamonds was 
addressed. In a press release published in January 2000, Global Witness used the term 
“conflict diamonds” for the first time in pointing out the “loopholes” in the existing 
“Certification of Origin” system put in place by the UNSC. Global Witness argued that 
these loopholes “undermined international efforts to implement the UN embargo.”606 
As the campaign was getting closer to the end of the agenda setting stage, the use 
of “conflict diamonds” became more visible. This change became evident in the 
consistent and repeated use of the term in a briefing document prepared by Global 
Witness titled Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and 
Control of Diamonds where they presented their visions for establishing a diamond 
certification and verification mechanism. The document defined the conflict diamonds as 
“[d]iamonds that originate from areas under the control of forces that are in opposition to 
elected and internationally recognised governments, or are in any way connected to those 
groups.”607 Adoption of such definition indicated that the use of multiple frames by the 
issue entrepreneurs was getting replaced by a strict use of a security frame.   
The strategy to emphasize the security implications of illicit diamond trade 
proved to be useful both in the short run and in the long run. In the short run, a similar set 
of sanctions were issued against Sierra Leone following PAC’s report. The primary goal 
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of the sanctions was to prevent the trade of rough diamonds originated from Sierra Leone 
in the international diamond market.
608
  
In the long run, the framing efforts of the campaign succeeded in turning the 
UNSC’s case by case approach in dealing with illicit diamond trade into a systematic one 
under the “conflict diamonds” frame and paved the way to their support to the initiation 
of the Kimberley Process. This effect became evident in the language used in UN 
resolutions. While a number of resolutions that were published since 1998 emphasized 
the link between diamond trade and conflicts,
609
 it was not until 2001 that the concept of 
“conflict diamonds” started to be used in UN resolutions.  
The UN General Assembly was first to use the term “conflict diamonds” within 
the UN system in its Resolution 55/56 and stated that  
The General Assembly, [e]xpressing its concern over the problem of conflict 
diamonds fuelling conflicts in a number of countries and the devastating impact of 
these conflicts on peace, safety and security for people in affected countries,... 
Acknowledging that the problem of conflict diamonds is of serious international 
concern, and that measures to address the problem should involve all concerned 
parties, including producing, processing, exporting and importing countries, as 
well as the diamond industry.”610 
 
The UNSC followed suit and used the concept of conflict diamonds for the first time in 
their Resolution 1343 in welcoming the UNGA’s take on the issue.611   
Therefore, tailoring the issue as a security problem at the agenda setting stage was 
a strategic move on the part of the advocates to reach out to a powerful potential ally. 
This finding supports the arguments developed in the previous chapters that campaigns’ 
framing choices are also motivated by their desire to strengthen their coalitions.   
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Engaging Targets – Getting the Industry to React 
The initial attempts to frame the issue as a problem that is worthy of global 
attention had diamond trading companies rather than states as their primary targets.  To 
that end, advocates initially used the human rights frame to both galvanize public support 
and convince the industry that their actions need to be changed. Diamond industry 
reacted to these initial frames fairly quickly as they were worried about the financial 
implications of a campaign that focuses on human rights consequences of the issue. For 
that reason, the industry counteracted by emphasizing the security frame at the expense of 
the human rights frame with the hopes that the issue would not taint the entire industry 
and lead to a financial catastrophe.  
The industry has been in the spotlight since the very first stages of the campaign. 
One of the very first reports that triggered the campaign, A Rough Trade, defined the 
industry’s practices as the main source of the problem and suggested that “lack of 
understanding and government scrutiny of the functioning of the diamond trade has 
resulted in the absence of any serious examination of corporate culpability, allowing 
many diamond companies to continue to operate without fear that their actions may be 
called into question by consumers.”612 Not only the report portrayed the industry as the 
main source of the problem but also the suggested course of action the report came up 
with was a change in the way the industry functions: “It is time that a business which 
operates in an arcane way, like a family business, re-assess its operation and accepts that 
corporate accountability is now an important factor in international business.”613  
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While the report held the diamond industry responsible for the damages created 
by illegal diamond extraction and trade, the described “damage” was framed in human 
rights terms. “A Rough Trade  approached the issue of Angolan conflict diamonds  
squarely in terms of unethical and unacceptable corporate conduct rather than as an 
international or Angolan peace issue” [emphasis in the original].614 The report 
highlighted the implications that such trade had on human rights and stated that:  
[l]eading companies should accept that the rationales used to justify the buying of 
‘outside goods’ (unofficial diamonds) in countries such as Angola and Sierra 
Leone must be weighed in the balance with the possible and severe implications 
that such a purchase can have, including the destruction wreaked by conflict, the 
suffering of millions of people, the deaths of hundreds of thousands, the billions 
of dollars of lost development and the high cost of conflict resolution.
615
 
 
The consumer awareness campaign that was launched shortly after also had the 
industry as its target. The goal of the Fatal Transactions campaign was detailed out as 
“calling on the public and other interested organisations to ask governments and 
companies involved in extractive industries to implement effective controls to ensure that 
the trade in natural resources does not finance or otherwise support conflict and economic 
injustice in Africa. The campaign wants to raise awareness and increase understanding of 
how western companies are involved in conflicts in Africa through buying natural 
resources from combatants.”616 Thus, the campaign primarily targeted the diamond 
trading companies and focused on convincing them that keeping diamond trade a 
profitable business depended on addressing the issue of illicit diamonds.
617
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The second report that played a critical role in getting the campaign started, The 
Heart of the Matter, also targeted the industry and used a similar combination of frames 
in trying to get the industry to react. This report was prepared by PAC and concentrated 
on the role of diamonds in Sierra Leone’s civil war: “Diamonds, in fact, have fueled 
Sierra Leone’s conflict, destabilizing the country for the better part of three decades, 
stealing its patrimony and robbing an entire generation of children, putting the country 
dead last on the UNDP Human Development Index.”618 Thus, similar to the report 
prepared by Global Witness, this report also focused on the responsibility of the industry 
in fueling the armed conflict and held them responsible for the consequences that this 
conflict had on people’s wellbeing. 
One of the first people within the industry who reacted to the campaign was 
Martin Rapaport, a prominent figure in the diamond industry who later became an ally 
and one of the biggest critics of the diamond industry’s practices. After paying a visit to 
Sierra Leone, Rapaport wrote an op-ed titled Guilt Trip in which he asked the industry to 
take responsibility and work to clean the industry from “conflict diamonds.” He 
suggested that  
De Beers decision to certify the non-conflict nature of the diamonds they sell on 
every invoice opens the way for other mining companies to provide similar 
certification on their invoices. It also opens the way for subsequent buyers to state 
— ‘The diamonds sold under this invoice have been certified by the seller as 
being non-conflict diamonds.’ Such disclosure based on an affirmative statement 
by the seller could be passed on through the entire diamond distribution system.
619
 
                                                                                                                                                 
business in order to take care of the image of diamonds in therefore tackle the issue of blood diamonds.” 
(Interviewee 2) 
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Martin Rapaport’s approach to the issue not only helped campaign put further 
pressure on the industry but also paved the way for the industry to rally around the 
concept of “conflict diamonds.” The industry never used the concept of “blood 
diamonds” and never acknowledged their responsibility in leading to human rights 
violations.
620
 Yet, promoting the “conflict diamonds” concept allowed them to replace 
their generic use of “illicit diamond trade” with a new concept that would neutralize the 
issue by packaging the problem as an isolated event.  
For the industry, conflict diamonds were primarily a “public relations problem” 
that had the potential to significantly damage both their reputation and also their financial 
interests.
621
 Thus, the primary goal of the industry was to prevent a large scale boycott 
that would stop the diamond trade all together. For that reason, it was in industry’s 
interest to frame the issue as an “anomaly” that only affects a small portion of the traded 
diamonds rather than a problem that stains all of the diamonds traded in the market. 
Moreover, by using the term “conflict,” which is more abstract than the term “blood,” the 
industry also meant to impersonalize the issue and strip the industry away from any 
responsibility in the staining of these diamonds.
622
  
As a function of the industry’s perception of the issue, testimonies also revealed 
that the industry was receptive to the connection between diamonds and conflict 
advocated by the campaign and promoted by Martin Rapaport. This acceptance was 
mainly because the use of this particular language confined the issue to only a small 
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portion of the traded diamonds and as a consequence it limited the potential financial 
burden that the campaign was likely to create for them:  
… industry worried that if something wasn’t done soon, their product which is 
only good for decoration, a luxury product would soon be in trouble in the market 
place. (Interviewee 1)  
 
I think this forced the diamond industry particularly De Beers which at the time 
had a larger control of the industry to do something. They recognized that the idea 
of people throwing blooded Tiffany’s and you know in New York that wasn’t 
going to be very good for optics. They really had to do something. So that was in 
part forced them to sit down and start talking about something. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The diamond industry was also a soft target, because [the industry] deal in non-
essential luxury products which are very much dependent upon their reputation 
among the consuming public. This meant that, where other industries may often 
ignore reputational challenges, [the diamond industry] have no choice but to react. 
(Interviewee 6)  
 
For the industry, the emotional connotations of the term “blood” appeared to be the 
primary reason behind the industry’s insistence on using the term “conflict diamonds.”  
As a part of the industry’s initial efforts to limit the financial implications of the 
campaign by framing illicit diamonds as an “anomaly” they also unsuccessfully 
attempted to frame the Campaign itself as a security threat. For instance, in an article 
published in Professional Jeweler in January 2001, the author argued that the conflict 
diamonds campaign itself had the potential to “destabilize Southern African nations 
where diamond revenue is used to improve the standard of living.”623 The industry also 
tried (and failed) to shift the emphasis from “conflict diamonds” to “prosperity 
diamonds” where they “proudly spoke of” legal diamond mining and trading practices in 
Botswana, South Africa and Namibia and the contribution that diamonds make to these 
countries’ economies.624 PAC reacted by publishing a number of reports in showing the 
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limited impact that diamonds so far had on economic development of African 
countries.
625
  
 Even though allies and targets of influence had varying reasons for being 
receptive to different frames, toward the end of the agenda setting stage the security 
language gained dominance with the coining of the term “conflict diamonds.” This in 
turn resulted in the sidelining of human rights frame in the process. As is discussed in the 
following section, when it came to the political commitment stage, the dynamics within 
the network changed - leading to a change in the reasons behind and implications of 
using a security frame.  
States In, Blood Out: Changing the Power Dynamics, Institutionalizing the Security 
Frame at the Political Commitment Stage 
 
In a relatively short period of time, the advocates’ efforts have paid out and states 
and industry representatives decided to come together to create a concrete mechanism to 
clean the diamond industry from illicit diamonds. In May 2000, South Africa, Namibia 
and Botswana spearheaded a meeting which turned into the first KP meeting. 
Representatives of the industry, NGOs and the UK, the USA and Belgium (the major 
trading countries) were called to attend the meeting and discuss how to “clean” the 
market from conflict diamonds.
626
  
When the framing of the issue is analyzed, four important dynamics are observed 
in transitioning from the agenda setting stage to the political commitment stage.  First, in 
this process, the campaign adopted a narrow definition of “conflict diamonds” and 
sidelined alternative frames. This change was mainly a consequence of the changing 
dynamics within the network that brought states into the center of the network while 
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decreasing the relative power of the NGOs. The industry was already a proponent of 
using a term that would define the issue as an anomaly and states’ preferences to use the 
term “conflict diamonds” was guided by their desire to make sure that the institutional 
mechanisms developed in regulating the diamond industry would not put states’ practices 
into question. While the decreasing power of NGOs within the network limited their 
capacity to frame the issue, it did not completely strip them of their framing capacity, 
either. Instead, NGOs used their limited framing capacity as a bargaining tool that they 
utilize occasionally to ensure states’ and the industry’s commitment to the process.  
Second, and related to the increased role of the states within the network, while it 
was not the first time that the security frame was introduced, the nature and the 
implications of the security frame changed significantly. At the agenda setting stage, 
security language was a function of NGOs’ desire to get the UNSC on their side and the 
industry’s motivation to prevent a large-scale boycott. Thus, the use of the security 
language at the agenda setting stage was mostly instrumental in addressing the human 
rights consequences of these conflicts without destroying the diamond industry 
altogether. However, when it came to the political commitment stage, the security 
language in the sense of “protecting national security” got embedded in the very 
definition of the “conflict diamonds” upon which the KP was established. This in return 
resulted in the shunning of the human rights frame from the debate. This supports the 
arguments in the literature about the long-term negative consequences of adopting 
security frames.
627
   
While the second finding supports the arguments in the securitization literature, 
the third one challenges them. The securitization literature suggests that the motivation 
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behind adopting a security frame is what this frame implies for the actors. In other words, 
security frames are useful in attracting states’ attention to an issue because of the 
receptiveness of the states to the imminent danger that the issue is argued to present.
628
 
However, the states’ and the industry’s motivations in adopting a security frame illustrate 
that the reason behind opting for a security frame can also be a function of what this 
frame leaves out (human rights practices) rather than what it entails (a threat to national 
security).  
Lastly, while the broader political context within which the campaign was 
operating was gradually changing, rather than initiating a change in the framing of the 
issue, the newly rising dynamics in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks reinforced 
the prioritization of national security concerns in the framing of the conflict diamonds 
issue.  
Institutionalizing the Security Frame 
One of the very important steps in strategically reframing the issue of conflict 
diamonds as a threat to national security took place in the early stages of the political 
commitment phase, and resulted in the institutionalization of the “conflict diamonds” 
concept into the KP. This subsection traces the changes in framing preferences and then 
discusses the reasons behind them.  
Once the KP negotiations began, issue entrepreneurs that focused on highlighting 
the human rights consequences of the issue at the agenda setting stage started to make 
“conflict diamonds” the only frame through which they discuss and promote the issue. 
For instance, within the period between the years 2000 and 2003 PAC published twelve 
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issues of Other Facets. These newsletters are important as they have been the primary 
publications through which PAC communicates its perceptions and assessments of the 
developments pertaining to Kimberley Process. In these newsletters the term “blood 
diamonds” was used nine times in total whereas the term “conflict diamonds” was used 
hundred and twenty-six  times. In instances where “blood diamonds” was used, it was to 
indicate that they were using this concept in replacing the term “blood diamonds.” 
Similarly, PAC published a total of eleven reports within the same period. In these 
reports, that are more formal expressions of PAC’s approach to the issue, PAC used the 
concept of “conflict diamonds” hundred and forty-four times whereas they did not use the 
term “blood diamonds” once (See Table 16). 
Table 15: The Use Blood Diamonds and Conflict Diamonds in PAC publications (2000-
2003)
629
 
  
number of 
publications 
Blood 
Diamonds  
Conflict 
Diamonds 
Other Facets  12 9 126 
Reports  11 0 144 
Total 23 9 270 
 
The securitization trend was also apparent in the reports published by non-
governmental actors who got involved in the issue at the political commitment stage. For 
instance, in their 2002 report World Peace Foundation used “blood diamonds” concept 
once while the concept of “conflict diamonds” was used in seventy-four occasions.630 
Similarly, in CRS Report for Congress prepared in 2003, the concept of “blood 
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diamonds” was mentioned once631 whereas the concept of “conflict diamonds” was used 
seventy-five times in this thirty-six page long report.
632
  
The changes in the advocates’ framing choices did neither happen in a vacuum 
nor without a reason. Instead, they were built on the industry’s insistence on using a 
limited definition and the interest that states saw in doing so. The disproportionate power 
that the negotiation process vested in the states resulted in the institutionalization of the 
security frame. The same trend surfaced during the Kimberley Process negotiations as a 
part of the efforts concentrated on coming up with a definition of conflict diamonds that 
would keep both the industry and the large number of states with varying interests at the 
table. As Interviewee 3 notes: 
I don’t think that the people who were negotiating the Kimberley Process all had 
very homogeneous intentions; I think everybody had different motivations in 
doing it. I think from African government point of view I think a lot of it would 
have been very much about this idea of controlling their national boundaries better 
and securing more revenues perhaps from these diamonds. Essentially toppling 
civil, rebel groups, you know undermining their legitimacy in some ways.  
 
In this respect, efforts to develop a limited definition of conflict diamonds that 
focuses on national security were a function of the changing dynamics within the network 
and a reflection of the priorities of those who had the upper hand in the network. In other 
words, the increasing role of states and the industry and the need to incorporate large 
number of actors with diverse interests and priorities can argued to be the primary reason 
for adopting a limited definition of conflict diamonds. Thus, the campaign adopted a 
security frame mainly because, as Nichols puts it, “without limiting “conflict diamonds" 
to a small percentage of all diamonds, De Beers would have backed out; without focusing 
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on rebel movements' use of diamonds, the governments would not have agreed.”633 This 
reasoning was echoed by the interviewees, as well:  
This was a negotiation between states and every new meeting a new state would 
join because it started with a small group of states, mainly sub-Saharan diamond 
producers, the US and Belgium, the UK, Israel but more and more countries 
understood that “wait a second we trade diamonds, we need to be a part of it or 
we want to trade diamonds in future or we think we have diamonds in our soil and 
we want to exploit these diamonds in the future, we need to be a part of it”. Then 
you have got your typical problem, all the time with countries that are not 
accepted to exist like Taiwan is not accepted by China, your issue with European 
Commission not being a country but trade issues are a European competence and 
not the competence of individual member states so they have a role. Diamond 
traders among themselves, De Beers being the biggest player, the World Diamond 
Council in Antwerp wanting to have a say so everybody had different fuse… 
(Interviewee 2)  
 
While the reasons behind the industry’s insistence on using a securitized notion of 
illicit diamonds were discussed in the previous section, the motivation that states had in 
adopting a similar approach requires some explanation. The literature argues that states’ 
receptiveness to security frames was a function of the indisputable place that security 
concerns occupy on their agendas. As a result of that, securitized issues are argued to 
have a better chance at attracting states’ attention as they appeal to these priorities.634 In 
other words security frames work because it tells states what they want to hear. However, 
the analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrates that the security frame worked 
because it left out what states did not want to hear: the human rights consequences of 
their diamond handling.  
You would never have an agreement with a country like Russia or China if you 
would have dealt with human right abuses by governments. Governments are not 
signing up to an agreement that puts them on the spot. I mean we tried and it 
shows now with the issue in Zimbabwe for the last couple of years that it actually 
harms the Kimberley Process that it limits itself to rebel movements but at that 
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point it was still quite a gain that we managed to have such a broad coalition to 
sign up. (Interviewee 2) 
 
In the end of  three-year long negotiations and as a result of these dynamics, KP 
defined conflict diamonds as: “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to 
finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in relevant 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or 
in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood 
and recognised in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in 
other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future.”635 The formal adoption 
of this definition finalized the institutionalization of the security frame within the KP 
structure.  
As also suggested by the securitization literature, institutionalization of the 
security frame resulted in the sidelining of human rights concerns. Human rights 
violations were indeed mentioned in the KPCS,
636
 but by limiting the very definition of 
conflict diamonds to diamonds that are used in financing rebel actions against legitimate 
governments, KP sidelined the human rights consequences of governments’ handling of 
diamonds. In other words, by limiting the definition of conflict diamonds to diamonds 
that pose a threat to “legitimate governments,” the political commitment stage 
essentialized the national security dimension of the issue as a condition for being 
considered as “conflict diamond.” As a result, the language that was initially adopted by 
the advocates strategically with the assumption that it would also encompass human 
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rights concerns became the very reason why human rights violations as well as other 
concerns got sidelined at the expense of national security.  
I think that the human rights aspect, I think it has been very implicit in the KP. I 
think if you look back at why the KP was created; it wasn’t created because a 
bunch of governments wanted to exchange certificates about in extraction figures 
and trade figures. It was created because it was a human rights problem that had 
to be resolved. And I think this is one of the oversights of the founding fathers - 
with the exception of one woman I think pretty much was a bunch of men - I 
think that this perhaps was what they overlooked, they just thought that it was so 
self-evident that you didn’t have to put that explicit language in there. 
(Interviewee 3)  
 
While the changing dynamics within the network was the most important factor in 
altering the framing of the issue at the political commitment stage, it is important to note 
that the changes within the broader political context also contributed to this process. In 
understanding how the actual content of the security frame has evolved to a one that 
strictly focuses on the protection of legitimate governments, the impact of September 11 
attacks that took place during the KP negotiations also need to be taken into 
consideration. While the securitization of the conflict diamonds issue cannot be attributed 
to these attacks or the political atmosphere that developed afterwards, it nonetheless had 
an impact on the negotiation process. For instance, one interviewee recalling the 
negotiation process stated that: 
When 9/11 took place the whole Kimberley process was in session in London. So 
we were there, we all stayed, all diplomats all NGOs and we watched the flights 
going to the tower. So you could say that it had a little bit of a change atmosphere 
afterwards and  I have heard some people arguing that diamonds are also very 
useful to trade for Al Qaeda kind of groups. (Interviewee 2)  
 
Some NGOs also incorporated this new security language into their approach. For 
instance Global Witness’s report For a Few Dollars More: How Al Qaeda Moved into 
the Diamond Trade, published in April 2003, was crucial in solidifying the security 
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threats that conflict diamonds issue was argued to present. The report stated that “Global 
Witness presents evidence that confirms that al Qaeda has been involved in the rough 
diamond trade since the 1990s. First in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the 
crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania.”637 Thus, the institutionalization of the security frame was not only 
a function of the states’ and the industry’s framing preferences but it was also enforced 
by the developments in the broader political context.  
Holding onto “Blood Diamonds” for a Rainy Day 
The decline in the relative power of the NGOs within the network limited their 
ability to frame the debate and pursue alternative approaches. Nevertheless, despite the 
central role that states assumed at the political commitment stage, NGOs did not 
completely lose their ability to frame the discussion, either. Once the combined use of 
human rights and security frames accomplished its primary goal of reaching out to 
potential allies and targets of influence, NGOs’ priorities have changed and keeping the 
related parties at the negotiation table became the number one priority. With that purpose, 
NGOs have complied with states’ and the industry’s framing preferences evidenced by 
above discussed examples.  
Despite the overall compliance with the security frame, NGOs occasionally used 
the term “blood diamonds” as a bargaining tool, as well. While the NGOs agreed to use 
the term conflict diamonds to keep the industry, as well as the states, committed to the 
process, they resorted to “blood diamonds” whenever they feel the need to strong-arm the 
industry and states into keeping their commitment to the negotiation process. 
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The use of “blood diamonds” term as a bargaining tool became apparent in the 
press releases distributed by the issue entrepreneurs during the KP negotiations. For 
instance, in a joint press release by PAC, Global Witness and Fatal Transactions, which 
was published as a reaction to the stalemate that the negotiations were in, stated that 
“[t]he Kimberley Process must succeed. To do so, it must produce a strong and effective 
plan at its forthcoming meeting in Botswana, for presentation to the United Nations 
General Assembly in December. Less would be a mockery of blood diamonds’ innocent 
victims and a travesty of the current international resolve on terrorism.”638  
The term “blood diamonds” was similarly used in pressuring the industry, as well. 
For instance, in reacting to the resolution reached at the World Diamond Congress in 
October 2002, Amnesty International called the industry to take more tangible steps in 
developing solutions by stating that, “There are no credible guarantees that this system 
will serve to break the link between diamonds and human rights abuses. For example, it 
is likely to do nothing to stop blood from being spilled on a daily basis in the diamond 
fields of the Democratic Republic of Congo.”639 
Advocates’ testimonies revealed similar insights: 
The business and governments wanted to talk about conflict diamonds and if we 
want to make them very angry we would talk about blood diamonds. (Interviewee 
2) 
 
… In the Kimberley process we pretty soon settled without much debate on the 
term conflict diamonds. And occasionally, an NGO or somebody in one of the 
meetings would use the term blood diamonds and you would pretty soon, if it 
persisted, you would see somebody from the industry’s hand shooting up and 
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saying “listen I thought we agreed we were going to use the term conflict 
diamonds.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
 Thus, while the advocates’ decreasing power within the network as well as their 
interest in keeping the industry and the states at the negotiation table encouraged them to 
settle on a security frame, they nevertheless, strategically invoked human rights frames 
embedded in the term “blood diamonds” whenever they felt the need to strong-arm the 
targets of influence.  
The analysis of the political commitment stage illustrated that changes in the 
composition of the actors involved in the campaign altered the power dynamics and the 
actors’ capacity to frame the issue. The shift of power from the NGOs to the industry and 
the states turned a strategically-used security frame to attract attention to human rights 
consequences of the issue into a discursive structure that aims to limit the meaning and 
the purpose of the campaign to focus on the protection of national governments against 
the rebels. NGOs, nonetheless, resumed some of their framing power and used the 
concept of “blood diamonds” as a bargaining tool to keep the negotiations going. This 
shift shaped the content and the nature of the policy implementation process, as well.  
Once Securitized, Always Securitized (?): Criticizing the Institution, De-securitizing 
the Issue – Policy Implementation Stage 
 
The three-year long negotiations resulted in the establishment of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme which also marked the beginning of the policy 
implementation stage.  KPCS can be considered as an example of policy implementation 
success as the certification scheme is being implemented by almost all of the diamond 
extracting and trading countries and the system regulates about 99% of the international 
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rough diamond trade.
640
 The KP is, in its structure, a voluntary agreement but 
nevertheless, it has been functioning as a compulsory one as the established system 
requires the states to abide by the KPCS standards if they want to trade diamonds with 
KP countries.
641
 The last ten years’ records illustrate that the KP has accomplished an 
important level of success “in curtailing the trade in illegal and illegitimate diamonds.” It 
has been also acknowledged to play a role in nearly complete elimination of conflict 
diamond trade originating from Central and West Africa (with the notable exceptions of 
some regions in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC)”.642  
The analysis of the policy implementation stage reveals that the changes in the 
political context made various actors aware of the states’ wrongdoings in handling 
diamonds. This in return paved the way to numerous attempts to de-securitize the KP’s 
approach to diamonds. Despite these efforts no significant change has been observed so 
far due to the power dynamics as well as the institutional structure of the KP.  
Unchanging Power Dynamics within a Changing Political Context – Early Attempts 
to De-securitize 
 
Despite the KP’s relative success, this stage has also been witnessing an 
increasing tension between those who insist on adhering to the limited conceptualization 
of conflict diamonds and those who work to expand the frame in order to bring human 
rights and development implications of the problem into the debate.   
This tension was a result of two dynamics. On the one hand, institutionalization of 
the “conflict diamonds” concept into the structure of KPCS as well as member states’ 
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framing preferences have perpetuated  the use of a strict national security frame despite 
increasing criticisms. On the other hand, the fact that the major diamond fueled civil wars 
have come to an end altered the broader political context within which the campaign 
operates and led to two sets of trends: one for those who want to keep the momentum 
behind the KP and one for those who want to reform it.  
Those who want to keep the KP’s momentum have turned their attention to the 
ongoing and potential security threats that conflict diamonds pose in order to show the 
continued need for the KP. For instance, in a report published by Global Witness in 2006 
it was stated that “[d]iamonds are still fuelling conflict... The number of conflict 
diamonds has significantly reduced because peace agreements have been signed in 
countries in Western and Southern Africa. But more diamond-fuelled wars could happen 
in the future unless the Kimberley Process strengthens government controls and the 
diamond industry cleans up its act.”643 
The end of the civil wars also created an opportunity for the critics who wanted to 
highlight the problems with governments’ handling of diamonds. Despite the early 
success and the efforts to keep the momentum up, KP’s slowness in suspending members 
that violate the terms of the agreement created an important challenge for the proponents 
of the existing frame. The narrowness of the conflict diamonds definition itself started to 
be highlighted as the core reason behind the KP’s limited capacity to address violations. 
The main concern was that the current emphasis on security has been giving leeway for 
states to use diamond trade to violate human rights, damage the environment, and hinder 
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economic development.
644
 This criticism, in return, has found its reflection in the calls for 
reform that ask to replace conflict diamonds frame with “blood diamonds” to 
accommodate non-security related concerns. 
The advocates who became critical of the KP started to focus on de-securitizing 
the issue by reintroducing the use of the term “blood diamonds” much more frequently 
than they were used at the political commitment stage. This trend becomes clear when the 
number of times that the concept of “blood diamonds” and “conflict diamonds” were 
used by the advocates in their publications is analyzed. The combined use of the term 
“blood diamonds” in the reports published by Global Witness and reports and newsletters 
published by PAC adds up to ten instances between the years 2000 and 2003. During 
same time period, the same publications used the term “conflict diamonds” two hundred 
and eighty-three times. When the process transitioned to the policy implementation stage, 
we observe that the concept of “blood diamonds” started to be used more frequently. The 
same actor’ publications have resorted to the concept of “blood diamonds” hundred and 
fourteen times since the establishment of the KPCS whereas the concept of “conflict 
diamonds” appeared four hundred and sixty-one times in the same publications (see 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The Number of Times the Concepts Appeared in Publications (2000-2003 and 
2004-2015) 
 
The attempts to de-securitize the issue have not only been apparent in the sheer 
frequency at which the concept of “blood diamonds” was used. These attempts have also 
been apparent in the contexts in which the term “blood diamonds” was used. While the 
reports kept using the term “conflict diamonds” when referring to the official functioning 
of the KP, the term “blood diamonds” was invoked when the system was being criticized. 
For instance, in their report titled The Truth about Diamonds, Global Witness used 
“conflict diamonds” in defining the issue and emphasizing the role of diamonds in 
fueling conflicts, but they switched to “blood diamonds” when they were highlighting the 
limitations of the existing system:  
Although the Kimberley Process makes it more difficult for diamonds from rebel-
held areas to reach international markets, there are still significant weaknesses that 
undermine its effectiveness and allow the trade in blood diamonds to continue... 
Kimberley Process meeting held in Botswana in early November [2006] made 
welcome commitments to strengthen the scheme but governments must 
accompany this with action if they are serious about stopping blood diamonds.
645
  
 
Similarly, in their joint report with Global Witness, Amnesty International stated that 
“poor government controls and enforcement are allowing blood diamonds to be certified 
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as conflict-free. Unscrupulous diamond traders are knowingly violating the Kimberley 
Process and national laws.”646 
Marange Incident – A Turning Point for the Credibility of the Security Frame 
The increasing criticism peaked with reports revealing that the Mugabe regime in 
Zimbabwe killed around 200 miners in the Marange region in a military operation.
647
 The 
report detailing the killings initiated a reaction in the KP and resulted in an embargo 
against Zimbabwe in 2009.  The embargo was lifted in 2011 which triggered even more 
reaction from the NGOs. The reactions intensified as it became apparent that the revenues 
that Mugabe regime made from their partnership with Anjin Investments (Chinese led 
diamond producing venture) were used to oppress the opposition prior to the elections.
648
 
The support the Mugabe regime received was in many forms and the reports suggested 
that “the feared Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Mugabe's secret police, is 
flushed with cash, and has bought hundreds of vehicles and weapons from China in 
recent months. Salaries have been increased and thousands of new officers are being 
trained, raising concerns that they will be used to intimidate voters in next year's 
elections.”649 
Both the tendency to use the term “blood diamonds” and the emphasis put on the 
need to address human rights violations increased as a result of the developments in 
Zimbabwe. Not only the newspaper articles written on Marange region
650
 but also the 
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NGOs that have been deliberately using the security frame started to pay more attention 
to non-security related consequences of illicit diamond trade. For instance, while the 
human rights implications of conflict diamonds were mentioned in a total of twenty-four 
times in thirty-six publications produced by Global Witness and PAC between the years 
2004 and 2008, the same implications were mentioned hundred and forty-eight times in 
nineteen reports published since 2009 (See Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The Number of Times PAC and Global Witness Publications Refer to Human 
Rights Implications of the Issue in Their Publications  
 Martin Rapaport, the leading figure in the diamond industry who has been 
working to clean the industry from conflict diamonds, was one of the critics who resorted 
to such a use. Following the developments in Zimbabwe he directly criticized the conflict 
diamonds definition of the KP by stating that “The KP definition of conflict diamonds 
does not address human rights violations and does not include blood diamonds. It is a 
legal definition established by governments to limit the scope and authority of the KP. 
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The KP is a highly politicized process controlled by governments for governments. Its 
primary function is to protect governments and their revenue - legitimate or not - from 
rebel forces and consumer boycotts. The KP is essentially agnostic when it comes to 
human rights.”651 In order to remedy this problem, Rapaport suggested replacing the term 
conflict diamonds with blood diamonds which he defined as “diamonds involved in 
murder, mutilation, rape and forced servitude.”652 
Following Rapaport’s suggestion to replace “conflict diamonds” with “blood 
diamonds,” other key NGOs also started to use the concept of “blood diamonds” more 
freely with the purpose of reforming the international regime. For instance, in their report 
on Zimbabwe published in 2010 PAC adopted such a use and suggested that 
“Zimbabwe’s diamonds are ‘blood diamonds’” and cited the very definition of conflict 
diamonds within the KP as the basis for Zimbabwe’s denial of their wrong-doings.653 
Similarly, Global Witness published a report in 2010 titled Return of the Blood Diamond 
criticizing the KP’s reaction to the developments in Zimbabwe.654  
The criticism surrounding the KP’s inability to properly react to the developments 
in Zimbabwe emphasized the non-security consequences of these developments and 
strengthened the calls to reframe “conflict diamonds”. For instance, PAC explained the 
situation in Zimbabwe in its report: 
the story of Zimbabwe’s contested diamond fields is about many things: 
smuggling and frontier hucksterism; a scramble fuelled by raw economic 
desperation and unfathomable greed; and, of course, heart-wrenching cases of 
government-sponsored repression and human rights violations... Zimbabwe is not 
the only country failing to meet some or all of the basic requirements asked of 
diamond producing nations by the Kimberley Process…But Zimbabwe sets itself 
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apart from the others because of the government’s brazen defiance of universally 
agreed principles of humanity and good governance expected of adherents to the 
Kimberley Process.
655
 
 
These developments brought the discussion on the need to address the “human 
rights violations conducted by state and non-state actors” to the forefront of the KP’s 
agenda, as well. KP’s Civil Society Coalition started to raise its voice and demanded the 
definition of conflict diamonds to be revisited. They argued that “implicit in the KP’s 
response to Marange was the acceptance that rights violations by those other than rebel 
movements not only matter to the KP, but that the KP has the moral authority to 
investigate and take remedial action.” 656 Yet, their call did not trigger any tangible action 
within the KP.  
The debate over the need to move away from a security frame became so heated 
that Global Witness, one of the issue entrepreneurs and a member of the KP Civil Society 
Coalition left the KP in 2011 arguing that KP will remain in a stalemate unless such 
move is made – which they evaluated as something that is not likely to take place.657 
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, the unchanging preferences and priorities of the 
states and the industry prevented any meaningful change from taking place. 
Interestingly, the security frame embedded in the KP has not only been perceived 
as a source of KP’s inability to address human rights concerns but also as a source of 
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KP’s limited ability to address variety of security concerns, as well. In other words, the 
problems with KP’s effectiveness have also been partially attributed to its inability to 
adapt to changing security needs. Thus, it has been argued that by building the system on 
a very limited definition of conflict diamonds, the KP’s ability to foresee and react to 
different sources of violence got curtailed. Alan Martin of PAC explained this by saying 
that “[t]he violence in the diamond sector has changed since the creation of the 
Kimberley Process…Today, it is not only the rebel groups sanctioned by the Kimberley 
Process that stand accused of abuses, but state bodies and private security firms. There is 
also growing concern that diamond revenue is not ending up in the pockets of the people 
who need it most.”658 
One example of such failure on the part of the KP was regarding the rebel 
movement in Central African Republic (CAR). While there were reports suggesting that 
Seleka, the coalition of rebel groups in CAR was funding their efforts through 
exploitation of diamond extraction,
659
 the KP only took steps after the rebels gained the 
control of the government.
660
 The official reason provided by the KP in explaining their 
lateness in reacting to the situation in CAR was that the “restrictive definition of conflict 
diamonds only allows for intervention should rebel groups attempt to overthrow a 
government”, which was not the case when the initial reports were published.661 This 
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event has led even the state representatives to question the restrictive definition of 
conflict diamonds.
662
 
What Prevents De-securitization from Succeeding? 
The limited capacity that the KP so far had in not only acknowledging the non-
security consequences of the illicit diamond trade but also in addressing the changing 
security concerns supports the arguments of the securitization literature regarding the 
long-term negative implications of adopting a security frame. Nevertheless, a close 
analysis also reveals that the reasons behind the negative implications of using security 
frames as well as the difficulty in de-securitizing an issue are not necessarily a function 
of the “unique” position that security threats occupy on states’ agendas.  
In the case of the conflict diamonds, two factors have so far hindered the attempts 
to de-securitize the issue. First, the relative power of states within the network has been 
critical in their ability to insist on using a security frame as evidenced by the problems 
experienced with Angola.  Angola played an active role in the establishment of KPCS in 
2003. Angola’s approach, and therefore their framing preferences at the time, was a 
function of their experience with a decade long civil war.
663
 After the establishment of 
the KP, the civil war in Angola came to an end and the president José Eduardo dos 
Santos, who became triumphant at the end of the civil war, is still in power. Civil war 
induced violence in the diamond industry was replaced with important roles that generals 
of the Angolan army play in the industry. Angolan government has been accused of 
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various human rights violations
664
 but they rejected these allegations
665
 and they strongly 
opposed any sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe, as well.
666
  
Thus, the difficulty in reframing conflict diamonds has been partially a function 
of states’ reluctance to open themselves to any allegations of human rights violations. 
Since states are holding their central role within the network, their priorities are still 
playing a significant role in the framing of the issue. As stated earlier, “conflict 
diamonds”, by definition, refers to extraction and trade of diamonds by rebels. In joining 
the KP, the states were diligent in making sure that the definition of conflict diamonds 
was kept narrow and that it made no reference to government actions or human rights 
consequences of such actions.  
The second reason why the calls for reframing the issue of conflict diamonds have 
not found reflection on the ground was due to the institutional structure of the KP. The 
KP’s decision making structure requires consensus for a decision to be made. While non-
governmental organizations and representatives of the industry are official participants of 
the KP, member states are the only ones who get to vote when decisions are being made. 
Therefore, a reform that would expand the definition of conflict diamonds would require 
unanimity, which is proved to be extremely difficult given states’ positions on the 
issue.
667
 Interviewees also raised similar concerns in their testimonies.  
I think certainly the architecture that was created was very, it was created hastily 
without thinking through how the landscape would change over time. I think if 
you look at some of the new multi stake-holder initiatives particularly EITI 
[Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative], I think there is a more of 
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acceptance and an inclusion in language in core documents that accepts that the 
world would change. I think even particularly on the kind of voting, decision 
making mechanisms, making sure that you can actually not get bogged down in 
people who you know where one country just says “I want to say no because I am 
somehow compromised therefore there will be no forward movement”. And I 
think this is where I think the Kimberley Process is falling down in its inability to 
be adaptive, ability to recognize that the world will constantly change and the 
scene in our landscape will constantly change and expectations of governments 
and industry will always change. (Interviewee 3)  
 
We couldn’t get agreement inside the Kimberley Process to deal with anything 
except what was on the initial agenda. So, expanding the mandate, going into 
human rights, going into development, going into the environment, a lot of 
countries understood the need for that, many would have agreed to that in the 
Kimberley Process but a lot said “no, that’s too much, we are not interested” and 
the way decision making works in the Kimberley Process, if you don’t have pretty 
much everybody on board, you couldn’t go ahead (Interviewee 1) 
 
Thus, it can be argued that the sustained use of a particular frame does not have to be a 
function of the perceived benefits of using that frame. The utilization could also be a 
function of the institutional structure that makes it difficult to alter the frame even when 
there is demand for it.  
In this respect, the findings supported the arguments in the literature that adopting 
a security frame results in the sidelining of other concerns associated with the issue, 
which in return has a potential to lead to unintended negative consequences in the long-
run.
668
 The analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign supports this argument as 
securitization of the issue resulted in decreased attention being paid to the human rights 
implications of diamonds. Yet, the findings also illustrated that this sidelining was not 
due to the unique role that security concerns play on states’ agendas, but rather a 
consequence of the institutionalization of the frame which makes it difficult to initiate a 
change even when security frame is no longer perceived to be desirable.  
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Any Hope Left for De-Securitization? 
Nevertheless, the difficulty in reframing conflict diamonds within the KP system 
has not brought an end to the attempts to do so. For instance, the KP’s inability to address 
development concerns has given rise to development of alternative efforts one of which is 
Diamond Development Initiative International (DDII). DDII was later followed by Peace 
Diamond Alliance, Community and Small Scale Mining Initiative and The Campaign for 
Just Mining among other multi-stakeholder efforts.
669
  While security frame that became 
embedded into the system has been limiting KP’s ability to address various concerns, it 
does not mean that the actors’ hands have been completely tied.  
Similarly, actors who are not satisfied with KP’s ability to address human rights 
consequences of conflict diamonds have been pursuing alternative venues. For instance, 
Survival International (SI), a British-based NGO, worked to bring the relocation of the 
“Bushmen” in Botswana, which was done in order to clear the potential diamond mines 
from natives, onto the international agenda. As a part of their efforts SI and their partners 
tried to threaten the Botswana’s economy by targeting its goal to become a tourist 
destination. The efforts paid out and as a result, the Botswana’s high court decided to 
recognize the “Bushmen’s” right to return to their land.670  
Overall, when the developments in the policy implementation stage were analyzed 
it can be concluded that once a security frame that is strictly limited to the protection of 
national security got embedded into the system, the frame itself became an obstacle in 
front of addressing the main problems associated with the issue. While the relative power 
of the actors within the network as well as the institutional structure contributed to the 
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perpetuated use of a narrow definition of conflict diamonds, the changing political 
context encouraged NGOs to question this definition and provided opportunities to work 
toward reframing the issue to address non-security implications.  
Conclusion 
The close analysis of the Conflict Diamonds issue, on the one hand, provided a 
number of insights into the dynamics and implications of securitization and supported 
some of the arguments in the literature while challenging the others. On the other hand, 
the analysis also provided evidence that supported the arguments developed in the 
previous chapters regarding the dynamics of framing.  
The analysis of the agenda setting stage illustrated that campaigns engage in 
multivocalization where they use multiple frames simultaneously to reach out to not only 
the targets of influence but also to potential allies. The advocates simultaneously used 
security and human rights frames together at the early stages of the campaign where they 
utilized the former to appeal to the UNSC as a potential ally and the latter to invoke a 
reaction from the industry. This finding further supported the arguments of the previous 
chapters and illustrated that the strategic motivations’ behind advocates’ framing choices 
are not necessarily about convincing target actors, they are also tailored as an instrument 
of coalition-building.  
The campaign’s attempts to multivocalize the issue has not come to end when the 
security frame got institutionalized into the KP’s structure. During the political 
commitment stage the advocates selectively used a human rights frame as a “stick” to 
ensure the compliance of the targets of influence. The advocates started to use the human 
rights frame more frequently at the policy implementation stage and this time with the 
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goal of pressuring the targets of influence to change their approach and embrace the 
human rights frame.  
The findings also illustrated that the actors’ motivations in adopting security 
frames are more complex than appreciated by the literature. The literature suggests that 
security frames are used to attract states’ attention to an issue based on the assumption 
that framing an issue as a security threat automatically prioritizes that item on states’ 
agenda. However, the analysis illustrated that adopting a security frame does not have to 
target states; it could be tailored to get non-state actors to commit to an issue as 
exemplified by the use of the security language to convince the diamond industry to take 
action. The analysis also showed that states’ and other actors’ receptiveness of a security 
frame does not have to be a function of what that frame implies (a security threat) but it 
could also be a function of what it leaves out (human rights violations).  
The discussion on how the content and implications of using a security frame 
have changed over time illustrated the importance of network dynamics. Once the states 
and the industry became involved in the issue and became the main actors that have the 
capacity to frame the discussion, they shifted the security frame to a one that only focuses 
on the threats to national governments. This presented a significant shift away from the 
agenda setting stage where framing was primarily in the hands of the NGOs. During this 
period, rather than focusing on the protection of national governments, the NGOs utilized 
the security frame as an opportunity to attract attention to human rights consequences of 
conflict diamonds. While the NGOs’ framing capacity decreased over time, they 
nevertheless, engaged in alternative methods to use their limited power to reshape the 
discussion on the issue.  
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The analysis additionally revealed that the strategic environment within which a 
campaign takes place has an important bearing on the framing of the issue, as well. The 
political context can both function as an enabling factor and also as a limitation in 
shaping the frames used. While the ongoing civil wars in Africa as well as the Canadian 
presence in the UNSC provided the necessary initial momentum for NGOs to 
successfully start the campaign, the September 11 attacks functioned as an impediment 
when the NGOs wanted to move the frame away from the protection of national security 
to the protection of individuals. Similarly, when it came to the policy implementation 
stage, the changing political dynamics in Africa encouraged NGOs to bring states’ 
handling of diamond extraction and trade into the spotlight.  
Finally, the fact that the security frame has not been replaced with an alternative 
frame, despite mounting criticism at the policy implementation stage, illustrated the role 
of institutional structures in sustaining advocacy frames. While the analysis supported the 
arguments in the literature and exemplified the long-term negative implications of 
adopting security frames, it also supported the arguments made in the previous chapters 
in challenging the uniqueness attributed to security frames by the literature. The close 
analysis illustrated that rather than being a consequence of the unique importance 
attached to security concerns, it is the institutionalization of the frame that sustains 
securitization over time.  The KP’s mechanisms that were built on a very strict version of 
a security frame empowered the actors who benefit from sticking to this narrow 
definition and made it almost impossible for alternative frames to find themselves a place 
within this structure. While the institutional structure made it difficult to de-securitize the 
issue, it did not stop the critics from pursuing alternative venues that would be responsive 
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to their concerns. Therefore, no matter how difficult the securitization process has made 
the issue for the advocates, it has not brought an end to them.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This study explores why transnational advocacy campaigns use security frames as 
a part of their attempts to get the international community to address transnational social 
problems. The puzzle that triggered this question was the discrepancies observed between 
the arguments developed in the literature and the evidence observed on the ground.  
Securitization literature, which focuses on the articulation of security issues 
through language, argues that framing issues as security threats is useful in getting issues 
onto the agenda and persuading the audience to the need of extraordinary measures in 
dealing with them.
671
 The literature grounds its argument on the assumption that security 
is the actors’ primary concern and appealing to these concerns increases the chances of 
getting attention to an issue.
672
 The literature uses this premise to explain the widening 
and the deepening of the security field which led to the securitization of number of issue 
areas ranging from food security
673
 to environmental security.
674
 Yet, while attracting our 
attention to the evolving nature of what counts as security, the literature does this with a 
normative concern; these scholars suggest that securitization leads to the removal of the 
issue from the realm of normal politics and that it justifies the initiation of extraordinary 
measures which are damaging to democratic structures and practices.
675
  
 The scholars who analyzed the reflections of the widening and the deepening of 
the security field on the global politics took a closer look at how transnational advocacy 
campaigns themselves appropriate the security language into their efforts to address 
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transnational social problems. A number of case studies were conducted in analyzing the 
securitization of advocacy campaigns ranging from HIV/AIDS
676
 and climate change
677
 
to women’s rights.678 The studies that focus on the short-term success of these campaigns 
appreciated the contribution that securitization made while the ones that focus on the 
long-term implications directed our attention to the negative influences such framing 
choices had on solving the root-causes of the problem. Despite these differences the 
assumption that cross-cut these studies is that “securitization” has unique characteristics, 
dynamics and implications which distinguish the use of this particular discourse from 
other alternatives.
679
   
Despite the uniqueness that these studies attribute to security frames, the TANs 
literature shows us how campaigns can succeed without using security frames. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, most of the successful advocacy campaigns such as 
ICBL,
680
 Maternal Mortality,
681
 Female Genital Mutilation,
682
 and Anti-sweatshops
683
 
succeeded either without using a security frame or after they moved away from a security 
approach (de-securitized). These studies challenge the explanatory power of the 
“uniqueness” claim in explaining the reasons for using them.   
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 Female Genital Mutilation campaign succeeded when it replaced the health frame, which did not hold 
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 Similarly Anti-sweatshops Campaign succeeded by using a human rights frame (DeWinter 2001; Knight 
and Greenberg 2002). 
256 
 
While contributing to our understand of the security field, the myopic focus of 
these studies prevented them from taking a closer look at the dynamics that lead to 
securitization and the lack of comparative studies limited these studies’ capacity to 
adequately test the uniqueness attributed to security frames.
684
  There is very limited 
dialogue between these two lines of research and almost no studies comparatively test the 
extent to which security frames correlate with transnational advocacy success and the 
conditions that shape advocates’ decisions to use them.685  
In analyzing the use of security frames by transnational advocacy campaigns, this 
study addresses the shortcomings of the literature through pursuing two goals. The first 
goal was to engage in a systematic comparison across transnational advocacy campaigns 
to test whether the arguments about the assumed positive correlation between security 
frames and advocacy success would hold when securitized campaigns are weighed 
against the non-securitized ones.  
When the comparative analysis illustrated that adopting a security frame is neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for advocacy success, the second goal became to 
take a closer look at the advocates’ motivations in using security frames and the 
dynamics surrounding these decisions. In doing so, I treated securitization as an instance 
of framing and utilized the insights gained from the framing and TANs literatures to test 
the extent to which these insights can be used in explaining securitization of advocacy 
campaigns.  
                                                 
684
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In conducting this research I neither argued nor proved security frames to be 
epiphenomenal. Rather, I illustrated that security frames function like any other frame 
which means that (i) security frames do not necessarily correlate with advocacy success; 
(ii) advocates’ motivations in using security frames are more complicated than 
appreciated by the securitization literature, and (iii) the impact that security frames have 
both on the direction and the success of a campaign depends on the strategic environment 
within which campaigns operate.  
This chapter serves as a conclusion and is composed of four sections. The first 
section presents a summary of the empirical findings of the study. The second section 
discusses the theoretical, methodological and policy implications of these findings. The 
chapter then acknowledges the limitations of the study and highlights the ways through 
which the study worked to overcome them. The chapter concludes by providing 
suggestions for future research.  
Empirical Findings 
The discrepancies observed between the findings of the securitization and TANs 
literatures raises doubts about the securitization studies’ ability to account for the reasons 
behind using security frames and the implications that such choices have for the success 
of advocacy campaigns. The findings of the medium-n comparison proved these concerns 
valid by testing the under-analyzed assumptions and showing their limitations in 
explaining securitization. The closer comparative analysis and the illustrative case study 
conducted on the Conflict Diamonds campaign then took a closer look at successful and 
unsuccessful examples of securitized, de-securitized and non-securitized campaigns and 
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shed light onto the dynamics surrounding the decisions to use security frames as well as 
the conditions under which such choices translate into advocacy success.  
Fundamentally, the medium-n comparison of thirty-eight cases proved the 
rationale behind the research question that triggered this study valid by illustrating that 
the prominence attached to security frames is not supported by the evidence when tested 
comparatively. As the comparative analysis I detailed in Chapter 3 illustrates, of the 
thirty-eight cases analyzed at the agenda setting stage only five of them used a security 
frame. The percentage of campaigns that used security frames has increased slightly 
when we looked at the political commitment (eight campaigns out of thirty-two) and the 
policy implementation stages (eight out of twenty-eight campaigns) yet, the shift was not 
prominent enough to claim a tendency among transnational advocacy campaigns to use 
security frames.  
The findings of the comparative analysis also illustrated that the myopic focus of 
the conventional wisdom overestimated the role that security frames play in leading to 
campaign success. Thus, as the evidence revealed, securitized campaigns are not 
necessarily more likely to succeed at any stage of global agenda setting or policy making. 
At the agenda setting stage 80% of the securitized campaigns reached at least partial 
success while the success rate for non-securitized cases was 84.8%. The analysis of the 
political commitment stage also revealed similar insights: the percentage of securitized 
campaigns that succeeded at the political commitment stage added up to 75% while the 
ratio was 95.8% for non-securitized campaigns. All of the securitized and non-securitized 
campaigns that have made it to the policy implementation stage secured at least partial 
success, hence, no significant difference was observed at that stage, either.  
259 
 
The comparative analysis of Small Arms and Landmines campaigns presented in 
Chapter 4 further supported the above reiterated argument by illustrating that not only 
using security frames does not guarantee success but also strategic de-securitization of an 
issue can contribute to the success of a campaign. As my analysis illustrated, successfully 
de-securitizing the issue of landmines allowed the ICBL to graft their issue onto the 
existing norms about the protection of civilians in times of war
686
 whereas the lack of 
such de-securitization has so far curtailed the attempts to regulate the trade and the use of 
small arms.
687
  
On the one hand, these findings illustrated that adopting a security frame is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for advocacy success. On the other hand, 
they also highlighted the importance of taking a closer look at the motivations and 
dynamics behind advocates’ framing choices as the increased likelihood of success is 
proved to be not enough of a reason in explaining the advocates’ decisions to use a frame 
with potential negative implications.  
Comparing the framing choices of advocacy campaigns allowed me to identify the 
patterns that cut across campaigns and helped me pinpoint the dynamics that illustrate the 
parallels between securitized, non-securitized and de-securitized campaigns. The 
comparative analysis illustrated that advocates tend to engage in multivocalization, i.e. 
the use of multiple frames simultaneously to reach out to as many targets of influence and 
potential allies as possible. As I showed in Chapter 3, even when advocates resort to 
security frames, security very rarely is the only dominant frame utilized by the campaign. 
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Except for the Conflict Diamonds case,
688
 all of the campaigns that utilized security 
frames at one stage of global agenda setting and policy making or the other did so by 
combining these frames with the others.
689
  
The closer analysis presented in Chapter 4 provided insights into the reasons 
behind such simultaneous use of frames and illustrated that campaigns combine frames in 
order to reach out to allies from as many advocacy and policy circles as possible and 
pressure targets of influence from as many angles as possible. For instance, the Child 
Soldiers campaign combined humanitarian and human rights frames together in order to 
appeal to both the UNHCR, which is responsive to the former frame, and the UNICEF, 
which is responsive to the latter, simultaneously.
690
 Similarly moving the issue of 
HIV/AIDS from the realm of health into the realms of human rights and development 
helped the campaign to surpass its initial failure and allowed them to lead to the creation 
of UNAIDS, co-sponsored by eleven organizations from different networks.
691
 
Identifying the tendency to engage in multivocalization both provided insights into the 
framing processes and also helped me illustrate the parallels between securitized, non-
securitized and de-securitized campaigns. 
                                                 
688
 As analyzed in Chapter 5 and further discussed below, even in the case of the Conflict Diamonds 
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The insights gained through treating securitization as an instance of framing is not 
limited to those gained into advocates’ tendency to use multiple frames together, the 
empirical results I presented in Chapter 4 also illustrated that the dynamics surrounding 
the decisions to adopt security frames are similar to those surrounding the decisions to 
use any other frame. Moreover, I suggest that they are shaped by the structural and non-
structural factors embedded in the strategic environment within which the campaigns 
operate.  
Structurally, the broader political context within which the campaigns operate 
plays a significant role in shaping advocates’ framing choices. As I discussed in Chapter 
4, the efforts to draft the Millennium Development Goals encouraged both the HIV/AIDS 
and Maternal Mortality campaigns to emphasize the developmental implications of these 
health issues.
692
 Similarly, the analysis also illustrated that the security implications of a 
number of issues ranging from development aid to conflict diamonds started to be 
emphasized as a reaction to the change that September 11 attacks made to the priorities 
on the global agenda.
693
  
Non-structurally, the advocates’ fields of expertise as well as their previous 
experiences are also revealed to play a role in determining advocates’ framing choices. 
The clearest link was observed between the Landmines campaign, on the one hand and 
Child Soldiers and Sexual Violence in Conflict campaigns, on the other. Once the ICBL 
succeeded at the political commitment stage, the advocates moved to other issue areas 
and either tried to replicate their strategies (as in the case of Child Soldiers)
694
 or utilized 
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their existing networks (as in the case of the Campaign to End Sexual Violence in 
Conflict Zones) as a part of their strategies to succeed.
695
 
In addition to providing insights into the parallels between securitization and other 
framing processes, the findings also shed a closer light onto the inner dynamics of 
securitization and provided answers for questions that the conventional wisdom falls 
short of adequately addressing. As the illustrative case study I presented in Chapter 5 
discussed, security frames can be utilized by advocates not necessarily to prioritize an 
issue on states’ agendas (as argued by the literature) but also to attract the attention of 
non-state actors, such as the industry. Relatedly, the appeal of the security frame to an 
audience does not have to be a consequence of the threat that the security frame voices 
(as proposed by the literature) but it could also be about which other concerns the frame 
silences. In the case of the Conflict Diamonds Campaign what the security frame silenced 
was the questioning of states’ human rights practices and a potential industry-scale 
boycott which made both the states and the industry receptive of the security frame. As I 
showed in Chapter 4, not only security frames but also other frames can also be tailored 
to various actors and they can also resonate with the audience not because of what they 
represent but because of what they leave out as it is observed in de-securitization of 
landmines
696
 and de-healthization of HIV/AIDS.
697
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696
 By emphasizing the indiscriminate nature of the damage that landmines create, as discussed in Chapter 
4, the campaign effectively silenced the potential contrary arguments that could have been developed based 
on the military utility of the landmines (Wexler 2003). 
697
As I discussed in Chapter 4, approaching HIV/AIDS as a health issue was not productive as such an 
approach forced people to talk about a stigmatized disease that was believed to affect only a particular 
group within the society (Prins 2004). Changing the course of the discussion and focusing on the 
developmental consequences of the issue on the entire society made the discussion more accessible to a 
wider audience (Knight 2008). 
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As opposed to the extant literature which claims that the outcome of a successful 
securitization to be the initiation of extraordinary measures in dealing with the problem at 
hand, the closer analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign illustrated that using 
security frames can lead to different types of policies depending on the author of the 
frame and the strategic context within which  the frame was adopted. The change in the 
power dynamics within the Conflict Diamonds campaign, as I discussed in Chapter 5, 
had significant implications for the impact that the security frame had for the campaign. 
The security language that was initially adopted by the NGOs to attract attention to the 
humanitarian implications of the trade in illicit diamonds then became re-appropriated by 
the industry and the states. These actors then utilized the frame to make sure to guide the 
process in such a way that the established regulations neither created an industry scale 
boycott nor led to the questioning of the diamond producing and trading countries’ 
human rights practices.   
Similarly, the illustrative case study conducted on the Conflict Diamonds 
Campaign also revealed that the “stickiness” of security frames (i.e. that the security 
frames tend to be sustained even when they are no longer desirable for the advocates) is 
not a function of the fact that securitization brings issues out of the realm of normal 
politics as claimed by the securitization literature.
698
 Contrary to the arguments in the 
securitization literature, the analysis showed that the persistent use of security frames is a 
function of the institutionalization of the rules and network dynamics rather than the 
uniqueness of security frames. As I showed in Chapter 5, security frame got embedded 
into the very definition of conflict diamonds which then laid the foundation of the 
Kimberley Process. The decision-making structure of the Kimberley Process was 
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established in such a way that decisions are made based on unanimity which in return has 
been functioning as an impediment in front of the efforts to reform the formal agenda. 
Thus, it is this structure that keeps security frames at the core of the global policy making 
pertaining to conflict diamonds even though the security language is no longer perceived 
to be desirable by the advocates and by important number of policy makers.  
 The argument that the frames tend to “stick” once they become institutionalized 
at the political commitment stage was also supported by the findings of the comparative 
analysis presented in Chapter 3.  Except for the case of Avian Influenza that experienced 
a drastic change in its framing (from health to security and biosecurity) all other cases 
that have succeeded at the political commitment stage sustained their dominant frames 
when they moved to the policy implementation stage. Thus, the sustained use of frames is 
proved to be neither unique to the security frames nor a function of security frames’ 
ability to move an issue to the outside of the realm of normal politics.  
The insights gained through combining a systematic treatment of thirty-eight 
cases with a closer analysis of a smaller set of campaigns not only illustrated the parallels 
between securitization and other instances of framing, they also shed light onto the 
dynamics and motivations that lead to securitization and the factors that shape the 
consequences of such choices. These findings have helped this study explore the research 
question at hand and also showed the contribution that treating securitization as an 
instance of framing can make to the literature.   
Broader Implications of the Findings 
The empirical findings of the study have theoretical and methodological 
implications for the literature as well as policy implications for the advocates. By 
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approaching securitization as an instance of framing, this study highlights the benefits 
that can be gained by increasing the dialogue between framing, TANs and securitization 
literatures; helps the securitization literature ask the questions it was overlooking and 
better answer the ones that it identified but fell short of adequately answering. Deepening 
our understanding of the dynamics behind advocates’ framing choices and their 
connection to success also has potential to inform advocates’ framing choices.  
While this study problematized the under-analyzed assumptions made about the 
uniqueness of security frames, it neither claimed nor proved that security frames are not 
used or that they do not lead to success. Securitization literature itself does not claim that 
every attempt to securitize will translate into successfully creating a perception of a 
security threat.
699
 Thus, the literature already accepts that certain conditions should exist 
for this transition to happen.
700
 However, what the existing studies in the securitization 
literature do not do is to provide a detailed account of the factors that make this transition 
possible. By treating securitization as an instance of framing, this study provided an 
alternative perspective on the factors that could better explain what distinguishes 
successful securitization from securitizing moves.  
The findings that illustrated that the motivations behind adopting security frames 
are similar to those behind using other frames contributed to the insights we have into 
what the literature identifies as “securitizing actors.” Securitization literature argues that 
security language is invoked by those who are in power with the purpose of legitimizing 
the use of extraordinary measures in addressing a problem.
701
 Studies that utilized the 
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insights of the securitization literature in explaining advocacy campaigns’ framing 
choices expanded on the securitization literature’s argument and suggested that any actor 
(state and non-state) can be a “securitizing actor” and use security frames to appeal to 
states’ (or security organizations’) security concerns in an attempt to get them to 
prioritize a particular issue on their agendas.
702
  
Yet, as my discussion on the comparative analysis of nine transnational advocacy 
campaigns illustrated, advocates’ framing choices are not only motivated by their desire 
to appeal to targets of influence but also by their goal of reaching out to potential allies. 
The closer analysis of the Conflict Diamonds campaign, then, illustrated how unlikely 
actors might become “securitizing actors” themselves (such as the diamond industry) and 
how these actors might engage in such an attempt not only to appeal to the security 
concerns of state actors but also to appeal to non-security concerns of non-state actors 
(the use of security language by the advocates to get the industry to worry about their 
financial gains). Thus, the findings expanded our understanding of who can be a 
“securitizing actor” and with what purposes.  
The insights that this study provided into the dynamics of securitization by 
treating it as an instance of framing also enhanced our understanding of why a particular 
audience accepts the claims of security threats raised by a securitizing actor. 
Securitization literature is criticized for not properly explaining the role of the audience 
in securitization processes, yet, the attempts to address this shortcoming only focus on the 
conditions under which the audience is convinced about the security implications of the 
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 As discussed in Chapter 4, for instance Hudson (2009) illustrates how the security language was adopted 
by not only the international organizations but also by the advocates who wanted to prioritize the women’s 
rights issues on the UN agenda.  
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problem at hand.
703
 These studies do not account for alternative reasons that may lie 
beneath the audience’s acceptance of such security claims.  
As the illustrative case study revealed an audience might be receptive of a security 
frame not necessarily because they are convinced about the security implications of the 
issue but because of what focusing on this frame means for their non-security concerns, 
such as the questioning of human rights practices of the states and the financial structure 
of the industry in the case of the Conflict Diamonds campaign. This approach contributed 
to the securitization literature’s ability to better explain the conditions under which 
security frames resonate with an audience. 
Approaching securitization from a framing perspective helped us appreciate 
alternative policy implications to which securitization can lead. Securitization literature 
claims that when done successfully securitization brings the issue out of the realm of 
normal politics and justifies the use of extraordinary measures.
704
 Yet an increasing 
number of studies questioned this approach and argued that securitization could also lead 
to alternative types policy implications.
705
 The international policy measures (the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) developed as a result of the securitization of 
conflict diamonds provided evidence to support that insight. Rather than overlooking the 
potential long-term implications of building policies on security frames, such an 
appreciation contributed to the way we measure securitization.  
 The study also makes a methodological contribution to the literature by engaging 
in a comparative analysis of successful and unsuccessful examples of securitized, de-
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securitized and non-securitized transnational advocacy campaigns. As stated in the 
beginning of the study, one of the important gaps in the securitization literature is the lack 
of comparative studies that would provide an opportunity to test the claims made across 
different campaigns with varying framing choices. Comparing securitized advocacy 
campaigns with the “dogs that did not bark” illustrated the validity of the research 
question and is proved to be useful in better judging the role and importance attached to 
security frames by the literature.  
The findings of the study also contributed to the broader inquiries within the field 
of international relations by deepening our knowledge of norm-building and of the factors 
that shape transnational advocacy campaigns’ role in it. Illustrating the similarities 
between the dynamics that surround securitized and non-securitized campaigns provided 
opportunities for the TANs and framing literatures’ arguments (such as the role of the 
strategic environment and advocates’ fields of expertise) to be tested across wider range 
of issues and hence, contributed to their validity. Additionally, the new insights gained 
into the dynamics of framing through this study (especially multivocalization) provided a 
new perspective to be further tested by the literature.  
The contribution of the study is not limited to the literature. The findings also 
provided insights for the advocates, who are in position to make strategic choices in 
framing their campaigns. Taking the potential negative long-term implications of 
adopting security frames into consideration, first, the advocates could benefit from the 
insights of the comparative analysis by observing that adopting a security frame is not a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for achieving success. Second, the findings regarding 
the “stickiness” of frames (that frames tend to stay once adopted) could be taken into 
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consideration in making framing choices as frames adopted strategically for their short-
term implications have the potential to become impediments in the long-run.  
In making these theoretical and practical contributions, the study on the one hand 
answered the calls of a newly developing approach that highlights the need to increase 
the dialogue between securitization and framing literatures.
706
 On the other hand, the 
study set a new research agenda that utilizes transnational advocacy campaigns as a 
testing ground to better understand the dynamics of global agenda setting and policy 
making.  
Limitations of the Study 
This study faced two limitations: the first one pertained to the number of case 
studies conducted by the study and the second was regarding the generalizability of the 
insights gained into the advocates’ “motivations” in choosing frames. The study 
addressed these limitations by paying specific attention to clearly defining the scope of 
the research in dealing with the former, and by rigorously analyzing the available 
resources to triangulate the answer in addressing the latter.   
First, I explored the actors’ motivations in using security frames through a single 
case study. Analyzing the securitization of the Conflict Diamonds case from the framing 
perspective both deepened our understanding of this particular case and also shed light 
onto various dynamics surrounding advocates’ decisions to use such frames. However, as 
the findings illustrated, advocates’ framing choices are shaped by both cross-cutting 
tendencies (such as multivocalization) and by dynamics peculiar to each campaign (such 
as network dynamics and advocates’ field of expertise). Therefore, the insights we have 
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gained into the dynamics of securitization should be further tested through replication of 
illustrative case studies in order to deepen our understanding.   
Even though expanding the scope would have lent further support to the 
arguments of this study, the lack of in-depth cross-case comparison did not take away 
from the main arguments. That is because the purpose of this study was not to put 
together an exhaustive list of dynamics that shape advocates’ decisions to use security 
frames that would be valid for every instance of securitization. The goal was rather to 
question the mostly unidimensional explanations that the existing studies provide in 
explaining why advocates adopt security frames and what implications such choices have 
for the advocacy efforts which this study succeeded in showing. Testing and expanding 
the list of factors identified in this study would be the next step to take in furthering the 
research agenda.  
Second, due to the nature of the question at hand the insights gained into the 
advocates’ motivations in securitizing an issue were inevitably limited to the perceptions 
and recollections of the advocates. This constituted a limitation as a small number of 
advocates who took part in the Conflict Diamonds campaign were willing to participate 
in the research. The combination of these factors raised two questions: did the 
interviewed individuals constitute a representative sample of the actors involved in the 
campaign, and how closely their recollections corresponded to actual events. The study 
took two measures to tackle with these limitations.  
To address the first question, the interviewees were strategically selected from 
organizations that were at the center of the campaign at various stages of global agenda 
setting and policy making and have worked in a decision-making capacity. The goal was 
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to gain insights into the perceptions of the main actors and also to make sure to hear 
about the perceptions of those who had the capacity and the interest in framing the issue, 
which the interviews reasonably provided.  
Yet, by itself, such interview selection process would not have answered the 
concerns identified above. For that reason a rigorous analysis of available academic and 
non-academic sources on the issue was conducted to trace the history of the campaign 
and to triangulate the factors that shape the advocates’ framing choices. As indicated in 
the previous chapter, a number of organizations and individuals have been very prolific in 
their writings and forthcoming about their stance on the issue.
707
 These numerous reports, 
briefings, scholarly papers, and interviews conducted by other scholars provided 
additional access points into the advocates’ perceptions and concerns.  
These insights were then compared with other scholarly works written on the 
issue as well as with official documents to test any discrepancies that might result from 
errors in actors’ recollections. The measures taken by this study to tackle the 
shortcomings helped the study’s claim to function as an initial step for a fertile research 
agenda.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study opened the doors for a research agenda that would better our 
understanding of the dynamics behind and the consequences of using security frames, in 
particular and dynamics surrounding framing strategies of advocacy campaigns, in 
general. The research agenda can be further developed mainly in three directions, both in 
terms of the questions to ask and also in terms of methods to utilize.  
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 Such as Smillie and Gberie 2001; Smillie 2002; 2010; 2011. Also see Global Witness 1998; 2000; 2006; 
PAC 2000; 2006; 2009. 
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First, as indicated above, the insights gained into security frames and their role in 
advocacy campaigns can be further tested by conducting more in-depth case comparisons 
across securitized campaigns. The securitization of Women, Peace and Security 
campaign is one of the issue areas that have been attracting increasing scholarly attention. 
A number of studies have analyzed how the issue got placed on the UNSC agenda; what 
role security frames played in that process and how it affected the policies developed in 
addressing the issue.
708
 Analyzing this case comparatively has great potential to provide 
further insights into the dynamics of securitization as the security language adopted by 
this campaign is particularly interesting. In this campaign securitization did not take the 
form of redefining of the issue as an existential threat to security but rather in the form of 
redefining women’s rights as a necessary condition for the establishment of lasting 
peace.
709
 Such comparative analysis would not only give an opportunity to further test the 
arguments developed in this study, but it would also allow us to further our knowledge on 
the various forms that security language can take and the varying implications such 
different uses can have for advocacy campaigns.  
 Similarly, the scholarly work on HIV/AIDS campaign could also be expanded by 
conducting such comparative assessment. The existing works that study the securitization 
of HIV/AIDS are mostly interested in critically analyzing the long-term implications of 
securitization of this particular health issue.
710
 While these studies provide important 
insights into how the issue got securitized, they fall short of answering why they got 
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 Such as see Cohn et al. 2004; Basu 2009; Tryggestad 2009; Hudson 2009; 2010; Willett 2010; Pratt 
2013; Miller et al. 2014.  
709
 Hudson 2010. 
710
 Such as Piot 2000; Singer 2002; Peterson 2002; Elbe 2003; 2006.  
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securitized as they do not look into varying reasons that different actors had for 
advocating or adopting the security frame.  
Second, one of the important arguments developed in this study was that security 
frames operate the same way that other frames do and in that respect they do not play a 
unique role in shaping advocacy campaigns or leading to success. That is to say, as it is 
the case for other frames, the adoption of security frames should coincide with a strategic 
environment that is conducive for advocacy success. To further illustrate this argument, 
in-depth comparison of issues that use alternative frames should be conducted. Such 
comparative studies would give us an opportunity to further understand the strategic 
nature of the framing processes and compare securitization with other framing trends 
such as environmentalization, developmentalization and human-rightsization.  
The case studies within the TANs and framing literatures explain how a number 
of issues get strategically reframed as environment, development and human rights 
issues. For instance, studies that look at the earlier stages of HIV/AIDS campaign 
highlight the contribution that human-rightsization and developmentalization of this 
health issue made for the campaign in the early stages.
711
 A similar set of insights are also 
advanced concerning how indigenous rights movements succeeded by 
environmentalizing their campaign.
712
 Yet, systematic studies that would test (i) the 
tendencies to engage in such reframing efforts over time; (ii) how well these choices 
resonate with advocacy success; and (iii) the advocates’ motivations in choosing these 
frames are needed. Such comparative analysis would not only contribute to the framing 
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literature but would also help us better situate securitization within the broader picture by 
testing tendencies to securitize against other framing tendencies.  
Third, the arguments of this study can be further supported by employing 
additional methods of research such as focus groups and surveys in order to deepen our 
understanding of the cases analyzed by this study. Conducting surveys would improve 
our understanding of framing tendencies and advocates’ perceptions about their framing 
preferences as well as dynamics surrounding these choices. Such analysis would also 
widen the reach of the studies by testing the arguments more rigorously across different 
campaigns, organization types, and network dynamics.  
Focus group analysis would afford us a better sense of advocates’ motivations in 
an interactive setting.
713
 Ongoing or recent campaigns would especially be amenable to 
such analysis for three reasons. First, advocates move across organizations and issue 
areas which makes it difficult to track them down for a focus group study. Second, 
advocates’ recollections of events and dynamics surrounding them are more likely to be 
vivid for recent campaigns in comparison to events that took place a long time ago. 
Third, as the interview process conducted for the Conflict Diamonds Campaign 
illustrated, as the time passes, some organizations get frustrated with the process and end 
up distancing themselves from the campaign which in return decreases their willingness 
to take part in such studies.
714
  
Among the cases that this study assessed, campaigns on Avian Influenza and the 
Campaign to End Sexual Violence in Conflict are likely candidates for such an analysis 
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 Berg 2012.  
714
 As it was seen in the hesitation that Global Witness showed in commenting on the Conflict Diamonds 
campaign.  
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as the former has recently reached to the policy implementation stage
715
 and the latter is 
still at the political commitment stage
716
 which give us opportunities to trace the 
developments as they happen. A recently developing campaign on climate refugees, the 
Nansen Initiative,
717
 which is at the early stages of global agenda setting, could also 
provide a fertile ground to conduct such an analysis.  
Enhancing the dialogue between framing, TANs and securitization literatures has 
a significant potential as each has important insights to gain from the others’ arguments, 
methodologies and shortcomings. This study functions as a step toward that end by 
pinpointing the problems arising from the limited dialogue between these literatures, and 
by hinting the benefits to be gained through collaboration.   
 
  
                                                 
715
 “Communication Campaigns,” Avian Influenza and the Pandemic Threat, available at http://www.un-
influenza.org/?q=content/communication-campaigns>, accessed 4 May 2014. 
716
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Policy Paper: Chair’s Summary – Global Summit to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict,” 13 June 2014, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chairs-
summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-violence-in-conflict/chairs-summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-
violence-in-conflict>, accessed 6 September 2014. 
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 The initiative describes its goal as “[t]owards a protection agenda for people placed across borders in the 
context of disasters and the effects of climate change.” (“About Us,” The Nansen Initiative, available at < 
http://www.nanseninitiative.org/>, accessed 1 December 2014.) 
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APPENDIX 
INTERVIEW PROCESS 
Identifying the main actors 
Identifying the nature and the extent of each actor’s involvement in the campaign 
was crucial in understanding the actor’s role in framing the issue. Different combinations 
of actors played a central role in the campaign at different stages of global agenda setting 
and policy making: the agenda setting stage of the issue was dominated by NGOs – with 
the sporadic involvement of various UN agencies. When it came to the policy making 
stage, private sector actors started to play a more dominant role in the process and 
claimed a central role alongside with states.  
In order to identify the main actors, the literature718 as well as the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme – the international certification scheme that was developed 
as a result of the advocacy efforts – websites were surveyed.719 For each actor, a web 
search as well as a survey of the literature was conducted to understand (i) when and why 
the organization has become involved in the issue; (ii) how the organization framed the 
issue and whether their framing choices have changed; (iii) the nature of their 
involvement (writing reports, lobbying etc.).  
The first question was answered based on the information provided on the 
organizations’ websites, while the organizations’ own publications and statements were 
surveyed in answering the second question. The answer to the third question was 
assembled using multiple indicators: first, the organizations’ own assessments of their 
                                                 
718
 For that purpose, Academic Search Premier, Social Science Citation Index, ProQuest Political Science, 
Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), Project MUSE, Peace Research Abstracts, LexisNexis 
Academic and Google Scholar databases were surveyed using the following keywords separately: 
“Kimberley Process”, “Conflict Diamonds,” and “Blood Diamonds”. 
719
 “The Kimberley Process,” available at <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>, accessed 12 January 2013. 
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role were identified through a survey of press releases, yearly reports, and other materials 
that are available on organizational websites. Second, the role of organizations within the 
issue network was traced through a close analysis of interactions within the network to 
see whether an organization’s actions were cited and/or adopted by the others. At this 
point the key dynamic to analyze was how influential a particular actor was/is in the 
issue. Building a sense of the level of influence that each actor had was crucial as the 
framing choices of each actor do not weigh equally in the outcome of the framing efforts, 
and dissecting the choices that matter in understanding the overall framing of the issue is 
crucial. These organizations and their contribution to the issue are discussed in detail in 
the following section.  
Once the critical organizations and actors were identified, a number of methods 
were used in identifying the persons to contact for in-depth interviews. The first step 
toward this end was to analyze the organizations’ websites to identify the key actors in 
each organization. Most of the organizations involved in the issue disclose their staff 
information on their website along with information about when and in what capacity 
they took part in the campaign. The second step was to survey the literature on the 
conflict diamonds issue and pinpoint the names that these studies identified as key 
players of the campaign. After this initial research, the identified individuals were 
contacted. The contact information was gathered through internet search. Both advocates 
and practitioners tend to move across different organizations and even across issue areas, 
which meant that a good portion of individuals I attempted to contact were currently 
affiliated with different organizations or now following different career paths. In these 
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cases, these individuals were contacted regardless of a change in their organizational 
affiliations.    
When the name of the practitioner who took part in the issue on behalf of the 
organization is not available, the highest ranking staff at the organization was contacted. 
The initial contact letter, approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst (IRB 2012-1437), included brief information on the scope and 
the content of the study along with a request for an interview. When the individual was 
unable or unwilling to participate in the study, they were asked to forward the request to 
others who they thought might be interested in taking part in the study. A similar request 
was also directed at the end of each interview to expand the reach of the study. Once an 
interviewee agreed to take part in the study, they were provided with an Informed 
Consent Form – also approved by the Internal Review Board – which included more 
detailed information on the study, as well as a declaration that their names would not be 
revealed in any product that would come out of this study without their prior permission. 
The potential interviewees were contacted starting with those who are from more 
influential organizations to less influential ones – determined based on the initial research 
done on the organizations involved in the issue as described above. The order in which 
the interviewees were contacted also reflected the historical development of the issue. 
That is to say, actors who were active in the agenda setting stage of the issue were 
contacted first, followed by those who took part in the political commitment and policy 
implementation stages of the issue.  
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Conducting the interviews 
With one exception, interviews were conducted on the phone, and recorded and 
transcribed afterwards.720 The questions were semi-structured and modified according to 
the circumstances of the interviewee’s involvement in the issue. The interview questions 
were tailored to address three main points. First, the interviewees were asked about the 
reasons for and the processes through which they became involved in the conflict 
diamonds issue. Second, the actors were asked about their perceptions on framing of the 
issue as well as their opinion on the effects that security frame had on the success of the 
campaign. Third, participants were asked about their perceptions on the possibility of 
using alternative frames in addressing the issue and potential consequences of such a 
tactic. The interviewees also received specific questions depending on the stage at which 
the individual or the organization they represented became involved in the issue. These 
questions were tailored to understand the actors’ individual assessments of the perceived 
influence of framing choices that came before them.  
The criteria I followed in choosing the practitioners to interview were threefold. 
First, I created the interview schema to reflect all three sectors that played a part in the 
Conflict Diamonds campaign. With that purpose, I interviewed individuals who 
participated in the issue on behalf of NGOs, the diamond industry, and the diamond 
extracting and trading states. Capturing the organizational diversity was crucial as 
different actors had varying reasons for their involvement in the campaign, and also had 
varying desired outcomes. This factor had an important bearing on the type of frames 
they advocated and how they put these frames into use.  
                                                 
720
 One interview was conducted in a written format per interviewee’s request. The questions were emailed 
to the interviewee and the answers were received in writing.  
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Second, geographical diversity was another important factor in interview 
selection. Capturing the differences generated by variance in locale was important to 
reflect the differences in perspective among (i) Northern – Southern NGOs (ii) diamond 
extracting and trading states and (iii) different segments of diamond industry. Talking to 
representatives of both Northern and Southern NGOs was useful as their priorities and 
the networks to which they pitched the issue varied (as did the reasons for adopting a 
security frame over others). The priorities of diamond extracting and trading states were 
also different as the former focused on the protection of national governments from 
combatant rebels, whereas the primary focus of the latter was a combination of 
minimizing responsibility and protecting economic interests. Nonetheless, they have both 
settled on a security language despite their varying reasons.  
Lastly, getting the perspective of different actors within the diamond industry was 
crucial as all elements within the industry were not equally vulnerable to the damage that 
a potential boycott would create. For instance, the industry within Europe and the USA 
was more vulnerable, as its members had direct contact with the customers. Those 
industry members in India and Israel are less vulnerable, as they lack such contact with 
consumers. This difference has in turn shaped industry members’ perceptions of the 
issue. In order to capture the above mentioned nuances, I interviewed participants from 
Africa, North America, Europe and the Middle East. Third, the interviews were 
conducted to gain insights into all three stages of global agenda setting and policy making 
analyzed in this dissertation; thus, participants were sought to capture the main set of 
actors for each stage of global agenda setting and policy making.  
  
281 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
2010. UN Security Council Session on AIDS in Africa Remarks Prepared for Delivery by 
Vice President Al Gore (10 January). Available at 
<http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/OVP/speeches/unaid_health.html>. 
Accessed 12 February 2013.  
Abrahamsen, R. 2005. Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear. 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 30(1):55-80 
Achvarina, Vera and Simon Reich. 2006. No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, 
and the Recruitment of Child Soldier. International Security 31(1):127-164 
Aminzadeh S.C. 2006. Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate 
Change. Hastings International and Comparative Law Journal 30:231-265. 
Amnesty International and Global Witness. 2007. UK Diamond Retail Survey (May). 
Anderson, S. C. 2003. CIA Director Says AIDS Threatens Stability, Economic Health 
Worldwide. Associated Press (11 February). 
Andersson, H. 2011. Marange Diamond Field: Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered. 
BBC (8 August). Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
14377215>. Accessed 21 January 2014. 
Andresen, Steinar and Tora Skodvin, 2008. Non-state influence in the International 
Whaling Commission, 1970 to 2006. In NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of 
Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations, 
edited by M. Betsill and E. Corell. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Annan, K. 2000. We the Peoples. United Nations.  
Annan, K. 2001. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: “Global Crisis-Global 
Action”. UN General Assembly.  
Aradau, C. 2004. Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation. 
Journal of International Relations and Development 7(4): 388–413. 
Arts, B. M. Noortmann and B. Reinalda (eds.) 2001.  Non-State Actors in International 
Relations. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights. 1991. Landmines in Cambodia: The 
Coward’s War. New York: Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights.  
Auster B. and K. Whitelaw. 2003. Terror’s Cellblock. U.S. News and World Report. 
Austin, John L. 1975. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon. 
282 
 
Auty, Richard M. 1993. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource 
Curse Thesis. London & New York: Routledge. 
Ayub, F. and S. Kouvo. 2008. Righting the Course? Humanitarian Intervention, the War 
on Terror and the Future of Afghanistan. International Affairs 8(4): 641–57. 
Bagshaw, S. 2005. Developing a Normative Framework for the Protection of Internally 
Displaced Persons. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc. 
Balzacq, T. 2005. The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context. European Journal of International Relations 11(2): 171-201. 
Balzacq, T. 2008. The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign 
and Interior Policies. Journal of Common Market Studies 46(1):75-100.  
Balzacq, T. 2011a. Enquiries into Methods. In Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve, edited by T. Balzacq. London: Routledge.  
Balzacq, T. 2011b. A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants. 
Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, edited by T. 
Balzacq. London: Routledge.  
Balzacq, T. 2011c. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. 
London: Routledge. 
Barnett, J. 2001. Security and Climate Change. Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research, Working Paper 7.  
Barnett, J. 2007. Environmental Security and Peace. Journal of Human Security 3(1):4-
16. 
Barnett, Tony and G. Prins. 2006. HIV/AIDS and Security: Fact, Fiction and Evidence - a 
Report to UNAIDS. International Affairs 82(2):359-368.  
Barrett, S. 2003. Environment and Statecraft. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Basu, S. 2009. Security Through Transformations: the Case of the passage of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security. Thesis 
Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Phd. Department 
of International Politics Aberystwyth University. 
Bates, D. C. 2002. Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by 
Environmental Change. Population and Environment 23(5): 465-477.  
Baumgartner, F. and B. Jones.1991. Agenda dynamics and policy subsystems. The 
Journal of Politics 53(4):1044–73. 
283 
 
BBC. 2000. Diamonds: A Rebel’s Best Friend (15 May). Available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/745194.stm>. Accessed 20 December 2014.  
Behnke, A. 2006. ‘No Way Out: Desecuritisation, Emancipation, and the Eternal Return 
of the Political - A Reply to Aradau’. Journal of International Relations and 
Development (9)1: 62–69. 
Bello, O. 2013. Africa: Kimberley Process after South Africa – Into Uncharted Territory. 
All Africa (25 November). Available at 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201311271432.html>. Accessed 20 January 2014. 
Benford, R. D. 1997. An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective. 
Sociological Inquiry 67(4):409-430. 
Benford, R. D. and D. A. Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26:611-39. 
Berg, B. L. 2012. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. London: Allyn 
and Bacon.  
Berridge, V. 1996. AIDS in the UK: The Making of Policy, 1981–1994. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Bertone, Andrea. 2003. Transnational Activism to Combat Trafficking in Persons. Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 10(2): 9-22. 
Betsill, M. M. 2002: Environmental NGOs Meet the Sovereign State: The Kyoto Protocol 
Negotiations on Global Climate Change. Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 13:49-64. 
Betsill, M. M. And E. Correll. (eds.) 2008. NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of 
Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Regimes. 
Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press.  
Bettini, G. 2013. (In)convenient convergences: "climate refugees", apocalyptic discourses 
and the depoliticization of the debate on climate-induced migration. In 
Interpretive approaches to global climate governance: (de)constructing the 
greenhouse, edited by. C. Methmann, D. Rothe, and B. Stephan. 
London: Routledge. 
Beyers, J. 2004. Voice and Access. Political Practices of European Interest Associations. 
European Union Politics 5(2):211-240. 
BICC. 2012. Fatal Transactions Newsletter (February). Available at 
<https://www.bicc.de/fataltransactions/pdf/FT%20Newsletter%20February%2020
12.pdf>. Accessed 6 January 2015.  
284 
 
Bieri, F. 2010. From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process: How NGOs Reshaped a 
Global Industry. Ashgate Publishers: Farnham Surrey, UK. 
Bieri, F. 2013. From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process. Ashgate. 
Bieri, F. and J. Boli. 2011. Trading Diamonds Responsibly: Institutional Explanations for 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Sociological Forum 26(3): 501-528 
Bieri, F. 2009. The Quest for Regulating the Global Diamond Trade. International 
Catalan Institute for Peace Working Paper Series No. 5. 
Biermann, F. and I. Boas. 2008. Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global 
Protocol. Environment. 
Bigo, D. 1994. The European Internal Security Field: Stakes and Rivalries in a Newly 
Developing Area of Police Intervention. In Policing across National Boundaries, 
edited by M. Anderson and M. de Boer. London: Pinter.  
Bigo, D. 2002. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of 
Unease. Alternatives 27:63-92. 
Blagden, P. 1995. The Use of Mines and the Impact of Technology. In Clearing the 
Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis edited by Kevin M. Cahill. 
New York: Basic Books and Council of Foreign Relations. 
Blagden, P. M. 1993. Summary of UN Demining. Proceedings of the International 
Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines. CICR/ICRC: Montreux, 117-123. 
Bloodgood, E. 2011. The Interest Group Analogy: International Non-governmental 
Advocacy Organizations in International Politics. Review of International Studies 
37, 93-120. 
Bob, C. (ed.). 2008. The International Struggle for New Human Rights. Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Bob, C. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International 
Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bob, C. 2010. Packing Heat: Pro-Gun Groups and the Governance of Small Arms. In 
Who Governs the Globe?, edited by Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and 
Susan K. Sell, 183–201. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bob, C. 2009. Introduction. The International Struggle for New Human Rights, edited by 
C. Bob. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.  
Bocşe, A. M. 2011. Understanding Transnational Advocacy Networks: How the Political 
Opportunity Structure Impacts. DRC Summer School. 
285 
 
Bolton, M. and T. Nash. 2010. The Role of Middle Power-NGO Coalitions in Global 
Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban. Global Policy 1(2):172-184. 
Bone, A. 2004. Conflict Diamonds: the De Beers Group and the Kimberley Process. In 
Business and Society: Public-Private Sector Relationships in a New Security 
Environment edited by A. J. K. Bailes and I. Frommelt. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Bourbeau, P. 2006. Migration and Security: Securitization Theory and Its Refinement. 
ISA: San Diego. 
Bourne. M. 2001. Conflict Diamonds: Roles, Responsibilities and Responses. Peace 
Studies Working Paper No. 2. Department of Peace Studies, University of 
Bradford.  
Boutwell, J., M. Klare, and L. Reed. 1995. The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. 
Brauch, H.G. 2009. Securitizing Global Environmental Change. In Facing Global 
Environmental Change, edited by H. G. Brauch et al., 65–102. Berlin & 
Heidelberg: Springer 
Brown, L. 1990. The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security. Millennium 19(3):461-476. 
Brown, O., A. Hammill and R. McLeman. 2007. Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security 
Threat: Implications for Africa. International Affairs 83(6): 1141-1154. 
Brysk, A. 1993. From Above and Below: Social Movements, The International System 
and Human Rights in Argentina. Comparative Political Studies 26(3):259-285. 
Brysk, A. 2009. Beyond Framing and Shaming: Human Trafficking and Human Rights. 
Journal of Human Security 5(3):8-21. 
Burgerman, S. 2001. Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Burnstein, P. 2007. Interest Organizations, Information and Policy Innovation. 
Sociological Forum , 22:174-99. 
Busby, J. W. 2007. Bono made Jesse Helms cry: Jubilee 2000, debt relief, and moral 
action in international politics. International Studies Quarterly 51(2):247-275. 
Busby, J. W. 2010. Moral Movements and Foreign Policy. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
286 
 
Buzan, B. 1991. New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. 
International Affairs 67(3): 431-451. 
Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in 
the Post-Cold War Era, London: Lynne Rienner. 
Buzan, B. and O. Waever. 2009. Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: 
Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory. Review of International Studies 
35:253-276. 
Buzan, B., C. Jones and R. Little. 1993. The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural 
Realism. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Buzan, B., M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre, E. Tromer, and O. Wæver. 1990. The European 
Security Order recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era. London: Pinter. 
Buzan, B., O. Waever, and J. Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework of Analysis. 
London: Lynne Rienner. 
CAMMA. Country Scorecards. Available at <http://www.carmma.org/scorecards>. 
Accessed 3 May 2014. 
Campbell-Lendrum, D. and R. Woodruff. 2007. Climate Change: Quantifying the Health 
Impact at National and Local Levels. Environmental Burden of Disease Series, 
No. 14. World Health Organization.  
Cardenas, S. 2004. Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights 
Pressure on State Behavior. International Studies Review 6(2):213-232. 
 CARE. The Right to Health. Available at <http://www.care.org/work/health/maternal-
health>. Accessed 1 May 2014. 
 CARMMA. Why CARMMA?. Available at <http://www.carmma.org/page/why-
carmma>. Accessed 3 May 2014. 
Carpenter, C. 2005. 'Women, Children, and Other Vulnerable Groups': Gender, Strategic 
Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue. International 
Studies Quarterly 49(2):295-334. 
Carpenter, C. 2007 Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and 
Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks. International Studies 
Quarterly 51(1):99-120. 
Carpenter, C. 2010. “Governing the Global Agenda: “Gatekeepers” and “Issue Adoption” 
in Transnational Advocacy Networks.” In Who Governs the Globe?, edited by 
Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, Susan K. Sell. Ithaca. NY: Cambridge 
University Press.  
287 
 
Carpenter, C. 2011. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Networks, Centrality and the Paradox 
of Weapons Norms. International Organization 65(1): 69–102. 
Carpenter, C. 2014. “Lost” Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the 
Shaping of Human Security. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 
Carpenter, C., S. Duygulu, A. H. Montgomery, and A. Rapp. 2014. Explaining the 
Advocacy Agenda: Insights from the Human Security Network, Research Note. 
International Organization, forthcoming. 
Carr, E. H. 1939. The Twenty Years of Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations, London: Macmillan. 
CASE Collective. 2006. Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked 
Manifesto. Security Dialogue 37(4):443-487. 
Cavalcanti, H.B. 2005. Food Security. In Human and Environmental Security: An 
Agenda for Change, edited by F. Dodds and T. Pippard. London: Earthscan. 
Chapkis, W. 2003. Trafficking, Migration, and the Law: Protecting Innocents, Punishing 
Immigrants. Gender and Society 17(6):923-937. 
Charmian, G. 2011. Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, Calls for Diamond Trade 
to be Held Accountable.  Global Witness (5 December). Available at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-
calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable. Accessed 7 February 2013. 
Charrett, C. 2009. A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the 
Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. Institut Català Internacional per la Pau. 
Chatterjee, P., and M. Finger. 1994. The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World 
Development. London: Routledge. 
Checkel, J. 1997. International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-
Constructivist Divide. European Journal of International Relations 3:473-95. 
Checkel, J. 1999. Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 
International Studies Quarterly 43:83-114. 
Chen et al., L. (ed.). 2003. Global Health Challenges for Human Security. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Child Soldiers International. Who are Child Soldiers. Available at <http://www.child-
soldiers.org/about_the_issues.php>. Accessed 23 December 2014. 
Clark, A. M. 1995. Non-Governmental Organizations and Their Influence on 
International Society. Journal of International Affairs 48:507-525. 
288 
 
Clark, A. M., E. J. Friedman and K. Hochstetler. 1998. The Sovereign Limits of Global 
Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on 
the Environment, Human Rights, and Women. World Politics 51(1):1-35. 
Clark, A.M. 2001 Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing 
Human Rights Norms. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Clarke, W. 2008. Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: 
Explaining Success and Failure. Hertie School of Governance Working Papers 
No. 35, Hertie School of Governance.  
Claude, I. L. 1966. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United 
Nations. International Organization 20(3):367-379. 
Cluster Munition Coalition. Treaty Status. Available at 
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-status.aspx>. 
Accessed 7 January 2015.  
CNA, 2007. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. Report from a panel of 
retired senior US military officers. Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation 
CNN. 2014. Ebola is a ‘ National Security Priority,’ Obama Says (8 September). 
Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/07/politics/ebola-national-security-
obama/>. Accessed 10 October 2014. 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Coalition for the ICC. Available at 
http://www.wfm-igp.org/content/coalition-icc>. Accessed 22 May 2014. 
Cohen, R. 1998. Protecting Internally Displaced Women and Children. In Rights Have 
No Borders: Worldwide Internal Displacement edited by W. Davies. Global IDP 
Survey/Norwegian Refugee Council. 
Cohen, R. 2006. Developing and International System for Internally Displaced Persons. 
International Studies Perspectives 7: 87-101. 
Cohen, R., and F. M. Deng. 1998. Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal 
Displacement. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Cohn, C. 2004. Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political 
Transformation?. Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights 
Working Paper No. 204. 
Cohn, I. and G. S. Goodwin-Gill. 1994. Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed 
Conflict. Clarendon Press. 
Collier, D. 1993. The Comparative Method. In Political Science: The State of the 
Discipline, edited by W. Finifter. American Political Science Association.  
289 
 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. 1998. On the Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford 
Economic Papers 50:563-73. 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler.2002. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. CSAE Working 
Paper, WPS 2002-01. 
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler.2005. Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49:625-633.  
Convention on Biological Diversity. Country Profiles. Available at 
<http://www.cbd.int/countries/>. Accessed 24 June 2013. 
Convention on Biological Diversity. History of the Convention. Available at 
<http://www.cbd.int/history/>. Accessed 18 May 2012.)  
Convention on Biological Diversity. Parties to the Protocol and Signature and 
Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol. Available at 
<http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/>. Accessed 18 May 2012. 
Cook, N. 2003. Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation. CRS 
Report for Congress.  
Cook. M. L. 2010. The Advocates’ Dilemma. Framing Migrant Rights in National 
Settings. ILR Collection. Cornell University ILR School.  
Cooley, Alexander and James Ron. 2002. The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity 
and the Political Economy of Transnational Action.  International Security 27(1): 
5-39 
Cooper, A. 2007. Celebrity Diplomacy. Paradigm Publishers: Boulder, Colorado. 
Correll, E. and M. M. Betsill. 2008. Analytical Framework: Assessing the Influence of 
NGO Diplomacy. In NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in International Environmental Regimes, edited by M. M. Betsill 
and E. Correll. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press.  
Corry, O. 2011. Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-Order Security and the Politics 
of Climate Change. Millennium 40(2): 235-258. 
Crogo, A. L. 2003. Unholly Alliance. Rabble.  
Davies, T. R. 2007. The Possibilities of Transnational Activism: The Campaign for 
Disarmament between the Two World Wars. Leiden, the Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
Davis, D. E. 2006. Whither the Quality of Democracy? State Fragmentation, Societal 
Disintegration, and the Unintended Consequences of Police Reform in Mexico. 
Latin American Politics and Society 48(1): 55-86. 
290 
 
Davis, D. R. and A. M. Murdie. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to 
Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. International Studies Quarterly 
56(1):1-16.  
De Waal, A. and R. Omaar. Can Military Intervention be "Humanitarian"?. Middle East 
Report 41:23-38. 
DeMeritt, J. H.R. 2012. International Organizations and Government Killing: Does 
Naming and Shaming Save Lives?. International Interactions 38(5): 597-621. 
Deudney, D. 1991. Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking. Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists 47(3): 22-29. 
Deudney, D. 1990. The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 19(3): 461-76. 
DeWinter, R. 2001. The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate Moral 
Agency in the Global Apparel Industry. Ethics & International Affairs 15(2):99-
115. 
Diamondfacts.org. Conflict Diamonds. Available at 
<http://diamondfacts.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=128
&Itemid=134&lang=en>. Accessed 28 March 2013.   
Dietrich, C. 2002. Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and its Neighbours. The Diamond and Human 
Security Project, Occasional Paper No.4. Partnership Africa Canada.  
Dikshit, P. 1994.  Proliferation of small arms and minor weapons. Strategic Analysis 
17(2): 187-204. 
Dimitrov, R. S. 2006. Science and International Environmental Policy: Regimes and 
Nonregimes in Global Governance. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Dimitrov, R. S., D. F. Sprinz, G. M. DiGuisto and A. Kelle. 2007. International 
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda. International Studies Review 9:230–258. 
Downs, G., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance 
Good News for Cooperation? International Organization 50(3): 379-406. 
Doyle, J. 2007. Picturing the Clima(c)tic: Greenpeace and the Representational Politics of 
Climate Change Communication. Science as Culture 16(2): 129-150. 
Ebertz, E. and M. Müller-Koné. 2013. Legacy of a Resource-Fueled War: The Role of 
Generals in Angola’s Mining Sector. BICC Policy Brief 12. 
291 
 
Eisinger, P. K. 1972. The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. University 
of Wisconsin.  
Elbadawi, I. and N. Sambanis. 2002. How Much War will we See? Explaining the 
Prevalence of Civil War.The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(3): 307-334. 
Elbe, S. 2003. The Strategic Dimensions of HIV/AIDS. International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Elbe, S. 2006. Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 
119-44. 
El-Hinnawi E.1985. Environmental Refugees. United Nations Environmental 
Programme:Nairobi. 
Emmers, R. 2013 Securitization.In Contemporary Security Studies 3
rd
 Edition, edited by 
A. Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Entman, R. M. 1993. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of 
Communication 43(4):51-58. 
Entman, R. M. 2004. Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Eriksson, M., N. L. Gleditsch, P. Wallensteen, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. 
Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 
39(5):615–37. 
Erturk, Y. 2008. Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural, including the right to development. Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences. United 
Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council. 
Evangelista, M. 1999. Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold 
War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Evans-Pritchard, A. 2010. Zimbabwe’s ‘Blood Diamonds’ exposed by Wikileaks Cable. 
The Telegraph (10 December). Available at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/8192700/Zim
babwes-Blood-Diamonds-exposed-by-Wikileaks-cable.html>. Accessed 21 
January 2014.  
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The EITI [Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative] Principles. Available at http://eiti.org/eiti/principles. 
Accessed 25 October 2014. 
292 
 
Farbotko, C.  and H. Lazrus 2012. The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global 
Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu. Global Environmental Change 
22(2):382-390. 
Faul, M. 2003. US Defends Detaining Teens. Associated Press (28 June). 
Fearon, J. D. 2004. Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others? 
Journal of Peace Research 41(3):275–303. 
Ferrari, L. L. 2011. Catholic and Non-Catholic NGOs Fighting HIV/AIDS in Sub-
Saharan Africa Issue Framing and Collaboration. International Relations 25(1): 
85-107. 
Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J. and Rucht, D. 2002. Shaping abortion 
discourse: democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Ferris, E. 2014. Ten Years after Humanitarian Reform: How Have IDPs Fared?. 
Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement (December).  
Ferris. E. 2015. Guest blogger Elizabeth Ferris describes “The Dangers of 
Mainstreaming IDPs Into Oblivion. Available at < http://www.internal-
displacement.org/blog/2015/guest-blogger-elizabeth-ferris-describes-the-dangers-
of-mainstreaming-idps-into-oblivion>. Accessed 3 March 2015.  
Finnemore, M. 1993. International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 
International Organization 47(4):565–597. 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink.1998. International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change. International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study of World Politics 52(4): 887-917 
Fiske, S. and S. E. Taylor. 1991. Social Cognition. McGraw-Hill. 
Florini. A. M. (ed.) 2000. The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. 
Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Florini. A. M. 1999. Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? The Politics of 
Transparency. Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics. 
Floyd. R. 2007. Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together 
the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies. Review of 
International Studies 33:327-350. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office . The Issue. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chairs-summary-global-summit-to-
293 
 
end-sexual-violence-in-conflict/chairs-summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-
violence-in-conflict>. Accessed 29 November 2014. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2014. Policy Paper: Chair’s Summary – Global 
Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (13 June). Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chairs-summary-global-summit-
to-end-sexual-violence-in-conflict/chairs-summary-global-summit-to-end-sexual-
violence-in-conflict>. Accessed 6 September 2014. 
Garcia-Moreno, C. 2014. Responding to Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Lancet 
383(9934):2023-2024. 
Garrett, L. 2005. The Lessons of HIV/AIDS. Foreign Affairs 84(4):51-64. 
Geddes, A. 2000. Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress 
Europe?. Manchester: Manchester University Press 
Gerring, John.2001. Social Science Methodology. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gerring, John.2007.Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gilmore, E. N. P. Gleditsch, P. Lujala, and Jan K. Rød. 2005. Conflict diamonds: A new 
dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 22. 
Glaeser, E. L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2004. Do Institutions 
Cause Growth? NBER Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Glasius, Marlies. 2002. Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil Society Influence 
on the Statute for an International Criminal Court. In Global Civil Society 
Yearbook 2002, edited by Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut K. Anheier, 
137–68. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Gleick, P. H. 1989. The implications of global climatic changes for international security. 
Climatic Change 15(1/2):309-325. 
Global Witness. 1998. A Rough Trade. London: Global Witness.  
Global Witness. 1998. Is the Price of Diamonds too High? How Angola’s Return to War 
Has Been Funded by the International Diamond Trade (14 December). Available 
at < http://www.globalwitness.org/library/price-diamonds-too-high-how-
angola%E2%80%99s-return-war-has-been-funded-international-diamond-trade>. 
Accessed 7 January 2015.  
Global Witness. 20 Years of Impact. Available at 
<http://new.globalwitness.org/20yearsimpact.php>. Accessed 8 January 2015.  
294 
 
Global Witness. 2000. Global Witness: U.S. Congressional Hearing. 
Global Witness. 2000. Why There Should Not Be an Embargo on All Angolan Diamonds 
(25 January). Available at <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/why-there-
should-not-be-embargo-all-angolan-diamonds>. Accessed 3 January 2015.  
Global Witness. 2001. NGOs Fear Conflict Diamond Process May Fail, Industrialized 
Countries Pick and Choose on Terrorism (30 November). Available at < 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/ngos-fear-conflict-diamond-process-may-
fail-industrialized-countries-pick-and-choose>. Accessed 6 January 2015. 
Global Witness. 2002. Time is Running Out: 61 Days for Governments and the Diamond 
Industry to Take Action to Eliminate Trade in Conflict Diamonds (1 November 
2002) Available at <http://www.globalwitness.org/library/time-running-out-61-
days-governments-and-diamond-industry-take-action-eliminate-trade>. Accessed 
6 January 2015. 
Global Witness. 2003. For a Few Dollars More. 
Global Witness. 2005. Annual Report. 
Global Witness. 2006. The Truth about Diamonds: Conflict Development (November).  
Global Witness. 2010. Diamonds, Sierra Leone, a War Criminal And A Supermodel. 
Global Witness. The Kimberley Process. Available at 
<http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-
process>. Accessed 15 March 2013. 
Goodwin, J.  and J. M. Jasper. 1999. Caught in the Winding, Snarling Vine: The 
Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. Sociological Forum. 14:27-54. 
Goose S. D. and F. Smtyh 1994. Arming Genocide in Rwanda. Foreign Affairs 
September/October.  
Gordenker, L, R. A. Coate, C. Johnsson and P. Soderholm. 1995. International 
Cooperation in Response to AIDS. Pinter Pub Ltd.  
Grant, A. and I. Taylor. 2004. Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: the Kimberley 
Process and the Quest for Clean Gems. The Round Table 93(375):385-401. 
Grillot, S. R., C. S. Stapley and M. E. Hanna. 2006. Assessing the Small Arms 
Movement: The Trials and Tribulations of a Transnational Network. 
Contemporary Security Policy. 27(1): 60-84. 
Guardian. 2000. Threat to Sierra Leone Hostages Splits UN (17 May). Available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/17/sierraleone1>. Accessed 15 
March 2013. 
295 
 
Guardian. 2010. Naomi Campbell's 'Blood Diamond' Testimony at War Crimes Trial: 
Live Updates (5 August). Available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/blog/2010/aug/05/naomi-campbell-blood-
diamonds>. Accessed 20 December 2014.  
Haas, P. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. International Organization 46 (1):1-35. 
Haas, P. 2000. Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and 
Comparative Politics. In Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding 
Norms in International Legal System, edited by D. Shelton, 43-64. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Haas, P., S. Andresen and N. Kanie. 2014. Introduction: Actor Configuration and Global 
Environmental Governance. In Improving Global Environmental Governance, 
edited by N. Kanie, S. Andresen and P. Haas. London: Routledge. 
Hadden, J. 2014. Explaining Variation in Transnational Climate Change Activism: The 
Role of Inter-Movement Spillover. Global Environmental Politics 14(2):7-25. 
Hafner-Burton, E. M. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem. International Organization 62(4):689-716. 
Halden, P. 2007. The Geopolitics of Climate Change: Challenges to the International 
System. Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency. 
Hansen L.and H. Nissenbaum. 2009. Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the 
Copenhagen School. International Studies Quarterly 53: 1155-1175. 
Harker, J. 2001. HIV-AIDS and the Security Sector in Africa: A Threat to Canada. 
Commentary No.80. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 
Harris, Paul G. and Patricia D. Siplon. 2007. The Global Politics of AIDS. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Hartmann, B. 2010. Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality 
and the Politics of Policy Discourse. Journal of International Development 
22:233-46. 
Hasenclever, A., P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger. 1997. Theories of International 
Regimes, Cambridge Studies in International Relations; 55. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hathaway, O. A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law 
Journal 111(8):1935-2042. 
Hathaway, O. A. 2007. Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51(4): 588-621. 
296 
 
Hazleton, R. 2002. Have NGOs focused on conflict diamonds and ignored 'diamonds for 
development'?. Partnership Africa Canada.  
Heinecken, L. 2001. HIV/AIDS, the Military and the Impact of National and 
International Security. Society in Transition 32(1):120-7. 
Heineman, E. 2008. The History of Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: Conference 
Report. Radical History Review 101:5-21. 
Henderson, S. 2002. Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental 
Ogranization Sector in Russia. Comparative Policy Studies 136-67. 
Hendrix, C. S. and W. Wong. 2013. When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and 
the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses. British 
Journal of Political Science 43(3):651-672. 
Hernandez, M. B. 2010. Confronting Human Trafficking: Nongovernmental 
Organizations and the U.S Anti-Human Trafficking Approach. Dissertation, Ohio 
State University.  
Hertel, S. 2005. What was all the Shouting about? Strategic Bargaining and Protest at the 
WTO Third Ministerial Meeting. Human Rights Review, 6(3):102–18. 
Hertel, S. 2006. Unexpected Power: Conflict and Change among Transnational Activists. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Herz, J. H. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics. 
2(2): 157-180. 
Higgot, R., G. Underhill, A. Bieler. 2000. Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global 
System. New York: Routledge. 
Hinsliff, G. 2003. Britain Slams the Door on Foreign NHS Cheats. The Observer 
(February 9). 
Homer-Dixon, T. 1991. On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute 
conflict. International Security 16(2): 76-116. 
Homer-Dixon, T. 1994. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from 
Cases. International Security 19(1): 5-40. 
Homer-Dixon, T. 1995. Environmental scarcities, state capacity, and civil violence. 
Bulletin - American Academy of Arts and Sciences 48(7): 25. 
297 
 
Hoogensen, G. and S. V. Rottem. 2005. Gender Identity and the Subject of Security. 
Security Dialogue 35(2): 155-171.;  
Howell, J. and L. Jeremy. 2009. Counter terrorism, aid and civil society. Palgrave 
Macmillan: New York. 
Hubert, D. 2000. The Landmine Ban: a Case Study ın Humanitarian Advocacy. 
Occasional Paper no. 42, Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for 
International Studies. 
Hudson, N. F. 2009. Securitizing Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. Journal of 
Human Rights  8:53–70 
Hudson, N. F. 2010. Gender, Human Security and the United Nations: Security 
Language as a Political Framework for Women. New York: Routledge. 
Hughes, D. M. 2005. The Demand for Victims of Sex Trafficking. Research Reports.  
Huliaras, A. and N. Tzifakis. 2010. Celebrity Activism in International Relations: In 
Search of Framework for Analysis, Global Society 24(2): 255-274. 
Hulme, David. 2007. The Making of the Millennium Development Goals. BWPI Working 
Paper 16 Manchester: Brooks World Poverty Institute. Available at 
http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-1607.pdf. 
(Accessed 5 December 2014) 
Human Rights Watch. 2009. Diamonds in the Rough (June).  
Human Rights Watch. 2012. World Report 2012: Angola.  
Humphreys, D. 2004. Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest 
Negotiations. Global Environmental Politics 4(2): 51-74.  
Humphreys, D. 2006. Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance, 
London: Earthscan. 
Hunt, P. and J. Bueno de Mesquita. 2007. Reducing Maternal Mortality. The contribution 
of the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Human Rights Centre 
University of Essex. 
Huysmans, J. 2004. Minding Exceptions: Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy. 
Contemporary Political Theory 3(3): 321–41. 
Huysmans, J. 2006. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and asylum in the EU. 
London: Routledge. 
IANSA. About Us. Available at < http://www.iansa.org/aboutus>. Accessed 26 February 
2014. 
298 
 
ICTY. About the ICTY. Available at <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>. 
Accessed June 2014.  
Ihlen, O. J. Bartlett and S. May. 2011.Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Communication. In Handbook of Communication and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, edited by O. Ihlen, J. Bartlett and S. May. Oxford: Wiley 
Blackwell.  
ILO. ILO Conventions and Recommendations on Child Labour. Available at 
<http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOconventionsonchildlabour/lang--
en/index.htm>. Accessed 30 November 2014.  
Ingram, A. 2013. After the Exception: HIV/AIDS beyond Salvation and Scarcity. 
Antipode 2(45):436-454. 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. 2007. Annual Report. 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Global Figures. Available at 
<http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>. Accessed 10 March 2015. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines 1997. Brochure. ICBL (April). 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines.  Join the Treaty. Available at 
<http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/finish-the-job/join-the-treaty.aspx>. Accessed 27 
January 2014.   
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Arguments for the Ban.  Available at 
http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/problem/arguments-for-the-ban.aspx. Accessed 16 
February 2014. 
International Campaign to Stop Rape and Gender Violence in Conflict. Campaign Call. 
Available at <http://www.stoprapeinconflict.org/campaign_call>. Accessed 12 
November 2914. 
International Crisis Group. 2001. HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue. Brussels.  
International Crisis Group. 2010. Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive. 
Afirca Briefing No. 69. 
International Organization for Migration. Migration and Climate Change: IOM’s 
Perspective. Available at <http://www.iom.int/cms/envmig>. Accessed 9 June 
2014. 
 Israel Diamond. Naomi Campbell: Diamond Celebrity of the Week. Available at 
http://www.israelidiamond.co.il/english/celebrity-jewelry/naomi-campbell-parker-
celebrity-of-the-week. Accessed 20 December 2014.  
299 
 
Jackson, N. 2006. International Organizations, Security Dichotomies and the Trafficking 
of Persons and Narcotics in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Security Dialogue 
37(3):299-317.  
Jasanoff, S. 1997. NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action. Third World 
Quarterly 18: 579–594. 
Joachim, J. 2003. Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and 
Women’s Rights, International Studies Quarterly 47:247-274. 
Joachim, J. 2007. Agenda Setting, the UN and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive 
Rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Johnson, K., J. Scott, B. Rughita, M. Kisielewski, J. Asher, R. Ong, and L. Lawry. 2010. 
Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations with Physical and 
Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
The Journal of the American Medical Association 304(5):553-562. 
Jones, R. W. 1999. Security, Strategy and Critical Theory. Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Josselin, D.  and W. Wallace. 2001. Non-state Actors in World Politics. New York: 
Palgrave. 
Judge, D. 1993. Predestined to save the earth”: the environment committee of the 
European Parliament. In A Green Dimension for the European Community: 
Political Issues and Processes, edited by D. Judge. London: Frank Cass. 
Kakonen, J. (ed.) 1994. Green Security or Militarized Environment. Aldershot: Darmouth 
Publishing Company. 
Kalin, W. and D. McNamara. 2001. International and National Responses to the Plight of 
IDPs. Forced Migration Review #10. 
Karp, A. 1993. Arming Ethnic Conflict. Arms Control Today 23(7):8-13. 
Karp, A. 1994. The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms. The 
Washington Quarterly 17(4): 65-77. 
Kartha, T. 1993. The Spread of Arms and Instability. Strategic Analysis 16(8):1033–
1050. 
Karyotis, G. and S. Patrikios. 2010. Religion, Securitization and Anti-immigration 
Attitudes: The Case of Greece. Journal of Peace Research 47(1):43-57. 
Karyotis, G. and S. Patrikios. 2010. Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration 
Attitudes: the Case of Greece. Journal of Peace Research 47(1): 43-57. 
300 
 
Keck, M., and Sikkink, K. 1998a. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Keck, M., and Sikkink, K. 1998b. Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement 
Society, In The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century, 
edited by D. S. Meyer and S. G. Tarrow, 217-262.  Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers.  
Keck, M., and Sikkink, K. 1999. Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and 
Regional Politics. International Social Science Journal 159: 89-101. 
Keen, D. 2005. Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey. 
Kempadoo, K. and J. Doezema. 1998. Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and 
Redefinition. Psychology Press.  
Kennan, G. 1985. Morality and Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs 64(2): 205-218. 
Keohane, R. 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies 
Quarterly 32(4): 379-396.  
Khagram, S., J. Riker, and K. Sikkink, eds. 2002. Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 2012. Plenary Comments of KP Civil Society 
Coalition. Opening Speech. KPCS. 
Kimberley Process. About.  Available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about. 
Accessed 30 January 2013. 
Kimberley Process. African Diamond Producers Association. Available at 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/african-diamonds-producers-association-
adpa>. Accessed 2 January 2015.  
Kimberley Process. Diamond Development Initiative. Available at 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/diamond-development-initiative>. 
Accessed 2 January 2015.  
Kimberley Process. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Available at 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about>. Accessed 17 May 2013.  
 Kimberley Process. Kimberley Process. Available at 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/>. Accessed 30 January 2013. 
Kimberley Process. KPCS Core Document. Available at 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document>. Accessed 27 March 
2013. 
301 
 
Ki-moon, B. 2007. A Climate Culprit in Darfur. The Washington Post (June 16). 
Kinney, B. 2011. Securitizing Sex, Bodies and Borders: Feminist Governance, Strategic 
Framing, and the Politics of Rights in Thailand’s War Against Human 
Trafficking. American Sociological Association, 2011 Annual Meeting, Panel, 
Gender and Human Security Presentation. 
Kjellman, K. E.. 2007. 10th Anniversary of the Mine Ban Convention, presented at 
Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the Mine Ban Convention. 
Klare, M. 1994. Awash in Armaments: Implications of the Trade in Light Weapons. 
Harvard International Review 17(1): 24-26, 75-76. 
Knight, G. and J. Greenberg. 2002. Promotionalism and Subpolitics: Nike and its Labor 
Critics. Management Communication Quarterly 15(4):541-570. 
Knight, L. 2008. UNAIDS: The First Ten Years.  
Koblentz, G. D. 2000. Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and 
Responses. International Security 34(4):96-132.  
Krause, Keith. 2002. Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The 
Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Global Governance 8(2):247-263. 
Labonte, R. and M. Gagnon. 2010. Framing Health and Foreign Policy: Lessons for 
Global Health Diplomacy.   
Landman, T. 2003. Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction 2
nd
 
edition. London: Routledge.  
 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Landmine Monitor. Available at < http://the-
monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/Landmine-Monitor>. 
Accessed 28 December 2014.  
Larson, K. 2013. In CAR, Diamonds are a Rebel’s Best Friend. Washington Examiner 
(May 6).  
Lau, R. R. and D. O Sears. 1986. Social Cognition and Political Cognition: The Past, The 
Present, and The Future. Political Cognition 347-366. 
Laurence, E. and R. Stohl. 2002. Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 7. Small Arms 
Survey.  
Le Billion, P. 2001. Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 
1975-2000. African Affairs 100(398): 55-80. 
302 
 
Le Billion, P. 2006. Fatal Transactions: Conflict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist 
Consumer. Antipode 38(4):778-801. 
Le Billion, P. 2008. Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds of Geographies of Resource 
Wars. Annals of Association of American Geographers 98(2): 345-372. 
Le Billion, P. 2009. Building Peace with Conflict Diamonds? Merging Security and 
Development in Sierra Leone. Development and Change 40(4): 693-715.  
Le Billion, P. 2010. Oil and Armed Conflicts in Africa. African Geographical Review 
29(1): 63-90. 
Léonard, S. and C. Kaunert 2011. Developing European Internal Security Policy: After 
the Stockholm Summit and the Lisbon Treaty. London: Routledge. 
Levy, A. V. (ed.) 2003. Diamonds and Conflict: Problems and Solutions. Nova Science 
Pub Inc. 
Levy, M. A. 1995. Is the Environment a National Security Issues. International Security 
20(2): 35-62.  
Lijphart, A. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political 
Science Review. 65(3): 682-693. 
Lipschutz, R.  and Holdren 1990. Crossing Borders: Resources Flow, the Global 
Environment, and International Security. Bulletin of Peace Proposals 21:121–
133. 
Litfin, K. 1999. Constructing Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence. 
Global Governance 5(3):359-78. 
Locher, B. 2007. Trafficking in the European Union. Norms, Advocacy-Networks and 
Policy-Change. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwiessenschaften. 
Lord, Janet. 2009. Reluctant Gate-Crashers Disability Rights. In The International 
Struggle for New Human Rights, edited by Clifford Bob. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press. 
MacFarlane, S. N. and Khong, Y. F. 2006. Human Security and the UN. Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press.  
Machel, G. 1996. The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. A/51/306.Add.1. United 
Nations. 
Maconachie, R. 2009. Diamond Mining, Governance Initiatives and Post-Conflict 
Development in Sierra Leone. BWPI Working Paper 50. 
303 
 
Maconachie,R. and T. Binns.2007. “Farming Miners” or “Mining Farmers”?: Diamond 
Mining and Rural Development in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone. Journal of Rural 
Studies 23:367–80. 
Maertens, L. 2013. A Depoliticized Securitization? The Case of Environmental 
Securitization within the United Nations. Presented at 8
th
 Pan-European 
Conference on International Relations 
Maslen, S. 1998. Practice and Implementation: The Use of Children as Soldiers: The 
Right to Kill and be Killed?. The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
6:445-451. 
Mathews, J. T. 1997.  Power Shift. Foreign Affairs 76(1). 
Mawdsley, E. 2007. The Millennium Challenge Account: neo-liberalism, poverty and 
security'. The Review of International Political Economy. 14(3):487-509. 
Mazey, S. 1998. The European Union and Women’s Rights. From the Europeanisation of 
National Agendas to the Nationalization of a European Agenda?. In Beyond the 
Market: The EU and National Social Policy, edited by D. Hine and H. Kassim. 
London: Routledge. 
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. 1996. Introduction: Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Framing Processes - Toward a Synthetic, Comparative 
Perspective on Social Movements. In Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framing, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. 
McDonald, M. 2008. Securitization and the Construction of Security. European Journal 
of International Relations 14(4):563-587. 
McDonald-Gibson. 2013. The Flawed Diamond Sale: Sanctions Lifted on Gemstones 
from Zimbabwe. The Independent (15 December). Available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-flawed-diamond-sale-
sanctions-lifted-on-gemstones-from-zimbabwe-9006352.html>. Accessed 3 July 
2014. 
McDonnell, M. 2007. The Role of Faith Based Groups in the Campaign to End Modern-
Day Slavery. Monday Developments September.  
McInnes, C. 2006. HIV/AIDS and Security. International Affairs 82(2):315-326. 
McInnes, C. and S. Rushton. 2010.  HIV, AIDS and Security: Where are we 
now?. International Affairs 86(1):225-245. 
304 
 
McVeigh, 2011. Blood diamonds will pay for Robert Mugabe's election terror campaign, 
campaigners warn. The Guardian (17 December). Available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/17/blood-diamonds-robert-
mugabe-zimbabwe>. Accessed 28 April 2014. 
McVeigh, R. 2004. Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social 
Movements. Social Forces 83(2): 653-690. 
Medico International. International Campaign Fatal Transactions. Available at 
<http://www.medico.de/en/themes/campaigns/documents/international-campaign-
fatal-transactions/1133/>. Accessed 18 December 2012. 
Meger, S. 2010. Rape of the Congo: Understanding Sexual Violence in the Conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28(2): 
119-135. 
Merry, S. E. 2006. Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the 
Middle. American Anthropologist 108(1):38-51. 
Mertus, Julie. 2009. Applying the Gatekeeper Model of Human Rights Activism: The 
U.S.-based Movement for LGBT Rights. In The International Struggle for New 
Human Rights, edited by Clifford Bob. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Meyer, D. 1995.Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons 
during the Cold War. Political Communication 12(2): 173–92. 
Meyer, D. 2004. Protest and Political Opportunity. Annual Review of Sociology 30:125-
145. 
Meyer, D. S. and N. Whittier. 1994. Social Movement Spillover. Social Problems 
41(2):277-298. 
Meyer, D., & Whittier, N. 1994. Social movement spillover. Social Problems 41(2):277-
298. 
Miller, B., M. Pournik, A. Swaine. 2014. Women in Peace and Security through United 
Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of 
National Action Plans, and Implementation. Institute for Global and International 
Studies.  
Mills, G. 1994. Small Arms Control: Some Early Thoughts. African Defense Review.  
Miriam, K. 2005. Stopping the Traffic in Women: Power, Agency, and Abolition in 
Feminist Debates over Sex-Trafficking. Journal of Social Philosophy 36(1):1-17. 
Mooney, E. D. 2001. Principles of Protection for Internally Displaced Persons. 
International Migration 38(6):81-101. 
305 
 
Mooney, E. D. 2005. The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for Internally 
Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern. Refugee Survey Quarterly 24:14-6. 
Moravcsik, A. 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe. International Organization 54(2):217-52. 
Morgenthau, H. J. 1948. Politics among nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
New York: 
Muggah, R. 2003. A Tale of Two Solitudes: Comparing Conflict and Development-
induced Internal Displacement and Involuntary Resettlement. International 
Migration 41(5):5-31.  
Muller, H. 1994. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy as Part of the European Union’s 
Common  Foreign and Security Policy, CEPS Working Document No.86. 
Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.  
Myers, N. 1997. Environmental Refugees. Population & Environment 19(2):167-182. 
Nadelmann, E. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society. International Organization 44:479-526. 
Nelaeva, G. Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal in the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY): Dealing with the “War Raging at Hearth of Europe”. 
Romanian Journal of European Affairs 11(1): 100-108. 
Network Movement for Justice and Development. 2007. Annual Report 2007. NMJD.  
Nichols, J. E. 2012. A Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe’s 
Marange Diamond Fields. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 
40(4):648-685. 
Nicolson, G. 2013. Blood Diamond Trail Leads to Loopholes in Kimberley Process. The 
Guardian (5 June). Available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/05/blood-diamonds-kimberley-
process>. Accessed 21 January 2014;  
No Peace without Justice. Ban FGM Campaign. Available at 
<http://www.npwj.org/FGM/BAN-FGM-CAMPAIGN.html>. Accessed 9 
December 2014.  
Nobel Women’s Initiative. 2011. Women Forging a New Security: Ending Sexual 
Violence in Conflict. Conference Report from May 2011 conference in 
Montebello, Canada. 
Nordas, R. and N. P. Gleditsch. 2007. Climate Change and Conflict. Political Geography 
26(6): 627-736. 
306 
 
Oestreich, J. 2007. Power and Principle: Human Rights Programming in International 
Organizations. Washington: Georgetown University Press. 
Office of the US Trade Representative. Fact Sheet: Trade, Illegal Wildlife Trafficking, 
and National Security. Available at <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/fact-sheets/2014/June/Trade-Illegal-Wildlife-Trafficking-and-National-
Security>. Accessed 6 September 2014. 
Olsson, O. 2007. Conflict Diamonds. Journal of Development Economics 82(2): 267-286. 
Orchard, P. 2010. The Perils of Humanitarianism: Refugee and IDP Protection in 
Situations of Regime-induced Displacement. Refugee Survey Quarterly 29(1):38-
60. 
Orogun, P. 2004. Blood diamonds and Africa’s armed conflicts in the post-Cold War era. 
World Affairs 166(3): 151–161. 
Ostergard, R. L. 2002. Politics in the Hot Zone: AIDS and National Security in Africa. 
Third World Quarterly 23(2):333-50. 
PAC. Diamonds, Death and Destruction: A History. Available at 
<http://www.pacweb.org/en/diamonds-death-and-destruction>. Accessed 1 May 
2014.  
 PAC. Publications. Available at <http://www.pacweb.org/en/publications/conflict-
diamonds-publications>. Accessed 17 September 2014. 
Padgett, J. F. and C. K. Ansell 1993. Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici. American 
Journal of Sociology 98(6): 1259-1319. 
Pallas, C. and J. Urpelainen. 2012. NGO Monitoring and the Legitimacy of International 
Cooperation: A Strategic Analysis. Review of International Organizations 7(1):1-
32. 
Parson, E. 2003. Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Partnership Africa Canada. 2000. The Heart of the Matter. By Smillie, Ian, Lansana 
Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton. Ottawa: PAC.  
Partnership Africa Canada. 2001. Other Facets (October). 
Partnership Africa Canada. 2002. Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo and its Neighbours (June). Partnership 
Africa Canada.  
Partnership Africa Canada. 2002. Other Facets (March). 
307 
 
Partnership Africa Canada. 2006. Killing Kimberley? Conflict Diamonds and Paper 
Tigers. 
Partnership Africa Canada. 2009. Zimbabwe Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History. 
Partnership Africa Canada. 2009. Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History. 
Ottawa: PAC.  
Partnership Africa Canada. 2010. Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarized Control of 
Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe. Ottawa: PAC. 
Partnership Africa Canada. Conflict Diamonds Today. Available at 
<http://www.pacweb.org/en/conflict-diamonds-today>. Accessed 14 February 
2013. 
Payne, B. K. 2001. Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled 
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 181-192. 
Peterson, S. 2002. Epidemic Disease and National Security. Security Studies. 12(2):43-
81.  
Pinto, V. C. 2014. Exploring the Interplay between Framing and Securitization Theory: 
the Case of the Arab Spring Protests in Bahrain. Revista Brasileira de Política 
Internacional 57(1):162-176. 
Piot, Peter. 2000. Global AIDS Pandemic: Time to Turn the Tide. Science 288:2176–
2178. 
Podesta, J. and P. Ogden. 2008. Security Implications of Climate Scenario 1: Expected 
Climate Change over the Next Thirty Years. In Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign 
Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change, edited by K. M: 
Campbell. Washington: Brookings Institution Press 
Pollack, M.A. 1997. Representing diffuse interests in EC policy-making. Journal of 
European Public Policy 4(4): 572–90. 
Pratt M, Werchick L: Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo. An Assessment of Programmatic Responses to 
Sexual Violence in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Orientale Provinces. 
Pratt, Nicola. 2013. Reconceptualizing Gender, Reinscribing Racial–Sexual Boundaries 
in International Security: The Case of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
“Women, Peace and Security”. International Studies Quarterly, 57(4):772-783. 
Price, R. 1998. Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land 
Mines. International Organization 52(3):613-44. 
308 
 
Price, R. 2003. Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics. World 
Politics 55(4):579-606. 
Price-Smith, A. 1998. Contagion and Chaos: Infectious Diseases and Its Effects on 
Global Security and Development. Centre for International Studies Working 
Paper 1998/001.  
Price-Smith, A. 2001. The Health of Nations. MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Price-Smith, A. 2002. The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, 
and Their Effects on National Security and Development. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Princen, T. and M. Finger. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Prins, Gwyn. 2004. AIDS and Global Security. International Affairs. 80(5): 931-952 
Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970 The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. 
New York: Wiley-Interscience. 
 Rapaport, M. 2000. Guilt Trip (7 April). Available at 
<http://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?Search=guilt%20trip&ArticleI
D=3830&ArticleTitle=Guilt+Trip>. Accessed 2 January 2015.  
Rapaport, M. 2010. Stop Buying and Selling Blood Diamonds. Rapaport Diamond 
Report February.  
Rappaport, M. 2000. Guilt Trip (7 April). Available at 
<http://www.diamonds.net/News/NewsItem.aspx?Search=guilt%20trip&ArticleI
D=3830&ArticleTitle=Guilt+Trip>. Accessed 2 January 2015.  
Rehn, E. and E. J. Shirleaf. 2002. Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts’ 
Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in 
Peace-Building. In Progress of the World’s Women 2002, Vol. 1. UN Women 
Headquarters.  
Republic of the Maldives Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water. 2006. Report on 
the First Meeting on Protocol on Environmental Refugees: Recognition of 
Environmental Refugees in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. Male, Maldives. 
Risse, T. S. C. Ropp. 1999. International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: 
Conclusion. In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, edited by T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Risse, T., S. Ropp and K. Sikkink. 1999. The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
309 
 
Roe, P. 2008. Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's 
Decision to Invade Iraq. Security Dialogue 39(6):615-635. 
Ron, J., H. Ramos and K. Rodgers. 2005. Transnational Information Politics: NGO 
Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000. International Studies Quarterly 49(3):557-
588.  
Rosenfield, A. and D. Maine. 1985. Maternal Mortality-a Neglected Tragedy: Where is 
the M in MCH? Lancet 13(2), 83–85. 
Ross, Michael 1999. The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics 51: 
297-322. 
Roth, K. 2004. War in Iraq: Not a humanitarian intervention. In World Report 2004. New 
York: Human Rights Watch 
Rushton, S. 2010. Framing AIDS: Securitization, Development-ization, Rights-ization. 
Global Health Governance 4(1): 1-17. 
Rutherford, K. 2000. The Evolvıng Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of 
NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines. World Politics 53(1), 74-114. 
Sabatier, P.A. 1998. The advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for 
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 5(1): 98–130. 
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner. 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 5398. 
Saikia, Y. 2004. Fragmented Memories: Struggling to be Tai-Ahom in India. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.  
Salter, M. B. 2011. When Securitization Fails: The Hard Case of Counter-Terrorism 
Programs. In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve, edited by T. Balzacq, 135-149. London: Routledge. 
Samset I. 2002. Conflict of Interest or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the 
DRC. Review of African Politcial Economy. 29:463–80. 
Sarin, R. 2003. A New Security Threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military. World Watch 
March/April 17-22 
Sasse, G. 2005. Securitization or Securing Risks? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations 
of Policies towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe. JCMC 43(4):673-93.  
Saunders, L. 2000. Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers 
Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds. Fordham International Law 
Journal 24(4): 1402-1476. 
310 
 
Schwartz, P. and D. Randall. 2003. An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its 
Implications for United States National Security. 
Scott, S. V. 2012. The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close 
have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global 
Climate Change Policy? Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 21(3):220-230. 
Sell, S. K. and A. Prakash. 2004. Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest between 
Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights. International 
Studies Quarterly 48(1):143-175.  
Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition. NWSA 17(3): 64-87. 
Shawki, N. 2010. Political Opportunity Structures and the Outcomes of Transnational 
Campaigns: A Comparison of Two Transnational Advocacy Networks. Peace and 
Change 35(3):381-411. 
Shawki, N. 2011. Organizational structure and strength and transnational campaign 
outcomes: a comparison of two transnational advocacy networks. Global 
Networks 11(1):97-111.  
Sheehan, M. 2005. International Security: An Analytical Survey. London: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Shiffman, J. 2006. Donor Funding Priorities for Communicable Disease Control in the 
Developing World.  Health Policy and Planning 21(6): 411-420. 
Shiffman, J. 2007.  Generating Political Priority for Maternal Mortality Reduction in 5 
Developing Countries. American Journal of Public Health 97(5): 796-803. 
Shiffman, J. and S. Smith. 2007. Generation of Political Priority for Global Health 
Initiatives: A Framework and Case Study of Maternal Mortality. The Lancet 370 
(9595): 1370-1379. 
Shiffman, Jeremy. 2009. A Social Explanation for the Rise and Fall of Global Health 
Issues. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87 (8):608–13. 
Short, N. 1999. The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines. 
International Negotiation. 4:481-500. 
Shultz, R., Godson, R., & Greenwood, T. (eds.). 1993. Security Studies for the 1990s. 
New York: Brassey's. 
Sikkink, K. 2002. Human Rights Advocacy Networks and the Social Construction of 
Legal Rules. In Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and 
Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy, edited by Y. Dezalay and B.Garth. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
311 
 
Simmons, B. A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic 
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Simmons, B. A. 2010. Treaty Compliance and Variation. Annual Review of Political 
Science 13:273-96. 
Singer, Peter W. 2002. AIDS and International Security. Survival (44)1:145-158. 
Singer, Peter W. 2004. Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious about Preventing Child Soldiers. 
Cornell International Law Journal 37:561-586. 
Sjostedt, R. 2011. Health Issues and Securitization: The Construction of HIV/AIDS as a 
UN National Security Threat. In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems 
Emerge and Dissolve, edited by T. Balzacq, 170-185. London: Routledge. 
Skodvin, T. and S. Andresen. 2003. Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling 
Commission, 1970-1990. Global Environmental Politics 3(4):61-86. 
Smillie, I. 2002. Dirty Diamonds: Armed Conflict and the Trade in Rough Diamonds. 
Fafo Report no. 377. Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science: Oslo, Norway 
Smillie, I. 2005. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds. 
Comparative Case Study 1, October. Verifor. 
Smillie, I. 2010. Blood on the Stone: Greed, Corruption and War in the Global Diamond 
Trade. Anthem Press.  
Smillie, I. 2011. Diamond Mining in Cote D’ivoire. DDI Publications.  
Smillie, I. and L. Gberie. 2001. Dirty Diamonds and Civil Society. Prepared for the 4th 
CIVICUS World Assembly. Vancouver, B.C., Canada. 
Smillie, I., L. Gberie and R. Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, 
Diamonds & Human Security. 
Smith, D. and J. Vivekananda. 2007. A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate 
Change, Peace and War.  International Alert. London. 
Snow, D. and R. D. Benford. 1988 Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization. In International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure 
to Action Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures edited by B. 
Klandermans and H. Kriesi and S. Tarrow, 197-217. London: JAI. 
Snow, D., & Benford, R. 1988. Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization. International Social Movements Research 1:197-217. 
312 
 
Snow, D., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. 1986. Frame Alignment 
Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation. American 
Sociological Review 51(4):464-81. 
Snow, D.A., and R. D. Benford, R.D. 1992. Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory edited by A.D. Morris and C.M. Mueller, 
C.M. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Snyder, R. 2001. Case Study: The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict. In Human Security and the New Diplomacy, edited by R. McRae 
and D. Hubert. Montreal: McGill University Press. 
Soderlund, G. 2005. Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against  
Solway, J. 2009. Human Rights and NGO “Wrongs”: Conflict Diamonds, Culture Wars 
and the “Bushman Question”. Africa 79(3): 321-346.  
Soroptimist International. Displacement and Natural Disasters. Available at 
<http://www.soroptimistinternational.org/16-days-of-activism-2014/post/745-16-
days---day-six-displacement>. Accessed 12 March 2015.  
Spar, D.L. 2006. Markets: Continuity and Change in the International Diamond Market. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(3): 195-208. 
Sprinz, D. F. 2001. Global Warming /Climate Change Convention. In Encyclopedia of 
International Political Economy, edited by R. J. Barry Jones. London: Routledge. 
Stoddard, A. 2006. Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and Its Impact on US Foreign 
Policy. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Stone, D. 1989. Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science 
Quarterly 104:281-300. 
Stone, D. 2001. Think-tanks, Global Lesson-Drawing and Networking Social Policy 
Ideas, Global Social Policy 1(3):338-360. 
Stone, D. 2006. Reframing the Racial Disparities Issue for State Governments. Journal of 
Health Politics. Policy and Law 31 (1):127–52. 
Strada, G. 1996. The Horror of Land Mines. Scientific American, 42. 
Stritzel, H. 2007. Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.  
European Journal of International Relations 13(3):357-383. 
Sundstrom, L. M. 2005. Foreign Assistance, International Norms, and NGO 
Development: Lessons from the Russian Campaign. International Organization 
59:419-449. 
313 
 
Szasz, A. 1994. Ecopopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Tamm, Ingrid J. 2002. Diamonds in Peace and War: Severing the Conflict Diamond 
Connection. Report Paper for World Peace Foundation: Cambridge. 
Tarrow. S. 1983. Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During 
Cycles of Protest. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Tarrow, S. 1994. Power in Movement. New York. Cambridge University Press.  
Tarrow, S. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tarrow, S. 2010. The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice. 
Comparative Political Science 43(2):230-259.  
Taureck, R. 2006. Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies. Journal of 
International Relations and Development 9(1):53-61. 
Telegraph. Naomi Campbell Admits She was Given Blood Diamonds. Available at 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/liberia/79278
69/Naomi-Campbell-admits-she-was-given-blood-diamonds.html?mobile=basic>. 
Accessed 20 December 2014.  
The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch. 1993. Annual Report. Human Rights Watch.  
The Economist. 2011. Betting on De Beers: Can Anglo American Revive the World’s 
Leading Diamond Miner? (November 2011). Available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21538145. Accessed 25 January 2013. 
The Nansen Initiative. About Us. Available at < http://www.nanseninitiative.org/>. 
Accessed 1 December 2014. 
The Office of Gordon and Sarah Brown. The Maternal Mortality Campaign. Available at 
<http://gordonandsarahbrown.com/2012/03/the-maternal-mortality-campaign/>. 
Accessed 2 May2014. 
Tickner, J. A. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on 
Achieving Global Security. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Tilly, C. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Addison-Wesley.  
Tinker, A. and M. A. Koblinski. 1993. Making Motherhood Safe. World Bank Discussion 
Papers 202.  
Toğral, Burcu. 2012. Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on 
Turkish Migration Practices. Alternatives 11(2): 66-77. 
314 
 
Transparency International. About Us. Available at <www.transparency.org/about_us>. 
Accessed 8 May 2012. 
Trombetta, M. J. 2011. Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, 
New Insights. In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve, edited by T. Balzacq, 135-149. London: Routledge. 
Trombetta, M. J.2008. Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the 
Discourse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 21(4):585-602. 
True-Frost, C. 2007. The Security Council and Norm Consumption. International Law 
and Politics 40:115-127. 
Tryggestad, Torunn L. 2009. ’Trick or Treat? The UN and Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’. Global Governance 
15:539-557. 
Tuchman M. J. 1989. Redefining Security. Foreign Affairs, 68(2):162-177. 
U.S. Department of Defense. 2014. DoD Releases 2014 Climate Change Adaptation 
Roadmap. October 13.  
Ullman, R. 1983. Redefining Security. International Security 8(1):129-153. 
UN. 2014.  Statement by SRSG Zainab Hawa Bangura to the Security Council (17 April). 
Available at <http://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/statement/statement-by-
srsg-zainab-hawa-bangura-to-the-security-council-17-april-2013/>. Accessed 4 
October 2014. 
UN. Background. Available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml>. 
Accessed 2 May 2014. 
UN. Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/poa/>. Accessed 4 September 
2014. 
UN. Communication Campaigns: Avian Influenza and the Pandemic Threat. Available at 
http://www.un-influenza.org/?q=content/communication-campaigns>. Accessed 4 
May 2014. 
UN. Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/aids.shtml>. Accessed 22 December 2012. 
UNEP 2012. Environmental Governance in Sudan. 
UNEP. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Available at 
<http://www.unep.org/maweb/en/index.aspx>. Accessed 24 June 2013. 
315 
 
UNFCC. Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change. 
Available at <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php>. Accessed 9 
June 2014.  
UNHCR. 2007. Handbook for Emergencies, 3
rd
 ed. Geneva, UNHCR. 
UNOCHA. Internal Displacement. Available at < http://www.unocha.org/what-we-
do/advocacy/thematic-campaigns/internal-displacement/overview>. Accessed 26 
February 2015.  
UNOCHA. Internal Displacement. Available at <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-
do/advocacy/thematic-campaigns/internal-displacement/overview>. Accessed 26 
February 2015.  
US Human Rights Network. Hold the U.S. Accountable: IDP Human Rights Campaign. 
Available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/our-work/campaign/hold-us-
accountable-idp-human-rights-campaign. Accessed 20 December 2014.) 
Vaguhn, J. 2009. The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian Organizations and the 
Securitization of Indistinctiveness. Security Dialogue 40(3): 264-285. 
Valocchi, S. 1996. The Emergence of the Integrationist Ideology in the Civil Rights 
Movement. Social Problems 43 (1): 116-130. 
Vieira, M. A. 2007. The Securitization of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic as a Norm: A 
Contribution to Constructivist Scholarship on the Emergence and Diffusion of 
International Norms. Brazilian Political Science Review 1(2):137-81. 
Voeten, E. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to 
Legitimize the Use of Force. International Organization 59(3):527-557. 
von Stein, J. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty 
Compliance. American Political Science Review 99(4): 611-622. 
Vultee, F. 2011. Securitization as a Media Frame: What Happens When the Media 'Speak 
Security'. In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve 
edited by T. Balzacq, 77-93. London: Routledge. 
Waever, O. 1995. Securitization and Desecuritization. In On Security edited by R. 
Lipschutz, 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wæver, O. 2004. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and 
their Origins between Core and Periphery.  Paper presented at International 
Studies Association Conference . Montreal, 17-20 March. 
Wæver, O., B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup and P. Lemaitre. (1993). Identity, Migration and the 
New Security Agenda in Europe. London: Pinter. 
316 
 
Waever, O., E. Jahn and P. Lemaitre. 1987. Copenhagen Articles 1: European Security — 
Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace 
and Conflict Research. 
Wæver, O., P. Lemaitre, and E. Tromer, (ed.) (1989). European Polyphony Perspectives 
Beyond East–West Confrontation, London: Macmillan. 
Walby, K. and J. Monaghan 2011. Haitian Paradox’ or Dark Side of the Security-
Development Nexus? Canada’s Role in the Securitization of Haiti, 2004-2009. 
Alternatives 36(4).  
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics, London, New York: MacGraw-Hill, 
Inc. 
Warkentin C. and K. Mingst. 2000. International Institutions, the State, and Global Civil 
Society in the Age of the World Wide Web. Global Governance 6(2):237-257. 
Watson, S. D. 2009. The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration. London: Routledge. 
Watson, S. D. 2011. The Human as Referent Object. Security Dialogue 42(1):3-20. 
Watson, S. D. 2012. “Framing” the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on 
Threat Construction. Millennium 40(2):279-301. 
WBGU. 2007. World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk. Summary for 
Policy Makers. German Advisory Council on Global Change.  
WBGU. 2008. Future Bioenergy and Sustainable Land Use. German Advisory Council 
on Global Change. 
Weiss, T. and D. A. Korn. 2006. Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and Its 
Consequences. London and New York: Routledge.  
Weitzer, R. 2007. The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and  
Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade. Politics & Society 35(3): 447-475.  
Weldon, R. 2001. Diamonds for Good. Professional Jeweler January.  
Wexler, L. 2003. The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and 
Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine 
Treaty. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 20(3):561-606. 
Wexler, L. 2010. Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the 
Blood Diamond Regime. Cardozo Law Review 31(5):1717-1780. 
Wheeler, N. 2004. The humanitarian responsibilities of sovereignty: Explaining the 
development of a new norm of military intervention for humanitarian purposes in 
317 
 
international society. In Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, 
edited by J. Welsh. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
White Ribbon Alliance. Why Support Us. Available at 
<http://whiteribbonalliance.org/why-mothers/>. Accessed 1 May 2014.  
WHO. 2010. The Top 10 Causes of Death.  Available at 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/index.html>. Accessed 24 
January 2013.    
Willett, S. 2010. Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact 
on Women, Peace and Security. International Peacekeeping. 17(2):142-158. 
Willetts, Peter. 1996. The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the UN System. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 
Williams, M. and L. Ford. 1999. The World Trade Organization: Social Movements and 
Global Environmental Management. Environmental Politics 8:268-89. 
Williams, M. C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. 
International Studies Quarterly 47:511-531. 
Williams, P. D. (ed.) 2008. Security Studies: An Introduction. Oxon: Routledge. 
Wolfers, A. 1962. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press 
Women Peace and Security. About Us. Available at 
<http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/>. Accessed 27 October 2014. 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Gender, Peace and Security. 
Available at <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/what-we-do/gender-peace-and-
security/>. Accessed 1 February 2015. 
Wong, W. 2012. Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Wong, W. and C. S. Hendrix. 2014. Knowing Your Audience: How the Structure of 
International Relations and Organizational Choices Affect Amnesty 
International’s Advocacy. The Review of International Organizations 9(1):29-
58. 
Woods, N. 2005. The Shifting Politics of International Aid. International Affairs. 
81(2):393-409. 
Woods, N. 2006. The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
318 
 
World Federalist Movement. Coalition for the ICC. Available at <http://www.wfm-
igp.org/content/coalition-icc>. Accessed 22 May 2014. 
Wright, C. 2004. Tackling Conflict Diamonds: the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme. International Peacekeeping 11(4): 697-708.  
WWF. Illegal Wildlife Trade Threatens National Security, Says WWF Report. Available 
at <http://wwf.panda.org/?207054/Illegal-wildlife-trade-threatens-national-
security-says-WWF-report>. Accessed 6 September 2014. 
Yanacopulos, H. 2005. The Strategies that Bind: NGO Coalitions and Their Influence. 
Global Networks 5(1): 93-110.  
Yeager, R. and S. Kingma. 2001. HIV/AIDS: Destabilising National Security and the 
Multi-National Response. International Review of the Armed Forces Medical 
Services 74:1–3. 
Zald, M. N. 1996. Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing. In Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framing, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zhouri, A. 2000. Transnational Campaigns for the Amazon: NGO Strategies, Trade and 
Official Responses. Ambiente & Sociedade 6(1): 31-63. 
 
 
 
 
